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Malicious hackers are increasingly evolving with technology by developing advanced tools to infiltrate. They are looking at micro laundering via sites like PayPal or using job advertising sites, to avoid exposure. Micro laundering makes it possible to launder a large amount of money in small amounts through thousands of electronic transactions. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the ethical hacking pedagogy is both a feasible and effective approach to prepare information security professionals of the future to combat black hat hacking and other forms of unethical conduct in the cyberspace.

The paper will specifically explore the ethics and implications of teaching students how to hack. It examines the strengths and limitations of the ethical hacking pedagogy. The discussion will then form the basis for exploring whether ethical hacking pedagogy is logical and justifiable.

The research has examined whether the ethical hacking pedagogy is an initiative-taking and effective approach to preparing information security professionals. Teaching students to hack is the only feasible approach to preparing future cybersecurity professionals because such training will allow them to master technical skills necessary for penetration testing.

A dominant theme that emerged from the research is the inability to evaluate students’ intention and provide oversight after their graduation. Thus, professional networks and peer groups will play an instrumental role in sustaining students in an environment that fosters ethical conduct.

An intriguing development in the realm of commercial software has arisen over the last decade, from highly improbable beginnings. From its inception in the ‘hacker ethic’, freeware has had a huge impact on IT businesses around the world, most strongly in the guise of its spin‐off, open source software. The eventual consequences are that, for example, more than 60% of all the servers on the World Wide Web are running the Apache open source system, and Linux, the open source cousin of Unix, is challenging Microsoft’s products as the most popular business server operating system. Major IT users such as multinational banks, and major IT companies including IBM, Hewlett Packard, Sun Microsystems, Dell, Oracle, Informix, Intel, Fujitsu, AMD and Computer Associates are investing in and supporting Linux. In 1998, Netscape Communications made public (‘opened’) the source code for its Netscape web browser. In 1999 Apple published the source for the ‘Darwin’ core of its Mac OS X. The Perl freeware programming language continues to gain popularity for web‐based applications.

Twelve years ago, a text was written within the hacking community which is widely referred to as the “Hacker Manifesto”. This text, and the opinions that it offers, have since been widely embraced by the hacker community and the document is referenced from numerous sites on the Internet. This paper sets out to examine the content of the Manifesto and considers the validity of many of the messages that it imparts. The Manifesto is considered to present an undoubtedly pro‐hacker message, without acknowledging other perspectives or the wider implications of the activities that it is advocating. The paper explores some of these issues, examining both the consequences of the Manifesto’s dissemination and ways in which security professionals and society at large should respond. It is concluded that whilst the Manifesto obviously cannot bear the sole responsibility for promoting and encouraging hacker activity, it at best sends out an incomplete message that should be balanced with appropriate counter‐argument.

One of the two main tasks of innovation leadership, a practice to inspire and enable creativity and innovation in organisations, is to construct a creativity-enabling organisational environment. One form of this main task is using developmental interactions, like mentoring, as innovation leadership practices. A hackathon is one type of innovation contest with three designed phases: pre-hackathon, hackathon event and post-hackathon, involving multiple stakeholders with distinct roles, such as hackers and mentors. In a hackathon, the central activity of mentors is to support the hackers’ innovation process, especially in idea creation and concept development. The mentor role has not been focal in hackathon studies; thus, this chapter addresses the role, impact, and ways to acknowledge the mentors as an integral, contributing innovation leadership practice in hackathons. As an empirical study, this chapter presents the results of a public sector case in a Swedish multi-disciplinary municipality conducting intra-organisational hackathons in three different collocations. The chapter contributes to the literature on innovation leadership at the team level with mentorship in innovation contests in the public sector context by revealing the dual-role tension of innovation leadership in mentor activities in the hackathon event phase from both the hackers’ and mentors’ viewpoints, and the necessity of mentor-benefitting training in pre-hackathon phase.

