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It is necessary to implement green supply chains. But green development needs to be gradual and coexist with ordinary products in the market. This paper aims to study the green and ordinary product pricing and green decision-making under chain-to-chain competition.

This paper considers consumers' multiple preferences and takes two competitive supply chains with asymmetric channels as the research object. Through the construction of the game models involving different competitive situations, this paper studies the pricing, green decision-making and the supply chains' profits, and discusses the impact of consumer green preference, channel preference, green investment and competition on the decision-making and performance. Finally, this paper further studies the impact of the decision structure on the environmental and economic benefits of supply chains.

The results show that consumer green preference has an incentive effect on the green supply chain and also provides an opportunity for the regular supply chain to increase revenue. Specifically, consumers' preference for green online channels improves the product greenness, but its impact on the green retailer and regular supply chain depends on the green investment cost. Moreover, competition not only fosters product sustainability, but also improves supply chain performance. This paper also points out that the decentralization of the regular supply chain is conducive to the environmental attributes of the green product, while the environment-friendly structure of the green supply chain is different under different conditions. In addition, the profit of a supply chain under centralized decision is not always higher than that under decentralized decision.

The novelty of this paper is that it investigates the pricing of two heterogeneous alternative products and green decision-making for the green product under the competition between two supply chains with asymmetric channels, in which the green supply chain adopts dual channels and the regular supply chain adopts a single retail channel.

Businesses are increasingly striving to become sustainable in terms of economic, environmental and social aspects. However, in the fresh food retail supply chains (SCs), achieving environmental objectives can be challenging because of the unique characteristics of products such as perishability, bulkiness, short product lifecycle and the requirement for cold chain infrastructure. The retail industry is the face of a SC. Therefore, its role in achieving sustainable objectives is pivotal. This study examines the effect of green in-store operations on sustainability performance indicators of fresh food retail and examines the moderating role of organization size in this context.

Data are collected through surveys using self-administered questionnaires from 70 retail stores with 188 completed responses. Data are analyzed using structural equation modeling.

Results show a positive relationship between green in-store operation with environmental social and economic performance. Furthermore, these relationships are moderated by the organization size such that the positive green in-store operation and performance relationships are stronger in the case of environmental and social performance only and for larger retail stores. No moderation is seen for economic performance.

The study broadens the understanding of green SC management’s effect on sustainability performance in the retail industry. It shows how the positive implications of a green SC are contingent on organization size and have prominence for environmental and social performance.

The rapid development of the Internet has led to an increasingly significant role for E-commerce business. This study examines how the green supply chain (GSC) operates on the E-commerce online channel (resell mode and agency mode) and the traditional offline channel with information sharing under demand uncertainty.

This study builds a multistage game model that considers the manufacturer selling green products through different channels. On the traditional offline channel, the competing retailers decide whether to share demand signals. Regarding the resale mode of E-commerce online channel, just E-tailer 1 determines whether to share information and decides the retail price. In the agency mode, the manufacturer decides the retail price directly, and E-tailer 2 sets the platform rate.

This study reveals that information accuracy is conducive to information value and profits on both channels. Interestingly, the platform fee rate in agency mode will inhibit the effect of a positive demand signal. Information sharing will cause double marginal effects, and price competition behavior will mitigate such effects. Additionally, when the platform fee rate is low, the manufacturer will select the E-commerce online channel for operation, but the retailers' profit is the highest in the traditional channel.

This research explores the interplay between different channel structures and information sharing in a GSC, considering price competition and demand uncertainty. Besides, we also considered what behaviors and factors will amplify or transfer the effect of double marginalization.

The managerial questions of this paper are as follows, and the authors are trying to solve them: How revenue sharing contract (CSR) degree and government subsidy affect the agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, revenue-sharing contract [RSC] and cooperative) would be more effective in motivating manufacturers and retailer to increase effort and improve agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, RSC and cooperative) would make manufacturer and retailer better off?

