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While in common English-language parlance speaking of “online celebrities” encourages the conflation of new forms of famousness with existing discourses on mass media stardom and fandom, the Mandarin Chinese term wanghong, a shorthand term for wangluo hongren (literally “person popular on the internet”), frames the enticing shores of online celebrity through the peculiar lexical domain of a grassroots popularity. The figure of the wanghong has in recent years accompanied the development of social media platforms in China, becoming a profitable profession, an inspirational role model, a morally condemnable by-product of internet economies, and in general a widely debated social phenomenon among local users. Drawing on interviews with more and less successful local online celebrities and discussions with their audiences, this chapter offers an up-to-date portrayal of the various forms of wanghong currently vying for attention on Chinese social media platforms, illustrating how popularity is crafted along with narratives of professionalism and economic aspirations intimately connected to the sociotechnical contexts of contemporary China.

This paper studies how a firm reacts to the threat from product market competition. Consistent with the strategic equilibrium model, we find that a firm increases investment in response to external product market threats. Further, the paper analyzes whether product market threats lead to an improvement in investment efficiency. When faced with product market competition, we find that firms that are otherwise likely to underinvest (overinvest) increase (increase) their investment significantly (less than the firms that are likely to underinvest) in the next period. However, firms that are predisposed to overinvest do not make cuts in capital expenditure, which indicates that strategic investment is a critical countermeasure for addressing competitive threats for all firms, their inclination to make suboptimal investment decisions notwithstanding. Overall, the evidence supports the predatory risk of waiting as well as competition and investment efficiency hypotheses. Additional tests suggest that product market threat partially substitutes for other external monitoring mechanisms designed to manage agency problems.