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Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country’s non-Islamist parties are still included in the political game. After significant alterations in their political sphere by mid-2013 at the advent of the Muslim Brother exclusion and the subsequent discrediting of Salafi al-Nour party, non-Islamist parties took clear part in the mobilization for presidential elections (2014, 2018) and competed for legislative seats in 2015. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect them to turn into long-term key political players with clear-cut ideological postures, unique platforms and strong grass root mobilization. With the exception of the electoral gains scored by numbered parties like Free Egyptians’ party and Nation’s Future in 2015 legislative elections, these parties seem to be lagging behind esp. in terms of their popular base; who became winners at the advent of the radical exclusion of the MB from July 2013 onwards.

This paper is based on archival research and guided by basic assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, mainly game-theoretic versions of the approach. It is divided into four sections, three of them are chronological and the last one is thematic.

Egypt’s non-Islamists engaged in the post-2011 political sphere, with strong Islamist rivals crippling their political chances in the first two years following the 2011 uprising. They surely capitalized on the exclusion and discrediting of the latter, but they suffered lack of ideological clarity and fragmentation from 2011 onwards with no enough evidence these weaknesses were surpassed after Islamists were “out of their way”. The only strand of non-Islamist parties which came out as “game winners” were those possessing the resources and enjoying overt “friendly” relations with al-Sisi regime. Nonetheless, internal conflicts inside key secularist parties shed light on their capacity to turn into long-term players in Egypt’s political sphere.

Very few papers were published on Egypt’s secularists parties after the 2011 uprising from the perspective of the alteration that occurred in their political environment affecting their political weight and gains. More generally, literature on non-ruling parties in authoritarian contexts mostly reduce these parties to secondary roles allocated by ruling regimes. The paper seeks to overcome both shortages.

This study aims to examine the moderator effect of religiosity on the relationship between halal brand awareness and habit towards purchasing decisions of halal products.

The quantitative method is used in this study. Descriptive and statistical (multiple and moderated regression) analyses are employed to test the hypothesis according to the research model. The data is collected using a cross-sectional design from 197 respondents consisting of business owners in North Sumatera, Indonesia.

It is found that both halal brand awareness and habit have a positive and significant effect on the purchasing decision of halal products. Meanwhile, religiosity significantly acts as a moderating variable in the relationship between awareness and purchasing decisions, as well as habit and purchasing decisions.

This study revealed the important factor of religiosity as a moderating factor in purchase decisions of halal products. The government may need to collaborate with Islamic educational institutions to raise awareness of the halal concept and product awareness. It is assumed that individuals who know about the Islamic religion will have a higher degree of awareness of halal products compared to individuals with limited knowledge of Islam; thus, providers of Islamic education play a crucial role in raising the level of awareness of halal products. Schools may serve as catalysts for the dissemination of knowledge of halal products.

Developing halal product markets can be done by enhancing the religiosity level of consumers, one of them through attending formal or informal religious classes.