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The purpose of this paper is to analyze and re-direct recent schematic and empirical scholarship on Habermas’ theory of the public sphere in library and information science (LIS).

This paper conducts a critical analysis of the relevant literature in light of Habermas’ origination and use/purpose of the public sphere concept.

The authors examined here produced a schematic operationalization of the public sphere that thinned the concept, but in turn, that schematization has produced insight into the civil society functions and communications of libraries, both within and without. For this work to be meaningful, the considerations and contexts of democratic society must be reinserted.

Further explorations of the relationship between the public sphere and civil society as they are manifested around and in libraries is called for. Additionally, Weigand’s approach to producing data/evidence on the public sphere and libraries should be furthered.

Understanding the role and function of libraries in democratic societies is essential for libraries to play a productive democratic role in those societies and thus, in guiding them.

This paper helps to situate the bewildering circumstances of libraries who face both popular support and broad political-social questioning of their role and place.

This paper arguably interjects a more sophisticated and nuanced theoretical picture of the public sphere than prior precis presented in the LIS literature have undertaken. It also engages a unique set of empirical-theoretical students from another perspective in order to deepen and shift that research discourse.

In recent years, the concept of “reification” has virtually disappeared from debates in social theory, including critical social theory. The concept was at the center of the revitalization of Marxist theory in the early twentieth century generally known as Western Marxism. Georg Lukács in particular introduced the concept to express how the process described in Marx's critique of alienation and commodification could be grasped more effectively by combining it with Max Weber's theory of rationalization (see Agger, 1979; Stedman Jones et al., 1977).¹ In Lukács's use, the concept of reification captured the process by which advanced capitalist production, as opposed to earlier stages of capitalist development, assimilated processes of social, cultural, and political production and reproduction to the dynamic imperatives and logic of capitalist accumulation. It is not just interpersonal relations and forms of organization constituting the capitalist production process that are being refashioned along the lines of one specific definition of economic necessity. In addition, and more consequentially, the capitalist mode of production also assimilates to its specific requirements the ways in which human beings think the world. As a result, the continuous expansion and perfection of capitalist production and its control over the work environment impoverishes concrete social, political, and cultural forms of coexistence and cooperation, and it brings about an impoverishment of our ability to conceive of reality from a variety of social, political, and philosophical viewpoints.

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most important authors in contemporary philosophy. In this chapter, we analyse his contribution to the philosophical debate on universalism and relativism and consider its implications for organization studies and organizations operating in an intercultural environment. We briefly describe the critique of a universal concept of reason that has been forwarded by sceptical and postmodern philosophers. As a response to this critique, we outline the contribution of discourse ethics and analyse the theories of Jürgen Habermas and his colleague Karl-Otto Apel. We explore the justification of discourse ethics and point out some problems in its argumentative logic. In the light of this critique, we outline some characteristics of an intercultural ethics that is based on constructivist philosophy and point to some encouraging prospects on the consolidation of the debate between relativistic and universalistic philosophers.

This chapter examines the significance of the fact that the fundamental outlook of modern religion according to Bellah, is compatible with the description of reality and the system of analytic concepts crystallized by Giddens and Habermas in their analysis of modern society. The conceptual common denominator between these three researchers indicates that Bellah's as well as Giddens’ and Habermas’ thought include an anti-nomological reflexive scientific-educative narrative that reflects a vision of the desired face of human society. A vision calling for the encouragement of continual reflexivity and the personal involvement of the individual in constructing his social reality. This common denominator brings to light a transition in the sociological-theoretical arena – flexing past borders created between theoretical streams in light of the fact that the roots of Bellah's thought lie in the Functionalistic tradition, Giddens’ in the Positivistic tradition and Habermas’ in the neo-Kantian tradition.

According to its advocates, community mediation empowers disputants in their dealing with conflict. However, critics of the community mediation movement have often contended that far from being empowering, community mediation programs constitute a means of social control and of informal state power enhancement. This paper undertakes a socio-theoretical examination of community mediation's empowerment claims and of its criticisms. The paradigmatic and contrasting works of Habermas on communicative action and of Foucault on power, freedom and governmentality are applied to community mediation. The paper contends that although Habermas’ insights are supportive of the community mediation agenda, the criticisms they engender might provide a way to move beyond optimistically naive assumptions regarding empowering claims. Conversely, although Foucault's work has often been used to dismiss community mediation's empowerment promises, the paper argues that it is possible to re-examine the empowering potential of community mediation from a Foucauldian perspective. It concludes that community mediation can provide a space for personal empowerment, if understood in a nuanced way.

