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A number of political economy concerns are associated with the provision of foreign aid to developing economies. These concerns suggest that foreign aid is likely to have harmful effects on a recipient’s institutional quality, and that attempts to give aid conditional on policy and institutional reforms are unlikely to succeed. Established in 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative is a comprehensive, structured attempt to provide multilateral foreign aid conditional on reforms in recipient countries. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate its effectiveness at affecting institutional reform in participating countries.

The authors document how participating countries fared in terms of the quality of their policies and institutions. The authors employ the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World index as a measure of economic institutions, and the Freedom House political rights (PR) and civil liberties indices as measures of PR and protections. Based on these measures, the authors report unconditional statistics (e.g. average changes) and also regressions of changes in the measures on HIPC Initiative aid allocations and other controls.

The authors find that most participating countries experienced either meager increases or outright decreases in institutional quality. The regression results provide no evidence that the Initiative affects meaningful reforms.

The potential for foreign aid to have deleterious effects on the institutional quality of recipient countries has been of increasing concern to students of economic development. Such effects can have important implications for entrepreneurial activity in these countries. The HIPC Initiative is specifically designed to acknowledge and, indeed, overcome these concerns, leading to actual increases in institutional quality of recipient countries. To the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first to assess whether the promise of the HIPC Initiative is being fulfilled.

The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of the impact of external debt on total factor productivity (TFP) and growth along with the TFP channel through which external debt affects the growth of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs).

This study uses panel data econometrics; basically, the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and alternative non-linear (panel threshold) models. For robustness check, it also uses panel-corrected standard errors, feasible generalized least squares and SUR (using alternative variables).

External debt significantly reduces both TFP and growth. Besides, it confirms that the relationship between external debt and TFP and gross domestic product growth is non-linear. Further external debt can affect the growth of HIPCs through the TFP channel. However, the threshold model result reveals weak evidence of threshold values although there are some threshold values of 67 and 54 for TFP and growth models, respectively.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study on most concerned countries (HIPCs) that shows a detailed and complete analysis of the TFP channel and the impact of external debt on growth. Thus, it provides appropriate and sound policies that consider the unique characteristics of the countries. Unlike most previous findings, this study does not support an inverted U-shape relationship between external debt and growth. Further, it provides insights into the relationships among TFP, external debt and growth. Moreover, it considers basic panel econometric tests like cross-sectional dependence, uses a non-linear simultaneous equations model along with the alternative non-linear model and is supported by different robustness checks.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate benefits to debt reduction by using the natural experiment provided by the debt relief programs: the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative launched by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1996 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative extension in 2005.

The authors apply a time-shifted difference-in-differences strategy to evaluate the effects of this intervention. The date of each country’s decision to participate in the program is used as one treatment point while the date of the completion of the debt relief program is used as another treatment point. The exercise compares different economic outcomes such as domestic and foreign investment, schooling, and employment of the treated observations to the counterfactual of untreated country-years. The period between the decision and completion points is a short run while the period after the completion point is considered a long run.

The authors found that debt relief increased capital investment as much as 1.63 percent in the short run and 5.79 percent in the long run. However, there was no effect on foreign direct investment suggesting that debt overhang does not affect incentives of foreign investors. Output and schooling enrollment increased both in the short and long run.

This paper exploits a natural experiment of debt relief in a number of developing countries to shed light on the possible benefits to debt reduction. The authors are able to separate the short- and long-run effects of debt reduction. The finding that domestic but not foreign investment responds to debt reduction is suggestive of the differences in incentives across these two sources of investment.

The management of external debt among highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in Africa still remains a challenge despite numerous packages and attempts to ameliorate the consequences of such odious debt. The purpose of this paper is to establish the factors that contribute to the growth rate of external debt and how these factors respond to shocks to external debt growth rate in Africa.

Data were obtained from 24 African countries and analyzed using a panel vector autoregression estimation methodology.

The study found that external debt growth rates respond positively to unit shock or changes in government investment spending, consumption spending, and domestic borrowings over a long period of time. In the medium term, external debt growth rates respond negatively to shocks in tax revenue, inflation, and output growth rates. The paper also provides empirical support that external debt may be consumed rather than invested among HIPCs in Africa.

The findings of this paper are limited to only HIPCs in Africa.