The purpose of this paper is to identify how the management structure of cybercriminals has changed and will continue to be revised in the future as their criminal business models are modified. In the early days of hacktivism, a distinction was made between a “hacker” and a “cracker”. The hacker was considered someone who was interested in the vulnerabilities in a computer system, but they were not out to exploit these vulnerabilities for illicit gains. Today, this is no longer true, as loosely coordinated gangs of computer hackers exploit vulnerabilities of financial institutions and the public to steal and transfer money across borders without difficulty.

The paper reviews legal cases dealing with the computer theft of assets from financial institutions and individuals. The focus is on external exploits of hackers not on employee’s theft of assets. It explores the management structure used by cybercriminals who have been caught and prosecuted by legal authorities in the USA and other countries. The paper discusses how this management structure has evolved from older traditional crime business models based on “family” relationships to morphing criminal gangs based in Russia, the Ukraine and other locations almost untouchable by the US legal authorities. These new criminal networks are based on knowledge relationships and quickly disappearing network connections. The paper concludes with a discussion regarding the management structure cybercriminals will follow in the future, as they continue their criminal activities.

The study provides indications of a trend toward more complex management and organizational structures among cybergangs.

Although there are many annual studies identifying the growth of cybercrime and the types of attacks being made, but there is not even a single study that shows how the cybercrime business model has changed over the past 20 years. From that perspective, the paper provides information of a changing and more effective business model for cyberattacks.

It is commonplace to say that the 11 September attacks have changed everything. A global revolution is changing business, and business is changing the world. With unsettling speed, two forces are converging; a new generation of business leaders is rewriting the rules of business, and a new breed of fast companies is challenging the corporate status quo. The Internet is an information superhighway, touching almost every aspect of the economy from government agencies, financial institutions, businesses, and professional organizations. With the year 2002 and its increasing number of court cases on Internet‐related issues, the courts are obviously still struggling with the question of intellectual property rights in an open source code environment supporting e‐commerce. By modeling and classifying the risks associated with cybersecurity issues, firms and specific individuals should not become a casualty of this cyberwar, nor become paranoid about the risks ‐‐ be informed and follow common business sense practices, policies, and procedures.

Security analyser tools provide a useful means of automatically identifying, and potentially exploiting, vulnerabilities within computer systems and networks but they are also of assistance to hackers looking for ways to break in. The paper highlights the range of tools that are available and of potential use to both audiences and considers the extent to which each group is likely to benefit from them in practice. It is considered that the ease of use of tools such as Back Orifice 2000 provides a means by which even the relatively unskilled hacker may inflict damage upon a system. Although tools are generally equally available to hackers and administrators, the hacker community is likely to be more aware of the opportunities available. Even where adminstrators are aware of the existence of particular tools, survey results indicate that they make relatively limited use of them. Factors that may account for this include their overall workload and lack of security awareness. Appropriate countermeasures can be identified to combat the individual categories of tool, but the problem of ensuring that these safeguards are implemented still remains.

The US fertility transition in the nineteenth century is unusual. Not only did it start from a very high fertility level and very early in the nation’s development, but it also took place long before the nation’s mortality transition, industrialization, and urbanization. This paper assembles new county-level, household-level, and individual-level data, including new complete-count IPUMS microdata databases of the 1830–1880 censuses, to evaluate different theories for the nineteenth-century American fertility transition. We construct cross-sectional models of net fertility for currently-married white couples in census years 1830–1880 and test the results with a subset of couples linked between the 1850–1860, 1860–1870, and 1870–1880 censuses. We find evidence of marital fertility control consistent with hypotheses as early as 1830. The results indicate support for several different but complementary theories of the early US fertility decline, including the land availability, conventional structuralist, ideational, child demand/quality-quantity tradeoff, and life cycle savings theories.

This article is concerned with answering the question: What is the extent and nature of the Information Warfare (IW) threat from sub‐state radical political groups? Although there has been a great deal of speculation and theorising about the potential threat from terrorist groups, there has been little open source research on this subject. Even at a classified level, it appears that intelligence agencies are struggling with the construction of methodologies for threat assessment.