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This paper aims to examine whether the amount of costs disclosed as relating to environmental controls is associated with environmental performance in terms of carbon-based eco-efficiency, and whether any relation supports voluntary disclosure theory or legitimacy theory arguments. Further, this paper attempts to determine whether the relations differ across the initial Kyoto Protocol period.

In this study, the focus was on Japanese firms over the period from 2002 to 2012. Disclosed environmental control costs (capital expenditures and operating costs) were identified and eco-efficiency measures based on carbon emissions were calculated. Relations were tested for using regression models controlling for other potential impact factors.

This study’s results indicate a negative relation between disclosed levels of environmental control costs and eco-efficiency performance measures, and, for two of our three eco-efficiency metrics, this is more pronounced over the Kyoto Protocol period.

These results support a legitimacy theory (as opposed to voluntary disclosure theory) explanation for the relation between the levels of disclosed environmental control costs and carbon-based eco-efficiency.

This study is the first to explore how flexibility in cost classification may be used by companies to foster a disclosure strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the motivations for and variations in terms of stock option modifications under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123(R). Stock options are used to motivate and retain employees. Unfortunately, when stock prices decline, existing options lose their incentive value. In response, firms look for ways to re-incentivize their employees. Their choices include issuing additional options and/or modifying existing grants.

We investigate the economic determinants of stock option modification post SFAS 123(R), such as financial reporting cost, shareholder/political cost and employee incentive and retention. Our analysis is based on 67 sample firms that modify their stock option plans from 2005 to 2008 and 67 control firms constructed based on size, industry, year and stock price performance for the prior five years.

The results show that loss firms are more likely to modify their options, which supports the argument that financial reporting costs influence the decision to modify. We find support for the shareholder/political costs hypothesis, as the overhang ratio is positively associated with the decision to modify. However, we find no evidence that modifications substitute for additional option grants. We find that politically sensitive larger firms are more likely to incorporate more shareholder friendly measures such as excluding executives from modification or providing shareholders the opportunity to vote on modification.

This is the first paper examining the economic determinants of stock option modification under SFAS 123(R). Our findings provide some insights regarding economic determinants of SFAS 123(R) for accounting policy-makers and investors.