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In this chapter, I respond to the thoughtful and insightful critical discussions of my book, The Politics of Our Selves, offered by Colin Koopman, Johanna Meehan, and Christopher Zurn. After distinguishing between the interpretive, conceptual, and practical–political aims of the book, I defend my interpretive claims vis-a-vis Foucault and Habermas against criticisms raised by Koopman and Zurn, clarify my understanding of the conceptual aim of the book in response to Koopman's critique, and indicate how my approach to the practical–political questions about overturning gender subordination raised by Zurn and Meehan can be developed further.

The chapter presents a novel account of a key concept in John Dewey’s reconstructionist theory specifically related to the nucleus underlying his idea of democracy: intersubjective communication, what Dewey called the ‘democratic criterion’. Many theorists relate democracy to a form of rule. Consequently, discussions of democracy tend to be limited to functionalist theories. Dewey’s idea of democracy establishes an important distinction from conventional theories by developing its radical, critical, evolutionary, and intersubjective potential. I argue that Dewey anticipated Jürgen Habermas’s Paradigm of Communication in his reconstructionist social theory with potential to de-reify institutions and to empower human beings democratically.

Evaluation of research is a core function of academic work, yet there has been very little theoretical development about what it means to ‘know’ in relation to judgements made in examination of doctoral research. This chapter addresses the issue by reflecting on findings from three projects aimed at enhancing understanding of doctoral examination. In order to progress understanding about knowledge judgements in the doctoral research context, the chapter draws on two key contributions in the field of knowledge and knowing, namely, Habermas’ cognitive interests and Chinn, Buckland and Samarapungavan’s notion of epistemic cognition. It examines the common ground between the two bodies of theory, drawing illustratively on empirical work in the field of doctoral examination. The comparison of the Habermasian theory of cognitive interests with Chinn et al.’s notion of epistemic cognition led to the conclusion that there were areas of overlap between the two conceptual schemas that could be utilised to advance research into doctoral examination in higher education. Habermas’ cognitive interests (which underpin his ways of knowing theory) offer a conceptual lens that facilitates analysis of the interaction of ontological and epistemic components of knowledge production. Chinn et al.’s notion of epistemic cognition allows for finer grained analysis of aspects of the cognitive work involved in knowledge rendition. This work is particularly pertinent in an era that sees the boundaries of the disciplines being challenged by the need for new perspectives and cross-disciplinary approaches to solving complex problems.

Among recent criticisms levelled against traditional administrative theory those raised by adherents to the Critical Theory perspective have gained considerable influence. This paper examines their claim that Habermasian Critical Theory in particular is in a better position to solve the theoretical and practical problems of educational administration. The focal points of discussion are Habermas's fundamental categories of “interests” and the “ideal speech situation” since their theoretical coherence is a minimum requirement for the theory's validity and practical applicability. It is concluded that Critical Theory, while being the most ambitious attempt to date to provide a new, post‐positivist framework for social and administrative studies, has insufficient epistemological resources to justify its claims. As a result, the theory is driven to rational a prioris which deprive it of empirical content and relevance. Since Critical Theory claims to have reunited theory with practice, lack of empirical content would seem to disqualify the claim and render questionable the theory's value for educational administration.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to discuss certain key issues involved in the science wars; second, to review William Rehg's Cogent Science in Context: The Science Wars, Argumentation Theory, and Habermas (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 2009).

In accord with the genre of a review paper, the author sets the larger intellectual context of Rehg's book, and then highlights Rehg's book.

The findings suggest that Rehg has done an excellent job of explaining and expanding Habermas's argumentation theory, thereby working out a nonrelativist and nonskeptical framework for science studies (e.g. science and technology studies, studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge, and ethnomethodological studies of scientific work). However, the present author's findings also suggest that Rehg has not addressed the concerns of Protestant fundamentalists in the science wars as strongly as those concerns can be addressed. In addition, the present author's findings show that Rehg is silent about those academic critics in the science wars who criticize scientism in the pejorative sense of the term.

In the final analysis, Rehg's use of Habermas's argumentation theory is credited with offering rich implications for taking the science wars to a new level of sophistication.

This article addresses a recent debate in this journal between Buschman and Widdersheim and Koizumi on public libraries and public sphere theory in library and information science (LIS). The article moves beyond the debate as the debate has been too focused on the theories of Jürgen Habermas. In order to really understand the democratic mission of public libraries and how it is related to the public sphere, the author argues that LIS scholars need to look beyond Habermas' theories of the public sphere.

This is a theoretical article that discusses different theories of the public sphere, and how they have been and can be applied in library and information science.

The author finds that a main disagreement between Buschman and Widdersheim and Koizumi is whether one can use the concept of a public sphere without doing it in a “traditional” Habermasian way. The answers put forward in this article, is that we can and should look beyond Habermas' work when seeking to understand the role of public libraries as public spheres.

The article puts forward theories that are not commonly used in LIS, and advocates for broadening the theoretical scope of LIS scholars studying the relations between public libraries and public spheres.