Considering the jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain, this paper proposes six models that consider CSR of manufacturer and retailer, and then the obtained optimal solutions are compared and analyzed. At the same time, the impact of government subsidies is analyzed, and corresponding conclusions are drawn.

The results show that, first of all, whether the increasing CSR of the manufacturer or the retailer can motivate both parties to improve the agri-food quality effort investment. Second, the WPC and RSC contract may play different role in different cases. Finally, under the model with government subsidies, regarding positive influence of government subsidies on efforts of manufacturer and retailer, quality and profits of members is investigated. Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward the following policy suggestions. Firstly, governments should formulate reasonable subsidy policies to support manufacturer and retailer to improve the agri-food quality, thereby promoting green industries' development. Secondly, manufacturer and retailer should actively improve CSR and strengthen the effort of agri-food so as to advance quality. Finally, manufacturer and retailer can choose cooperative model or WPC contract.

In this paper, one manufacturer and one retailer are considered. Since the agri-food supply chain structure in reality is more complicated, the future research direction can consider the supply chain structure with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. In addition, this paper only considers the subsidy, and future research can classify the subsidy into different types.

The study makes two substantive contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of sustainable operations:(1) incorporating quality-based demand function in supply chain and dynamic process of agri-food quality; (2) exploring the impact of CSR awareness of members and subsidy of government on agri-food quality, and comparing the influence in different models.

This study aims to establish a centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model based on factors of risk aversion of supply chain members and product greenness. The research aims to study whether the introduction of the “cost + risk sharing” contract affects coordination of this type of green supply by calculating the optimal decision of each mode.

This research designs a supply chain model under centralized and decentralized decision-making. This model uses the Stackelberg game to calculate the optimal decision under decentralized decision-making to evaluate the effect of a green supply chain and then analyze the “cost + risk sharing” contract and the degree of coordination of the supply chain. A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the centralized mode for the impact of variables on the supply chain.

This research finds a double marginalization effect in decentralized decision-making, and the risk aversion coefficient plays a decisive role in the utility of supply chain members. The specific range of risk- and cost-sharing factors allows supply chain members to achieve Pareto improvements and provides decision-making based on the corresponding management strategies according to each other’s risk preference degree.

The influence of each variable on the green supply chain in the centralized mode is studied by MATLAB numerical simulation. It provides reference for green supply chain members to formulate corresponding management strategies according to each other's risk preference degree.

This research innovatively considers manufacturers and retailers to explore the market demand for product greenness. It introduces a novel “cost + risk sharing” contract to coordinate the green supply chain.

To study these issues, the authors chose a GFSC with one producer and one material supplier as research object, the supplier will offer green material to the producer and the producer will make green food using green production technology. Then, the authors proposed that consumers' perceived value was determined by the trustworthiness levels of the related green and quality-safety information provided by the supplier and the producer. Then, considering the trustworthiness levels of the green and quality information provided by the supplier and the producer, the authors improved the demand function. Afterwards, we constructed four investment models and their income models are built and then a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract (hereafter, CSRS) was adopted to coordinate the GFSC.

With the growth of consumers environmental awareness and life level, consumers' requirements for green and high quality food are growing. In recently years, to increase consumers' perceived trustworthiness on the product greenness and quality levels, stakeholders in green food supply chain (hereafter, GFSC) start to adopt the blockchain-based traceability system (hereafter, BLTS). For investors, they need to know the investment conditions and how to coordinate the GFSC.

(1) When the revenue-sharing coefficient is less than three-fourths and higher then a certain vaule, the cost-sharing and revenue-sharing contract can make the GFSC coordinate. (2) The investment cost threshold of the BLTS has a positive relationship with the trustworthiness improvement levels of the green and quality information, the green degree of food products and the quality of food products. (3) In the proposed four investment situations, as the growth of consumers perceived credibility coefficient about the greenness information and the quality information, chain members' revenues will increase. In addition, comparing with co-investing the BLTS, benefits of chain members are lower than them in the sole investment model.

