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In M&A markets, acquirers face a hold-up problem of losing the value of investments they make in due diligence, negotiations, and post-acquisition planning if targets would pursue the options of waiting for better offers or selling to an alternative bidder. This chapter extends information economics to the literature on M&A contracting by arguing that such contracting problems are more likely to occur for targets with better outside options created by the information available on their resources and prospects. We also argue that acquirers address these contracting problems by using termination payment provisions to safeguard their investments. While previous research in corporate strategy and finance has suggested that certain factors can facilitate an acquisition by reducing a focal acquirer’s risk of adverse selection (e.g., signals, certifications), we note that these same factors can make the target attractive to other potential bidders and can exacerbate the risk of hold-up, thereby leading acquirers to use termination payment provisions as contractual safeguards.

For many exporting firms, success in foreign markets hinges to a large extent on the performance of their foreign intermediaries (Albaum, Strandskov, & Duerr, 2002; Ellis, 2000; Root, 1987). In spite of the key role played by intermediaries in foreign markets – i.e. sales agents and independent distributors (Solberg & Nes, 2002) – exporters often regard them as temporary arrangements and second-best alternatives to conducting foreign marketing, sales, and service activities in-house. The typical assumption is that foreign intermediaries are low-control entry modes (Hill, 2003; Root, 1987) that do not have the potential of exploiting the full sales potential of export markets. In other words, foreign intermediary arrangements could have inherent limitations that foster mediocre rather than excellent market performance. Several studies report that exporters generally distrust foreign intermediaries and suspect them of shirking at any given occasion (Beeth, 1990; Nicholas, 1986; Petersen, Benito, & Pedersen, 2000). Poor performance is sometimes expected. On the other hand, foreign intermediaries often find that exporters put in place incentive structures that do not induce them to achieve excellent performance. Hence, it is asserted that foreign intermediaries may deliberately seek mediocrity rather than very poor or outstanding performance.

This paper aims to study the impact of human resource heterogeneity on firms’ cash-holding policies.

The authors construct a proxy for human resource heterogeneity using the dissimilarity in employees’ skill structure between the firm and its peers in the same industry.

The authors report evidence that firms with heterogeneous human resources hold more cash than other firms. This effect is more pronounced in labor-intensive firms and firms more susceptible to hold-up by employees, i.e. firms located in regions with more labor disputes and firms surrounded by more external employment opportunities. In addition, the authors demonstrate that high cash holdings triggered by human resource heterogeneity reduce the scale and efficiency of firms’ capital investment.

This study highlights the role of human resource heterogeneity in determining firms’ cash policies. This paper adds to the understanding of labor adjustment costs within the firm and provides insights into firms’ cash-holding decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate the potential welfare effects of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) international operations.

The paper is conceptual, applying standard economics state ownership theory based on agency theory and incomplete contracts theory to different forms of SOE cross-border operations.

When private firms are risk averse or financially constrained, or when writing complete contracts and making credible commitments are not possible, state ownership can achieve objectives such as international operations supporting domestic industrial policy, addressing social objectives in another government’s territory and addressing transnational market failures. Welfare effects may, however, also depend on home-host country relationships.

This is the first application of standard economics state ownership theory to state-owned multinationals. The analysis shows that key conclusions from the state ownership literature in a domestic setting can be extended to international operations, and highlights new theoretical issues arising from SOEs going beyond their home jurisdiction to that of another government.

Policy reforms to primary health care delivery in New Zealand required government-funded firms overseeing care delivery to be constituted as nonprofit entities with governance shared between consumers and producers. This paper examines the consumer and producer interests in these firmsʼ allocation of ownership and control utilising theories of competition. Consistent with pre-reform patterns of ownership and control, provider interests appear to have exerted effective control over these entitiesʼ formation and governance in all but a few cases where community (consumer) control pre-existed. Their ability to do so is implied from the absence of a defined ownership stake and the changes to incentives facing the different stakeholding groups. It appears that the pre-existing patterns will prevail and further intervention will be required if policy-makers are to achieve their underlying aims.

This chapter opens the second part of the Volume, focusing on the small farms' role and dynamics within the evolving food system. Assessing small farmers' actual and potential contribution to the change towards a sustainable food and nutrition security requires a deep understanding of their strategic decision-making processes. These processes take place in a context highly conditioned by internal and external conditions, including the complex relations between farm and household, which are mapped and described. Building on an adaptation of Porter's model (Porter, 1990), the chapter investigates how farmers, given those conditions, define their strategies (in particular their innovation strategies) aimed at economic and financial sustainability through a multidisciplinary analysis of scientific literature. Internal conditions are identified in the light of the Agricultural Household Model (Singh & Subramanian, 1986) which emphasizes how family farming strategies aim at combining business-related objectives, and family welfare. Then, a comprehensive set of external conditions is identified and then grouped within eight categories: ‘Factors’, ‘Demand’, ‘Finance and Risk’, ‘Regulation and Policy’, ‘Technological’, ‘Ecological’, ‘Socio-institutional’ and ‘Socio-demographic’. Similarly, six types of strategies are identified: ‘Agro-industrial competitiveness’, ‘Blurring farm borders’, ‘Rural development’, ‘Risk management’, ‘Political support’ and ‘Coping with farming decline’.