This study has some few debilitating implications for external debt management among HIPCs in Africa. First, the paper suggests that debt repayment may be a problem. This is largely because external debt is consumed rather than invested. External debt sustainability needs a holistic approach in less developed countries. The findings place much emphasis on improvements in gross domestic product and tax revenues as the principal routes out of the debt doldrums. However, this option must be exploited with great caution as there is ample evidence that these poor countries increase their external borrowing capacities with improvements in economic outlook.

This paper fills a research gap that identifies specific components of government deficit budgets that may be contributing to the growth rate of external debts among HIPCs.

This paper aims to focus on the expectations and predicaments of Cameroonian civil servants two years after the country reached its completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

In‐depth interviews were conducted with some civil servants in Yaoundé, the provincial capital of the Centre Region and the capital of Cameroon, and Bamenda, the capital town of the North West Region. Newspaper articles were also an important source of data for this paper.

Cameroonians were initially exhorted to understand the government's adoption of the stringent measures prescribed by the Breton Wood Institutions in order to revamp the ailing economy. The austerity measures adopted by the Cameroon government led to immense hardship for civil servants and Cameroonians in general. Cameroonians initially had high hopes for the HIPC programmes, but they were rather seeing their living and working conditions deteriorating further. This led to bribery and corruption and other social vices perpetuated by all categories of civil servants. Because of the deteriorating living conditions, the economy has been marred by continuous strikes, which have led to the massacre of many Cameroonians. Although the future seems to be bright in the long run, it is bleak within the next few years given the enormous challenges facing the country.

This is a useful source of information to Cameroonian diasporas who are not abreast with the happenings in Cameroon.

This paper exposes the hypocrisy of the Cameroon government and the incessant strikes that have bedevilled the country. This paper will be of interest to Cameroonians, especially those in diaspora who are attempting to fight Paul Biya's corrupt regime.

In 2019, a popular revolution toppled Sudan's long-term military president, Umar al-Bashir. The country then entered a three-year transition toward democratic rule during which power was shared between Sudan's military and civilian political organizations. In this period, international organizations and foreign governments were quick to proclaim their support for Sudan's democratic transition. However, policy reforms during Sudan's transition went beyond changes to formal political institutions, as the transitional government implemented major programs of economic restructuring. These restructurings were supported by Sudan's international partners, who normalized a discourse that Sudan was “overindebted,” and who held that political and economic reforms ought naturally to accompany each other. As a result, the transitional government implemented a shock program of liberalization and austerity that imposed material hardship on much of Sudanese society, including during a global recession resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. This contributed to endangering the transition itself and the progressive promises of Sudan's 2019 revolution.

This chapter traces the history of how Sudan was excluded from Western financial and commercial markets through the imposition of sanctions in the 1990s. This caused Sudan to explore non-Western sources of external financing in East Asia and the Arabian Gulf. This history then shapes the contested ways in which Sudan's debts are counted by international institutions to create the misleading impression that the country is overindebted. Finally, the chapter examines how different elites coalesced to impose a program of shock fiscal austerity and economic liberalization during a crucial political moment, which helped to imperil the country's fragile political transition.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.

The Covid-19 pandemic has rekindled interest in sovereign debt crises amidst calls for debt relief for developing and emerging countries. But has debt relief lessened the debt burdens of emerging and developing economies? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. In particular, the focus is on the implications of debt relief and institutional qualities for sovereign debt in emerging and developing economies.

The model extends the framework on the probability of default by incorporating the receipt of debt relief by a debtor country. Doing so allows to better explain movements of sovereign defaults relating to debt relief. The model is estimated via the regular probit regression.

The analysis shows that the debt relief provided, thus, far, failed to ease the debt overhang problems of developing and emerging countries and reduced investment. The current debt relief schemes may underscore the prospects of self-enforcing and self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises rather than eliminating the dilemma completely. Regarding the forms of debt relief, the analysis shows that debt forgiveness offers favourable prospects in terms of debt sustainability and economic outcomes than debt rescheduling. Perhaps, the sovereign debt crises, particularly in low-income countries, hinge on insolvency problems rather than transitory illiquidity issues.

Any debt relief mechanism should consider seriously the potential incentive effect that reinforces expectations of future debt-relief initiatives. Importantly, solving the sovereign debt problem requires a programme for sustained investment and economic growth, while not discounting the critical role of prudent debt management policies and institutions.

This study contributes a different angle to the debate on sovereign debt distress. Aside from the structural and economic factors, this study investigates the role of debt management policy in the debtor nation and the implications of debt relief benefits for sovereign risk. The framework also focuses on whether the different forms of debt relief exert distinctive impacts.