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The purpose of this paper is to provide novel and rigorous evidence on the productivity effect of varying attributes of performance-related pay (PRP) and shows that the details of PRP indeed matter.

In doing so, the authors exploit the panel nature of the Finnish Linked Employer–Employee Data on the details of PRP.

The authors first establish that the omitted variable bias is serious, which makes the cross-sectional estimates on the productivity effect of the details of PRP biased upward substantially. Relying on the fixed effect estimates that account for such bias, the authors find: (first, group incentive PRP is more potent in boosting enterprise productivity than individual incentive PRP; second, group incentive PRP with profitability as a performance measure is especially powerful in raising firm productivity; third, when a narrow measure (such as cost reduction) is already used, adding another narrow measure (such as quality improvement) yields no additional productivity gain; and fourth, PRP with greater power of incentives (the share of PRP in total compensation) results in greater productivity gains, and returns to power of incentives diminishes very slowly.

Much of the empirical literature on PRP focuses on a question of whether the firm can increase firm performance in general and enterprise productivity in particular by introducing PRP and if so, how much. However, not all PRP programs are created equal and PRP programs vary significantly in a variety of attributes. This paper provides novel and rigorous evidence on the productivity effect of varying attributes of PRP and shows that the details of PRP indeed matter.

Group incentive schemes have been shown to be positively associated with firm performance but it remains an open question whether this association can be explained by the motivating characteristics of the group-incentive scheme itself, or if this is due to factors that tend to accompany group-incentive schemes. We use a controlled experiment to directly test if group-incentive schemes can motivate sustained individual effort in the absence of rules, norms, and institutions that are known to mitigate free-riding behavior.

We use a controlled lab experiment that randomly assigns subjects to one of three compensation contracts used to incentivize an onerous effort task. Two of the compensation contracts are group-incentive schemes where subjects have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of their coworkers, and the third (control) is a flat-wage contract.

We find that both group-incentive schemes resulted in sustained, higher performance relative to the flat-wage compensation contract. Further, we do not find evidence of free-riding behavior under the two group-incentive schemes.

Although we do find sustained cooperation/performance over the three work periods of our experiment under the group-incentive schemes, further testing would be required to evaluate whether group-incentive schemes can sustain cooperation over a longer time horizon without complementary norms, policies, or institutions that mitigate free-riding.

By unambiguously showing that group-incentive schemes can, by themselves, motivate workers to provide sustained levels of effort, this suggests that the “1/n problem” may be, in part, an artifact of the rational-actor modeling conventions.

Most research on worker participation treats it as an establishment-level phenomenon even though it is seldom used on an establishment-wide basis. This paper, however, examines how three forms of incentive compensation are used at the job level, and it assesses the potential ramifications for inequality. I find that the use of incentive compensation reflects the gender composition, unionization, and functional role of jobs. Jobs with many full-time women, for instance, are less likely to use group incentives and profit sharing because they are less likely to play central or managerial roles in establishments. This suggests that incentive compensation may increase inequality.

Notes the attempts by many companies today to identify innovative compensation strategies that are directly linked to improving organizational performance. Observes that there are many approaches to incentive compensation such as cash bonuses, stock purchase and profit sharing. Examines the individual and group incentive concepts that reward performance based on predetermined organizational goals and metrics, several behavioural theories that can be associated with reward and compensation, and convergent and divergent views and conclusions from the business community.

The purpose of this paper is to compare effects of different monetary team‐based reward strategies on performance, pay satisfaction, and communication behavior in computer‐mediated groups.

In a laboratory experiment, 32 groups of undergraduate students, each consisting of three individuals, interacted electronically and performed a consensus‐reaching task. Team‐based incentives were distributed either equally (each team member received an equal share) or equitably (each team member's share depended on her/his individual contribution). A control group received no team‐based (or other) incentives.

Hierarchical multilevel analyses revealed that both types of team‐based rewards increased team members' motivation and pay satisfaction compared to the control condition. Moreover, the effects of team‐based rewards on performance were moderated by group members' assertiveness. In addition, team‐based rewards lead to more cooperative and task‐oriented communication in the computer‐mediated groups. Finally, equally divided rewards led to higher pay satisfaction on average than equitably divided incentives.

On a research level, this study shows that team‐based rewards have positive effects not only on performance but also on communication behavior in computer‐mediated groups. As a practical implication, reward effects should be considered cautiously as they might be influenced by team members’ personality. Moreover, whereas no major differences were found between equity and equality principles in terms of performance, the latter seems to be preferable when satisfaction is a major issue in virtual teams.