The German wine law has been made responsible as one of the reasons for the critical market position of German wines inside and outside Germany. As a consequence, a new wine law (the profile wine concept) has been introduced in year 2000. As consumers are increasingly looking for variety and change the wine denomination becomes a critical purchasing criterion beside bottle and brand design. The main function of a wine law is to reduce the perceived purchasing uncertainty of consumers. We analyse the factors that determine the degree of consumer uncertainty when buying wine. This uncertainty can be reduced by the information economics mechanism of signalling. We derive signalling requirements that an efficient wine law should fulfill. Subsequently we analyse how the former German wine law and the new profile wine concept comply with these requirements by analysing their effects on three distinctive consumer groups within the concept of the triangle of goods characteristics. We conclude by opposing governmental regulation on the wine market with possible self regulation possibilities within the industry.

Previous studies have argued that trust and commitment can create value in cooperative relationships. However, this study observed that, in practice, trust and commitment alone may not ensure value creation in asymmetric relationships. Accordingly, this study aims to investigate the mediating role of specific assets in the effects of trust and commitment on value creation in asymmetric buyer–seller relationships.

Contract manufacturers (CMs) in Asia were sampled to validate the argument proposed by this study. Most Taiwanese CMs are partnered with international brands (original equipment manufacturers [OEMs]) that have stronger bargaining power. This cooperative relationship is characteristically asymmetric. A questionnaire method was applied, and structural equation modeling was performed to verify the proposed hypotheses.

Specific asset investment (SAI) was a crucial mediator that explained the effects of trust and commitment on the relationship value of an asymmetric cooperative relationship. Past studies have claimed that power asymmetry results in an unequal distribution of benefits. Nevertheless, regarding the relationship between CMs and OEMs, the study revealed that relationship value could still be increased once the congruent goals have been achieved by both parties. This finding contradicts past theoretical predictions.

Characteristically asymmetric CMs–OEMs (seller–buyer) relationships cannot be maintained merely through trust and commitment, particularly in the context of power and resource imbalances in which the stronger party often possesses a wider selection of prospective partners. The results of this study suggested that the CM should unilaterally invest in specific assets conducive to a cooperative relationship as an expression of faith in the relationship with the stronger firm, thereby creating opportunities for value cocreation.

The analysis of the relevance of relationship quality in the context of asymmetric cooperative relationships confirmed the mediating influences of SAI on ensuring value creation and the maintenance of the relationships. Relationship value could still be created despite the highly asymmetry power relationship. The CMs’ SAI is the key mechanism for this achievement.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how various transaction-cost characteristics influence the choice of vertical coordination (VC) structures (e.g. different contract types) and horizontal coordination (HC) structures (e.g. different farmer organization types) to link smallholder farmers efficiently with buyers. It analyzes the relationship between vertical and horizontal structures, and the economic sustainability of different structure combinations.

The paper develops a conceptual framework to predict coordination structures as a function of transaction-cost characteristics, compares predictions for the Malian cereals market to empirical evidence using 15 case studies, and then analyzes structure combinations.

Asymmetric scale between farmers and buyers; uncertainty in production, prices, policy, and contract enforcement; and quality and quantity debasement lead to selections of structures with high levels of control. Vertical and horizontal structures demonstrate a complementary relationship in certain core coordination roles, while exhibiting substitutability in the provision of other coordination activities. The marketing cooperative and marketing contract pairing is the most prevalent combination.

The conceptual framework is useful for explaining the selection of coordination structures, and can be applied in other contexts to strengthen external validity.

The framework facilitates predictions and explanation of both VC and HC structures, with empirical application on a country and value chains receiving little attention in the literature.

This paper explores firms’ strategic options when their investments are subject to the threat of government expropriation. I develop a simple hold-up model of political risk. In the model, a firm decides whether to invest and then the government decides whether to expropriate the firm’s investment or to simply collect normal taxes on its profits. The government is motivated by revenue and a wide range of nonpecuniary factors: its reputation, electoral pressures, patronage opportunities, and pressure from external actors. In the model, the likelihood of expropriation depends on several factors: the firm’s profits, the amount of taxes it pays, the government’s ability to operate the firm’s assets, and the government’s political incentives. Effective management of political risk requires an integrated strategy, consisting not only of public and government relations efforts, but also financial, value chain, and human resources strategies designed to reduce the government’s incentives for expropriation.