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This volume of Research in Economic History (REH) includes eight papers, five of which were submitted and evaluated through our regular channels. An additional three were solicited from among those presented at the conference “Toward a Global History of Prices and Wages,” held in Utrecht in August of 2004. Because of the emphasis of these papers on data and the relevance of their findings for our understanding of long-run economic growth and development in different parts of the world, we encouraged a number of authors from this conference to submit their work to REH. Associate editor Gregory Clark took responsibility for soliciting, refereeing, selecting, and editing the submissions. We anticipate publishing up to three more of these in the next volume, enriching both REH and our understanding of economic history.

Since 1997, a quantitative revolution has swept Korean economic history and generated a new paradigm. From 1700 to 1900 the Korean economy expanded and contracted along lines suggested by Adam Smith. Economic expansion was based on productive land and a stable commodity market. The direct result was high real skilled wages. Economic contraction became clear from the mid-nineteenth century when the value of land declined, commodity prices rose, and real skilled wages fell. The contraction was apparent before the appearance of Japanese imperialism and the absorption of Korea into the international commodity market after 1876.

Research in Economic History, Volume 25, includes six chapters covering a range of geographic areas and tackling a range of issues in economic history. The first two address United States topics, one analyzing data from the eighteenth and the other from the twentieth century. Both have a macroeconomic focus. Peter Mancall, Josh Rosenbloom, and Tom Weiss consider growth in colonial America, while Gary Richardson examines the role of bank failures in propagating the Great Depression.

This paper is about how a command system allocated resources under profound uncertainty. The command system was the Soviet economy, the period was Stalin's dictatorship, and the resources were designated for military research & development. The context was formed by the limits of the existing aviation propulsion technology, the need to replace it with another, and uncertainty as to how to do so. We observe the formation of a quasi-market in which rival agents proposed projects and competed for funding to carry them out. We find rivalry and rent seeking, imperfectly regulated by principals. As rent seeking spread and uncertainty was reduced, the quasi-market was closed down and replaced by strict hierarchical allocation and monitoring. In theory, a dictator cannot commit to refrain from taxing the returns from today's effort tomorrow; therefore, we expect agents in a command system to seek only short-term returns from quasi-market activity. Agents’ willingness to invest in the Soviet quasi-market for inventions is ascribed to a reputation mechanism that enforced long-run returns.

This study consists of an examination of productivity growth following three major technological breakthroughs: the steam power revolution, electrification and the ICT revolution. The distinction between sectors producing and sectors using the new technology is emphasized. A major finding for all breakthroughs is that there is a long lag from the time of the original invention until a substantial increase in the rate of productivity growth can be observed. There is also strong evidence of rapid price decreases for steam engines, electricity, electric motors and ICT products. However, there is no persuasive direct evidence that the steam engine producing industry and electric machinery had particularly high productivity growth rates. For the ICT revolution the highest productivity growth rates are found in the ICT-producing industries. We suggest that one explanation could be that hedonic price indexes are not used for the steam engine and the electric motor. Still, it is likely that the rate of technological development has been much more rapid during the ICT revolution compared to any of the previous breakthroughs.

The heights of lower- and upper-class English youth are compared to one another and to their European and North American counterparts in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The height gap between the rich and poor was the greatest in England, reaching 22cm at age 16. The poverty-stricken English teenagers were among the shortest for their age so far discovered in Europe or North America; in contrast, the English rich were the tallest in the world in their time: only 2.5cm shorter than today's US standard. Height of the poor declined in the late 18th century, and again in the 1830s and 1840s conforming to the general European pattern, while the height of the wealthy tended rather to increase until the 1840s and then levelled off. The results support the pessimistic view of the course of living standards among the ultra-poor in the Industrial Revolution period.