Search results

Earnings per share (EPS) is a key ratio which must be disclosed in the financial statements of South African listed enterprises. It is used to compare the performance of an enterprise over time and to compare its performance with that of other enterprises. Financial analysts also use EPS to calculate the price‐earnings (PE) ratio. In South Africa, listed companies are required to disclose three EPS measures, namely basic EPS (BEPS), diluted EPS (DEPS) and headline EPS (HEPS). This article reports on the results of a study of financial managers’ perceptions of the importance of HEPS and the actual disclosure practices relating to HEPS in selected listed companies’ annual reports. This article also reports on financial managers’ perceptions of selected other accounting measures of performance (such as EPS) and other financial indicators not ordinarily found in the annual report (such as the PE ratio), of the importance of EPS measures in general and of headline EPS in particular. The study found support for HEPS, compared to other per share measures, despite misconceptions regarding the objective of HEPS. The study also found that 95% of the selected companies disclosed HEPS together with the required reconciliation. However, half of the companies contravened the headline earnings definition. As a result, approximately one third of all selected companies overstated their HEPS.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the possibility of South African companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) using adjusted earnings as a part of an impression expectation management strategy focused on demonstrating how reported earnings measures meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts.

A multiple response analysis approach is used. Earnings adjustments are coded according to a defined typology and assessed for their status as either valid or invalid. The number of occurrences of adjusted earnings measures over a five year period (2010-2014) meeting or beating analyst forecasts is calculated.

The use of adjusted earnings by JSE listed companies is a common occurrence. There is evidence to suggest that this is used part of an impression expectation management strategy. Most of the adjustments are invalid. When otherwise valid adjustments are used in a particular year, these are frequently repeated, and when adjusted earnings are reported, these normally exceed analysts’ forecasts.

The paper is based on a relatively small sample from a single jurisdiction and limited time period. Nevertheless, the findings point to the need to revisit how financial performance is measured and reported, evaluate additional regulation to protect investors and understand in more detail exactly how and why companies use adjusted earnings as an impression expectation management tool.

The paper adds to the limited body of research on performance reporting outside of the USA and Europe. It also examines the use of adjusted earnings in a unique setting where, in addition to IFRS numbers, companies are required to report a mandatory adjusted earnings figure (headline earnings).

Agency theory motivated this study, posing that leverage mitigates the agency problem. The aim was to examine whether leverage influences the relationship between executive-employee pay gaps (EEPGs) and firm performance. The study was conducted in the mining and retail sectors between 2012 and 2021.

Two EEPGs were featured based on their executive fixed pay and variable incentives accumulation. Proxies of firm performance were headline earnings per share; return on assets; earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; and return on stock price. Data were collected from 76 JSE-listed firms in the retail and mining sectors and analysed using the two-step generalised method of moments.

The results revealed the hybrid implication of the pay gap for firm performance in the retail and mining sectors of South Africa, depending on the performance measures emphasised. More importantly, the study shows that with the moderating effects of leverage, firms can improve their performance while shrinking the pay gap.

The results have implications for policy addressing income inequality, debt management, executive compensation and regulatory reforms in South Africa concerning productivity and remuneration decisions.

The article provides specific literature for retail and mining industries on pay gaps, shows that it is possible to reduce the pay gap without compromising performance and suggests a new measure of performance that is more attuned to pay gap effect measurement.

In the continuing endeavour to work towards ever better management, experience plays a crucial role. We learn from success, but we can learn much more from failure. Further, it is far better and cheaper when we learn from other people′s failures rather than our own. This monograph assesses the requirements of project management in relation to industrial projects, illustrating the factors that can result in failure by means of a series of case studies of completed and abandoned projects worldwide that have failed in one way or another. The key roles played by project planning and project cost control in meeting and overcoming the practical problems in the management of industrial projects are examined in detail. In conclusion the lessons that can be learned are evaluated and presented, so that we may listen and learn – if only we will.

Argues that informational arrangement may make an organization less of a cumbersome machine by exteriorizing organizational processes on screen, making them transparent, witnessable and (reflexively) self‐changing. The platform organization addresses how some organizations – global investment banks engaged in institutional currency trading and big science collaborations engaged in high energy physics knowledge production – implement a transparency regime of information that extends to local and implicit knowledge. In other words, through being exteriorized, knowledge is kept current, alive and distributed in the respective organizations; to a significant degree, it is effectively precluded from becoming implicit and embodied in places and persons. Corresponds to a form of coordination that is content‐driven rather than social authority based. “Management by contact” is a knowledge‐enhancing, specialist activity closer to mediating and coaching than to “governing” and deciding.