Mixed methods research can provide a fruitful line of inquiry for educational leadership, program evaluation, and policy analysis; however, mixed methods research requires a metatheory that allows for mixing what have traditionally been considered incompatible qualitative and quantitative inquiry. The purpose of this paper is to apply Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action as that metatheoretical justification.

After reviewing the traditional quantitative/qualitative divide based on incompatible ontologies, the author argues for a pragmatist stance toward educational leadership inquiry. Such a stance allows for mixing methods because it privileges methodology and epistemology in social inquiry, rather than ontological theories of reality. Using Habermas’s metatheory, the author shows how truth claims are linguistically mediated; how they make reference to objective, subjective, and normative formal worlds; and how they are always fallible and revisable.

The author argues that Habermas’s metatheory allows (and requires) integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches to fully understand social phenomena. Such integration is possible if researchers attempt to make methodological decisions explicit by linking methodology (and thus methodical decisions) to all three formal worlds, and articulating the rationale for doing so. The author also argues that making the entire corpus of claims bound within a line of social inquiry subject to critical examination promotes the validity of inquiry.

This paper contributes to the discussion on mixed methods research by applying a particular strand of pragmatism. This is an advance in the extant literature, which argues for a pragmatist stance on mixed methods research, but has not yet conceptualized a metatheoretical position supporting this stance.

Habermas’ concept of communicative rationality, in which reason is construed in terms of the noncoercive intersubjectivity of mutual understanding and reciprocal recognition, provides a valid foundation on which the theory and practice of selves‐directed learning can be developed. In an increasingly individualized world a focus on learning networks allows a perspective transformation from the purely individualistic instrumental rationality of self‐directed‐learning towards communicative interaction via learning encounters and the possibility of satisfying the emancipatory conditions of communicative rationality within communities of selves‐directed‐learners in life and work. The orientation of communicative action to criticizable validity claims which are open to empirical investigation is the central core that makes this learning process both theoretically and practically possible.

This paper analyses what is seen as a crisis of authority in financial reporting. It considers the view that an element of authority may be restored to accounting through communicative reason. The paper argues that the justice‐oriented rationality of traditional, Habermasian, communicative ethics is incapable of providing a solid foundation for the re‐authorisation of financial reporting. The paper argues that a more adequate foundation might be found in an enlarged communicative ethics that allows space to the other of justice‐oriented reason. The inspiration for the enlargement is found in Ricoeur's analysis of narrative, his exploration of its role in the figuration of identity, and in his biblical hermeneutics which reveals the necessity of an active dialectic of love and justice.

Although communication is of vital importance in construction projects, the construction industry is confronted with great communication difficulties and an ineffective use of information and communication technology (ICT) systems. In this study, the objective is to analyse obstacles and preconditions for an effective use of ICT by focusing on characteristics of interorganizational communication in construction projects. Interorganizational communication and ICT are studied by elaborating on these phenomena from the perspective of two paradigms – the traditional functionalist and the radical humanist – and theories representative for these paradigms – the agency theory and Habermas’ critical social theory. By using the method of metatriangulation, it is shown that in addition to the functionalist perspective, the critical social theory of Habermas is an appropriate theory for analysing obstacles and preconditions for an effective interorganizational communication and use of ICT. Based on this analysis, a critical research agenda on communication and ICT in construction is formulated. It is concluded that this type of research will lead to a more articulated view on the alignment between ICT applications and communication in construction projects and will show new directions for ICT development in the future.

This paper aims to use critical theorist Jürgen Habermas’s conceptualization of the relationship between knowledge and interests to better understand the role of common and competing interests during organizational learning.

The paper draws on critical accounts of work and learning, and on Habermas’s theoretical work on knowledge and interests, to examine the relationship between interests and organizational learning and, in particular, to consider conflict of interest’s role in organizational learning.

Transposed to organizational level, Habermas’s conceptualization of the relationship between knowledge and interests suggests that organizational learning can result from a technical interest, shaped by money and power, and from tensions and incompatibilities between the system’s technical interest and the lifeworld’s practical and emancipatory interests. There is ample evidence that the first combination does indeed account for a great deal of organizational learning but to date, very little scholarly attention has considered the possibility of organizational learning resulting from the second combination.

Despite interests and interest differences being visible in a number of studies of learning by individuals at work, the relationship between interests and learning at the organizational level is not well understood. This paper is a contribution to this area, using Habermas’s conceptualization of knowledge and interests to better understand the role of interests during organizational learning, raising the possibility that competing interests can result in organizational learning, and suggesting areas for further research.