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On September 29, 2003, the staff (“Staff”) of the Division of Investment Management of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) issued a report to the SEC entitled the “Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds” (the “Report”). The Report recommends amending Rule 203(b)(3)‐1 of the Advisers Act to require a hedge fund manager to “look through” each existing client and count each of the hedge fund’s underlying beneficial owners as a “client” of the hedge fund manager for the purpose of determining whether an investment adviser has 15 or more clients and therefore must register under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Such a registration requirement effectively would increase the minimum investment requirement for a hedge fund. The Report does not necessarily support the argument that subjecting hedge funds to periodic examinations by the SEC will help in early detection of fraud and prevention of resulting investor losses. Despite the Staff’s intentions to identify distinctions between customary hedge fund vehicles and other types of investment funds, no clear hedge fund definition or standard was provided in the Report. As a result, there is a danger that the scope of new hedge fund regulations will be too broad

The growth of the use of hedge funds in both the USA and in Europe has led to greater attempts to regulate the market. The authors provide a guide to the way regulations are likely to be imposed and the differences which may occur in the USA and European markets as a result.

Hedge fund replication gained considerable attention during the period surrounding 2007 when it was anticipated to become for hedge fund investors what index funds are for equity investors. The hedge fund replication concept only lacked a track record. This paper aims to present an updated evaluation.

Performance is evaluated on both a raw‐return basis and a risk‐adjusted basis using Fung and Hsieh's 8‐factor model. Particular emphasis is given to analyzing the performance of these products during the financial crisis and to highlighting the specific characteristics that distinguished them from their hedge fund cousins during this period.

The results show that the hedge fund replication space is definitely proving its existence as a credible hedge fund investment alternative. Talented hedge fund managers will always be in high demand, but they may have to just prove their high compensation a bit harder.

Although this study is based on a short sample period, the results indicate that hedge fund replication products delivered returns that were at par with the returns of hedge funds. The replication products performed comparatively well during the crisis probably as a result of having less exposure to illiquid assets.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this article uses the most extensive data set of 22 hedge fund replication products to analyze their performance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine in which ways hedge funds contribute to financialization.

Two already identified conduits through which financialization operates are applied to hedge funds.

The paper finds that hedge funds drive the phenomenon of financialization in two major ways, i.e. the financialization of corporations, and the financialization of markets. Hence, hedge funds can be conceived as agents of change for financialization.

There are indications that hedge funds possess disciplinary power. Future research should address this pivotal point, even though such power will be difficult to prove empirically.

Hedge funds have been found to potentially increase market volatility. In times of crisis, stricter regulation of these investors that take excessive risks seems prudent.

Through linking “hedge funds” with “financialization” this paper closes a research gap. In addition, the so far rather structural debate about financialization benefits from the actor-centered approach of this paper.

The purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.

The paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.

The five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.

This is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.

This paper aims to help explain the rapid growth in aggregate hedge fund assets under management until June 2008 followed by their subsequent dramatic collapse in terms of the conflicting emotions such investment vehicles evoke, and, from this, to consider the implications of the excitement‐generating potential underlying all financial innovations.

Within the framework of critical discourse analysis, this paper explores how hedge funds were represented in the financial press, manager interviews, investor comments, and Congress hearings, before and after the burst of the hedge fund “bubble”. The authors then draw on the psychodynamic literature, and frame the human unconscious need for excitement in this discourse.

The paper finds evidence demonstrating how hedge funds were transformed in the minds of investors into objects of fascination and desire with their unconscious representation dominating their original investment purpose. Based on a psychoanalytic interpretation of financial markets, and dot.com mania in particular, the authors show how hedge fund investors' search for “phantastic objects” and the associated excitement of being invested in them can become dominant, resulting in risk being ignored.

The authors take an interdisciplinary perspective drawing on the insights of the psychoanalytic understanding of unconscious fantasies, needs and drives as these relate to investment activity.

Public policy implications are that stricter ethical guidelines for the hedge fund industry need to be introduced, and suitability regulations that go beyond mandatory transparent disclosure of investment risks are required.

The paper is one of very few studies concerning investors' emotional attachment to financial innovations, and builds on the emerging field of emotional finance. The conclusions and implications discussed in the paper go beyond any single financial market or product.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the “market-neutral” characteristics of the market-neutral strategy hedge funds in Chinese A-share market.

The analyses in the paper are conducted to study the market-neutral characteristics by means of index analysis, correlation analysis, β-neutral analysis and the three-factor model analysis.