(1) The demand function we proposed can help chain members forecast market demand to support production or ordering decisions. (2) The investment decision policies can offer a theoretical reference for chain members to use the BLTS. (3) The CSRS will offer the theoretical reference for coordinating the supply chain after using the BLTS. Furthermore, our study method can be referenced by other scholars. (4) The study method can offer a method reference for researchers who do a similar discussion in a manufacturing supply chain. Although, our research cannot guide the industrial practices, it can serve as a reference of the similar research in industry.

Under the carbon tax policy, the authors examine the operational decisions of the low-carbon supply chain with the triple bottom line.

This paper uses the Stackelberg game theory to obtain the optimal wholesale prices, retail prices, sales quantities and carbon emissions in different cases, and investigates the effect of the carbon tax policy.

This study’s main results are as follows: (1) the optimal retail price of the centralized supply chain is the lowest, while that of the decentralized supply chain where the manufacturer undertakes the carbon emission reduction (CER) responsibility and the corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the highest under certain conditions. (2) The sales quantity when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR is the largest. (3) The supply chain obtains the highest profits when the retailer undertakes the CER responsibility and the CSR. (4) The environmental performance impact decreases with the carbon tax.

The results of this study can provide decision-making suggestions for low-carbon supply chains. Besides, this paper provides implications for the government to promote the low-carbon market.

Most of the existing studies only consider economic responsibility and social responsibility or only consider economic responsibility and environmental responsibility. This paper is the first study that examines the operational decisions of low-carbon supply chains with the triple bottom line under the carbon tax policy.

This paper aims to introduce corporate social responsibility into the green supply chain and analyse the impact of different decision makers’ decision-making schemes on carbon emission reduction in the supply chain.

This study uses a two-stage low-carbon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and retailer as the research object. It uses the Stackelberg game model to analyse optimal carbon emission reduction and its influence under different decision-making modes.

Increased consumer green preferences and trust can improve the manufacturing enterprises’ carbon emission reduction rate. The carbon emission reduction rate decreases with increased green innovation costs. When green technology innovation costs remain constant, the greater the market capacity, the higher the carbon emission reduction rate. Market capacity has the most significant impact on the optimal carbon emission reduction rate without considering social responsibility decisions and has the least impact on the optimal carbon emission reduction rate while fully considering the social responsibility decision. To achieve decarbonisation production, the market capacity must be small, and when green innovation costs are high, it is the optimal choice without considering social responsibility. To achieve a higher level of carbon emission reduction, when the market capacity is low and the research and development cost is high or when the market capacity is large, it is the optimal choice.

The results provide scientific policy decisions and management significance for governments and enterprises in low-carbon subsidies and supply chain management. The findings also provide a basis for future theoretical research and enterprise practice.

The paper attempts to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a two-part tariff coordination mechanism.

To deal with this pricing conflict problems of dual-channel supply chain consisting of dominant manufacturer and a retailer, considering the fact that online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions, the authors establish some basic models and exploit them to discuss the optimal pricing decisions under the decentralized and centralized decision and analyze the influence of online reviews and in-sale service on dual-channel supply chain. Finally, the authors design a profit-sharing coordination mechanism.

The results show that the optimal online direct selling price is positively correlated with product perceived quality obtained from online reviews and negatively correlated with the in-sale service. The traditional retail price is positively correlated with the in-sale service and weakly correlated with online reviews. For the manufacturer and retailer, whether decentralized decision or coordination contract, their profits increase with the increase of the in-sale service in a certain range and quality perceived from spontaneous online reviews. Online reviews and in-sale service are important factors on consumers’ purchase decisions. Positive in-sale services and online reviews can provide consumers with a better shopping experience, thereby promoting their enthusiasm for shopping and improving their quality of life. The two-part tariff coordination mechanism improves the profits of the manufacturer and the traditional retailer, respectively, through the transfer fee.

The proposed approach can well analyze the channel conflicts and pricing problems between retailers and manufacturers with respect to product offline price and online price. The analysis and results can inform decision-making for manufacturers and retailers.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.