Emphasizes the need for coherence between the reward structure and the organizational culture of effective schools. Provides a framework for discussion which includes a typology of rewards, including pecuniary, non‐pecuniary extrinsic and intrinsic rewards. Analyses several pay‐for‐performance strategies, classified by permanency of increases (merit or incentive) and mode of distribution (individual or group). Explores the perceived advantages and disadvantages of various merit and incentive plans in support of effective schools. Suggests that more attention to a closer fit between compensation strategies, organizational strategies, and workforce behaviours is required to increase the positive effects of reward structures.

The challenge facing human resource/compensation professionals in the people‐intensive, high‐technology industry, will be the development of a model and strategy intended to respond to the specific needs of unique professionals engaged in high growth organisations. This article examines the complex purposes of compensation, including the eight factors contributing to the determination of compensation levels, while considering constraints and contingencies. Job‐based evaluation and person‐based systems will be examined together with individual and group incentive plans as they impact upon growth cycles of high‐tech firms. The innovative nature of high‐technology organisations can be directly linked to compensation strategies for management. These high growth firms utilise a most unique compensation approach which is fundamentally different from normative organisations. They: (1) use annual incentives, but emphasise the longer term; (2) emphasise stock rather than long‐term cash plans; (3) use stock options where the manager benefits only if stock prices increase; (4) use a much larger proportion of stock than typical firms provide; and (5) encourage much wider use of stock among a broad employee group. Compensation occupies as significant a niche as articulate strategies and leading edge innovativeness, for high‐technology organisations.

This paper aims to interpret and compare managerial intentions for and employee perceptions of group-based incentive systems.

The data comprise interviews with managers and employees in four Finnish firms with experience of company-wide incentive systems involving profit-sharing and team-based rewards. Benefitting from social exchange theory, managers’ intentions and employees’ perceptions are examined.

Managers’ and employees’ views resemble each other concerning profit-sharing as reflecting reciprocity rooted in perceived distributive fairness, whereas examination of the team-based rewards revealed impediments in reciprocity. While managerial intentions for team-based rewards refer to social exchange with economic intensity via selection of controllable performance measurements aimed at making individual-level effort count, the employees’ perceptions deem such metrics non-controllable, reflecting perceived distributive and procedural unfairness.

Profit-sharing seems to create fair social obligation and goal congruence between managers and employees, whereas team-based incentives easily suffer from unfairness, reducing their effectiveness.

Distinguishing between managerial intentions and employee perceptions pertaining to incentive systems facilitated in-depth exploration of the social exchange inherent in them, conceptualized in terms of economic intensity, fairness and controllability. With this lens, qualitative analysis revealed differences in interpretations of controllability and fairness between the managerial intentions and employee perceptions. The central contribution to scholarship takes the form of interpretations reflecting upon these key findings.

A survey of over 1,000 companies conducted in 1990 indicated that two‐thirds will be giving merit‐only increases in 1991, which was a 60 per cent increase over two years ago. However, a current question: Is pay for performance used effectively? This article examines both individual and group incentive plans and explores all key factors utilised in determining the outcome (implementation) of these plans. Furthermore, the structure of an effective pay‐for‐performance plan is outlined in light of the mission, strategy and objectives of the organisation to determine how rigid or entrepreneurial the design can be. It was concluded that pay for performance is fundamental for competitive organisations.

The authors investigate the joint effects of two environmental variables, performance-based pay (PBP) and performance monitoring (PM), on behavioral dishonesty in a setting where the controls subsequently are absent. In a laboratory study using 88 participants in a 2×2 experimental design, simulating a work environment, the authors manipulate the presence of PBP and PM. Once the participants are accustomed to their assigned work environment and have completed contractual tasks unrelated to the dishonesty experiment, the authors allow them to privately roll dice to determine the size of a bonus gift card. Dishonesty levels are inferred from differences between treatment groups in the prizes claimed. The authors find an interaction effect, where inferred dishonesty in the performance-based-pay group is higher than the fixed-pay group when there is no PM, but lower when there is PM. Although theory and existing literature did not lead us to hypothesize these exact results, they offer important insights into a complex relationship. By jointly examining the effects of worker contracts and workplace monitoring on dishonesty, this research extends the understanding of the potential consequences of formal controls. As the workplace grows more complex, employers increasingly rely on information provided by frontline employees and managers. Thus, unintended effects of managerial controls on honesty are an important topic in the business literature.