The results show that the performance advantage of the market-neutral strategy hedge funds is obvious. Most market-neutral strategy funds are exposed to market risks and the α strategy funds also have obvious style factor exposure; strictly speaking, all of the market-neutral strategies have not reached the “market-neutral” requirements. This paper also finds that Chinese trading restrictions on stock index futures in September 2015 have a significant impact on Chinese market-neutral strategy hedge funds.

The conclusion of this paper has a certain reference value for understanding the risk characteristics and possible problems of hedge funds in emerging markets, and also has important reference value for investors.

The current financial crisis revealed weaknesses in the US financial system, including the difficulty of valuing complex assets. This paper seeks to examine regulatory and compliance issues for hedge funds valuing complex assets.

Within the context of hedge fund valuation, the paper provides a general overview of: the regulatory background of hedge funds and the central role valuation plays in the operation and regulation of such funds; relevant cases brought by the SEC; and a discussion of valuation best practices.

Hedge funds are not “unregulated.” There is a body of law and accounting standards that applies to hedge fund valuation. Nevertheless, hedge fund valuation standards are evolving in this era of heightened regulatory scrutiny. The common concepts that have emerged from valuation best practices will likely provide the underpinning for any regulatory initiatives regarding hedge fund valuation.

By the time of publication, Congress may pass pending legislation governing hedge funds and there may be additional notable SEC cases on hedge fund valuation.

The economic crisis has revitalized the SEC's interest in this area. Consequently, hedge funds should consider adoption of a compliance program that specifically targets valuation by stressing investor disclosure, independence of the valuation function, comprehensive written valuation polices and procedures, and internal controls.

The paper compiles and organizes in one place the regulatory and compliance standards governing asset valuation by hedge funds.

The demand for Saudi Arabian real (SAR) is very high in the pilgrimage (hajj) season while the authority, unfortunately, does not hedge the hajj funds. As such, the hajj funds are potentially exposed to exchange rate risk, which can impact the value of hajj funds and generate extra cost to the pilgrims. The purpose of this paper is to conduct simulations of Islamic hedging for pilgrimage funds to: mitigate and minimize exchange rate risk, identify and recommend the ideal time, amount and tenors of Islamic hedging for hajj funds, estimate cost saving by pursuing Islamic hedging and propose technical and general recommendations for the authority.

Forward transaction mechanism is adopted to compute Islamic forward between SAR and Rupiah (Indonesian currency) or IDR. Findings – based on simulations, the paper finds that: the longer the Islamic hedging tenors, the better is the result of Islamic hedging, the decreasing of IDR/USD is the right time to hedge the hajj funds and, on the other hand, the IDR/SAR appreciation is not the right time to hedge the hajj funds.

Based on simulations, the paper finds that: the longer the Islamic hedging tenors, the better is the result of Islamic hedging, the decreasing of IDR/USD is the right time to hedge the hajj funds and, on the other hand, the IDR/SAR appreciation is not the right time to hedge the hajj funds.

The research suggests the authority to (and not to) hedge the hajj fund, depending on economic conditions and market indicators. Even though the assessment is for the Indonesian case, other countries maintaining hajj funds might also learn from this paper.

To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first paper in Indonesia that attempts to simulate the optimal hedging of hajj funds.

The purpose of this article is to describe the process for forming and registering a new investment company (or mutual fund) or converting an existing hedge fund into a mutual fund and registering the converted fund. This article discusses the timing, tax and regulatory implications under Delaware law, the US Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”), the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).

This article summarizes and analyzes rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) applicable to forming and registering new mutual funds and converting existing hedge funds into mutual funds under the 1940 Act and Advisers Act.

For smaller hedge fund managers who have recently registered with the SEC and desire to sponsor a new registered fund product as part of their advisory business, converting and registering an existing hedge fund is a viable alternative to forming an entirely new fund. The conversion process involves converting an existing hedge fund into a Delaware trust and then registering the new trust as a mutual fund under the 1940 Act. The adviser may, under certain circumstances, advertise the past performance of the hedge fund when marketing the new mutual fund. In addition, the adviser may continue to receive performance based or incentive compensation within the boundaries established by the Advisers Act. The authors believe that the conversion process is a viable and cost‐effective method for smaller hedge fund advisers to expand their existing investment advisory products and more easily grow assets under management.

This article provides a useful summary of the process for forming a new mutual fund or converting an existing hedge fund, including a brief outline of the SEC rules and regulations applicable to the fund registration process generally under the 1940 Act. Many hedge fund managers have recently incurred significant compliance costs as a result of registering as an investment adviser with the SEC. This article provides insight into the fund conversion process, which the authors believe is an overlooked and viable option for smaller hedge fund advisers to leverage existing compliance costs through sponsoring a registered fund product.