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Introduction: The liberalization tendency in the economic system of most countries in the world exists in the last years. Our last research proves that in most cases liberalism gives a positive effect on social-economic development (including pension system). However, constructive potential of economic liberalism is not everlasting, it means, first at some stages there is a certain end for the liberalization of the economy. Secondly, after a certain level (before the last level) liberalism may bring out an imminent shortage (the market sinister) in the free market in a destructive way. That is why one of the essential (and very difficult) duties of economic science is to define effective ranges of liberalism (accordingly, government regulation) for each certain country during a specific time frame. One of the differences of the pension system from other social protected chains is that this system is capable to liberalize. Is it possible to measure the degree of the government regulation of the pension system? Unfortunately, this chapter has revealed that there is no such methodology. The author has created a methodology for the first time that allows to measure the degree of government regulation in the pension system. This methodology is called the Index of Liberalism (Dirigisme) of Pension System (IL(D)PS). By calculating IL(D)PS, the author finds out that the regulation degree (interval) of the pension system. Measurement of the degree of government regulation in the pension system allows evaluating the social consequences of the implemented reforms. IL(D)PS has been calculated on the basis of four indicators: (i) ratio of the private pension assets (%GDP); (ii) ratio of the public pension expenditures (%GDP); (iii) social security tax rates for employers; and (iv) restrictions for investment of the pension funds. At the initial stage IL(D)PS has been calculated for 31 countries. Among 31 countries, there are developed, emerging, post-socialist countries and countries known for their revolutionary reforms in the pension system. According to IL(D)PS, the most dirigiste (leftness) countries are France (0.868), Greece (0.732), Italy (730) and Azerbaijan (0.704). According to the IL(D)PS, the most liberal (rightness) countries are Australia (0.208), Denmark (0.223), the Netherlands (0.231) and Canada (0.237). In Azerbaijan, pension provision is under governmental monopoly (extreme dirigiste system). The private pension system in Azerbaijan has not been formed yet. Azerbaijan has a certain degree of liberalization of the pension system. Aim: The author wants to measure the degree of the government regulation in the pension system. Method: The author have performed correlation, analytical-statistical and cross-country analyze. Findings: The degree of the government regulation in the pension system has been measured in 31 countries.

Data from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation are linked to longitudinal records from the Social Security Administration to examine the relationship between the long-term unemployment that prime-aged (ages 25–55) male workers experienced around the time of the 1980–1982 twin recessions with earnings, receipt of either Disability Insurance or Supplemental Security Income (DI-SSI) benefits, and mortality. Separate estimations are made for those who voluntarily and involuntarily left employment and the combined sample of these two groups. We find that 20 years later, long-term joblessness was associated with significantly lower earnings and higher likelihoods of the receipt of DI-SSI benefits as well as mortality.

This paper advances the specification and estimation of econometric models of retirement and saving in two earner families. The complications introduced by the interaction of retirement decisions by husbands and wives have led researchers to adopt a number of simplifications. Our analysis relaxes these restrictions. The model includes three labor market states, full-time work, partial retirement, and full retirement; reverse flows from states of lesser to greater work; an extended choice set created when spouses make independent retirement decisions; heterogeneity in time preference; varying taste parameters for full-time and part-time work; and the possibility of changes in preferences after retirement.

This article estimates the causal effect of benefit levels on elderly enrollment in two public assistance programs by using the variation in eligibility and benefit levels introduced by old-age pension benefits. The findings are threefold. First, the low take-up among the elderly is not driven by changes in the composition of the eligible pool. Second, old-age pensions decrease the use of public assistance programs by decreasing the gain of participation – the potential benefits. Third, we find program-specific responses: a $100 increase in potential Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits leads to a 4–6 percentage point increase in the take-up probability, but we are unable to estimate consistent results for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Together with the fact that eligible individuals who begin receiving old-age pensions continue to participate in SSI more often than they maintain SNAP enrollment, the different program response could be due to preference for cash over in-kind transfers.

A dynamic model of the evolution of health for those over the age of 50 is embedded in a structural, econometric model of retirement and saving. Effects of smoking, obesity, alcohol consumption, depression, and other proclivities on medical conditions are analyzed, including hypertension, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart problems, stroke, psychiatric problems, and arthritis. Compared to a population in good health, the current health of the population reduces retirement age by about one year. Including detailed health dynamics in a retirement model does not influence estimates of the marginal effects of economic incentives on retirement.