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This chapter offers an analysis of the decision code of Khaled Mashal, the former leader of the Hamas organization. Using the Applied Decision Analysis (ADA) method, it examines five decisions made by Mashal in 2011–2017. The analysis suggests that Mashal tends to use mainly the poliheuristic decision rule in these decisions, and considers the political-organizational dimension of Hamas as non-compensatory. Thus, Mashal made these decisions by first eliminating any alternative which risked his organization’s political status, and only then he rationally chose the alternative with the greatest expected utility from the remaining ones.

For more than nine decades, the Jewish–Palestinian conflict has dominated all aspects of life in the Arab world. The Arabs have disregarded and neglected their political, economic, and social development since 1916 because of their obsession with defeating the Jews or driving them into the sea. When the Arab armies collectively failed to destroy the newly established Jewish state in 1948, the dynamics of the conflict changed. On the one hand, Arab rationalists such as King Abdullah ibn al-Husyan (King Abdullah-I) (d 1951) of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (HKJ) suggested accepting the United Nations Partition Plan as proposed by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947. On the other hand, most Arab countries followed the lead of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nassir, who advocated the destruction of Israel. The latter view was also adopted by the PLO during Ahmad Shukeiri's reign (1964–1967) and later by Yasir Arafat (1969–2004) and most Palestinian armed factions.

In 1993 and 1994 it was assumed that Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation would drive Israeli-Palestinian peace. However, in the period from 1994 to 1999, the peace process basically did not move forward. The first goal of this paper is to explain why the Israeli-Palestinian peace process stalled in this time period. The second goal of this paper is to suggest policies that could increase the likelihood of arriving at, and maintaining, a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace in the future. I argue that the failure of the peace process from 1994 to 1999 is related to the political rivalry between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas, Hamas' lack of participation in the peace process, and the nature of Israeli-Palestinian economic relations. The interaction of these issues creates a highly unstable situation, resulting in periodical spells of Israeli-Palestinian violent conflict. I conclude a stable peace requires an independent Palestinian state with a capital in parts of East Jerusalem, a unified territory without Israeli extra-territorial enclaves, a fair share of natural resources, control over public policies, and an economy not integrated with that of Israel. The issue of Palestinian refugees must be resolved, but the return of refugees to Israel is not practical; a viable alternative is a financial settlement. In the short run, Israel should strengthen the Palestinian Authority by granting it tangible political gains. Hamas should be formally invited to participate in the peace process.

All religious activists appear to look alike, and indeed are treated by the news media as one in the same. However, many variations exist. On one level, different activists choose different tactics. Terrorism is only the most extreme (and the rarest) form of public action. Other activists utilize media campaigns, public intimidation and democratic choice (by putting forward candidates in elections). On a more basic level, great differences exist in the desired outcome of the struggle itself and in the degree to which religion is central to the conflict.

This chapter uses the poliheuristic theory of decision-making to analyze the decisions of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The study examines a series of Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the peace process during 1996–2014. Using Applied Decision Analysis (ADA), this study demonstrates that Netanyahu ruled out alternatives that failed to satisfy alternatives on the non-compensatory decision dimension – his political survivability. The prime minister’s final choices were made from the remaining options according to their ability to maximize net benefits with respect to Netanyahu’s ideological concerns.

Purpose – Research on terrorism has demonstrated the importance of state violence as a factor in the adoption of terrorism. This chapter seeks to clarify this previous research by examining the process through which state violence contributes to violence through groups’ narratives and appeals for action.

Methodology – To study how state violence contributes to terrorism this chapter uses qualitative methods that are ideal for clarifying social processes across cases. This chapter uses a mixed-methods approach, first using a comparative-historical analysis of groups involved in the anarchist, anti-colonial, and New Left waves of terrorism. Examining this diverse set of groups highlights the common role and process through which state violence contributes to terrorism. This study is combined with an in-depth analysis of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s online propaganda, which provides a detailed picture of how state violence is featured in terrorist texts.

Findings – This chapter reaffirms the previous research on the role of state violence as a grievance and indication that alternative methods are unavailable. In addition to this, this chapter demonstrates the symbolic importance of state violence, which provides a moral justification for terrorism and martyrs to aspire to and avenge.

Value – This chapter clarifies the role of state violence in the development of terrorism by describing how it is integrated in the narratives of terrorist groups to justify and inspire violence.