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Debt, dividend and investment policy constitutes a company's important financial decisions to determine firm performance. The research emphasizes on the problem of overinvestment, a phenomenon that worsens firm operation. Furthermore, it clarifies the moderation role of debt and dividend policy in mitigating the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance in the case of Vietnamese listed companies.

The research uses all financial statement of non-financial Vietnamese listed companies on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchange in the period of 2008–2018. The data are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The final data set is comprised of 669 listed companies. The study measures overinvestment though investment demand function and HP filter. Moreover, the research employs the dynamic model, so it has to apply the SGMM method to deal with the problem of endogeneity caused by the lagged dependent variable.

The research finds that overinvestment is negatively associated with firm performance. Debt or dividend policy separately can moderate the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance. However, when these two policies are combined, they lessen the positive interaction impact of each policy due to the substitution between debt and dividend policy.

The research may have two limitations. Firstly, the research measures overinvestment indirectly through investment demand function and HP filter. These two measures only help identify the sign that companies may have the problem of overinvestment because we cannot determine whether they overinvest or not in reality. Secondly, when using interaction variables, the problem of multicollinearity may be higher, and this may adjust the signs and significance level of variables in the models.

Practically, the research proposes three policy recommendations. Firstly, a company can exploit debt or dividend policy to limit excessive free cash flow in order to constrain the problem of overinvestment. Secondly, a company should enhance its corporate governance to resolve agency problems. Thirdly, the government should make the financial sector more transparent and effective to improve monitoring functions of various parties in the capital market.

Overinvestment sometimes can cause social issues. Overinvestment means that companies make ineffective investment. If they continue this situation over a long time, companies may have financial distress or even go bankruptcy. As a result, it will slow down economic growth and increase unemployment in the economy.

The research is supposed to make two great contributions to the existing empirical studies in two aspects. Firstly, it is the first attempt to take into consideration the interaction between overinvestment and financial policies. Secondly, it helps enhance the fundamental stance of the agency theory, which supports the interdependence of debt, dividend and investment policy.

Single-party regimes increasingly use Subnational Performance Assessments (SPAs) – rankings of provinces and districts – to improve governance outcomes. SPAs assemble and publicize information on local government performance to facilitate monitoring and generate competition among officials. However, the evidence are sparse on their effects in this context. The authors argue that built-in incentive structures in centralized single-party regimes distort the positive impact of SPAs.

The staggered rollout of the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) created a natural experiment. Due to 2010 budget constraints, the first iteration of the PAPI survey covered only 30 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces before covering all in 2011. The PAPI team used matching procedures to identify a statistical twin for each province before randomly selecting one from each pair. The authors use randomization inference to compare the outcomes of these control and treatment groups in 2011.

Exposure to PAPI helped improve almost all aspects of governance; however, significant evidence of prioritization bias exist. The positive effects only persisted for the dimension of administrative procedures, which was the one area of governance that was prioritized by the central government at the time. Other dimensions only registered short-term effects.

Our study provides an examination of the impact of SPAs in a single-party regime context. In addition, the authors leverage the natural experiment to identify information effects causally. The authors also look past short-term effects to compare outcomes for five years after the treatment occurred.

This research examines the relationship between market power and liquidity creation in the specific context of bank profitability in the Vietnamese banking sector.

The study applies the methodology proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) to demonstrate the creation of bank liquidity through a three-step procedure for investigating the relationship between market power and liquidity creation. The three steps include non-fat liquidity (NFLC), fat liquidity (FLC) and system generalized method of moments estimation for panel data.

This study finds that liquidity creation increases when a bank has high market power. Further, highly profitable banks positively impact the market power of banks with regard to liquidity creation, relative to less profitable banks. Moreover, bank size, capital, economic growth and interest rate negatively influence bank liquidity creation, while credit risk positively relates to bank liquidity creation.

Measurements used in this study are based on the works of Berger and Bouwman (2009). There are specific variations, relative to Basel III. In addition, other variables significantly impact bank liquidity creation that have not been considered in the models, and a quadratic model should have been considered to measure market power and bank liquidity creation.

This study suggests that managers should control the liquidity of their banks by supervising vulnerable characteristics that have been mentioned herein and emphasizing improvements in profitability. Further, the government may consider encouraging banks to generate more liquidity by modifying regulations concerned with market power or reinforcing policies about improving the transparent business environment.

This study characterizes an attempt to examine the influence of market power on the liquidity creation of banks in Vietnam, which represents one of the most dynamic systems in Asia, with several varied participating banks. The current study also examines the same within the specific context of the modifying impact of the profitability of banks.