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This research aims to examine the importance of Greek banks' internationalisation. Further, it seeks to identify the entry modes and organisational forms adopting Greek banks when crossing borders as well as to suggest a modelling approach.

Empirical data were collected by using secondary and primary data sources. Primary data sources included semi‐structured interviews with the key stakeholders in the industry.

This research identified that Greek banks, adopt foreign direct investment entry mode and organisational forms such as branches and representative offices (internal growth), as well as subsidiaries and affiliates (external growth). It also was found that the participating in this research Greek banks, combine the two types of growth in their foreign markets entry. This study identified that the balance of combination is dependent upon a number of reasons and factors.

The study contains several shortcomings. The empirical study, for example, contains only three cases, which naturally raises the problem of generalization. Further, the theoretical view may contain conceptual elements, which hinder more specific observations. However, despite these limitations, the study contains some theoretical and managerial implications.

The paper reports on the findings of the one of the first in its kind research study carried out in Greece in the Greek banking sector. The findings that emerged set the foundation for helping the various stakeholders in the sector to contribute towards building strong international presence to help them sustain the fierce competition from foreign banks.

The purpose of this paper is to present measures and policies followed during the Greek fiscal crisis to safeguard financial stability.

Greece since 2009 was subjected to the Excessive Deficit Procedure and a government debt crisis due to the arrival of the global economic crisis leading to a major economic and banking crisis. Two huge bailout loans and programs helped Greece avoid default. However the second bailout loan and participation of banks in the Private Sector Involvement caused losses to the banking system that amounted to €37.7 billion. To deal with the prospect of potential bank failure Bank of Greece the central bank in cooperation with national and international authorities developed many strategies to safeguard financial stability such as cash management and liquidity operations establishment and operation of Greek Financial Stability Fund (GFSF) institutional framework for recapitalization and resolution of credit institutions.

The first step was to support bank liquidity pressures. In the face of these pressures the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations provided lending to euro that ended 2010 and accounted to €97.6 billion. The second step was to establish a legal and regulatory framework for bank resolution and assess funds needed to recapitalize banks through stress tests and diagnostic assessments. Results showed that during 2012–2014 the Greek banking sector would require approximately €40.5 billion for strengthening its capital base of which €27.5 billion corresponded to the four “core banks”. Bank of Greece and GFSF managed to complete a €48.2 billion bank recapitalization in June 2013 of which the first €24.4 billion was injected into the four biggest Greek banks. In return Bank of Greece received a number of shares in those banks which it can now sell again during the upcoming years. The third step of policies was to implement resolution and restructuring measures. From October 2011 to March 2014 12 banks resolved through the new legal and regulatory framework under either a transfer order (order to transfer assets and liabilities to a transferee credit institution) or establishment of a bridge bank. All policies succeeded to safeguard Greek financial stability and restore bank losses that resulted from Greek public debt “haircut”.

To the best of the author’s knowledge this is the first paper examining this issue.

The aim of this paper is to examine the productivity of the Greek banking sector for the time period 2004‐2006.

Standard ratio measures of bank financial performance have been used as output measures in a data envelopment analysis model in combination with efficiency ratios’ analysis.

The Greek banking efficiency remains relatively constant throughout the period under observation, while, on average, big banks perform better than medium and small ones.

Profit and loss accounts as well as balance sheet accounts of each bank are used for examining bank efficiency.

A positive relationship between bank size and performance is observed. More specifically, it is suggested that large total assets gives a bank the ability to achieve higher efficiency levels; thus, a merger of two small banks will probably increase their efficiency and competitiveness in the long term.

Greek banks are at a crossroad and faced with the dilemma of expanding their operations internationally or staying at home. The current financial crisis has made this dilemma stronger. The paper's findings suggest that probably the best solution for the Greek banks to overcome their current problem is to merge.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current regulatory framework of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, trying to show solutions for strengthening it.

This paper aims to investigate the deposit and investment guarantee fund in Greece by identifying new problems and developing solutions.

The main finding is that the deposit and investment guarantee fund contributes to the stability of the Greek banking sector and also offers practical solutions to strengthen it. Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund has an important feature, which is the speed of a decision about a bank failure resolution (in five working days), but needs immediately strengthening and increasing its funds to cope with the resolution of non-viable banks and undertaking for costs. There should be an appropriate ratio between the size of total assets (especially cash and cash equivalents) of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund and the amount of total guaranteed deposits, which is now below 2 per cent. Regulatory framework needs revising and fees must be increased if its funds fall below a certain level of coverage of guaranteed deposits. Also, a guarantee premium, not only a flat rate premium, should be implemented for all banks. An additional risk-adjusted premium varying according to Greek banks’ risks of their portfolios would be better to increase funds of deposit guarantee fund and reduce moral hazard of bank manager by increasing costs. They must ensure an adequate diversification of re-deposits of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund funds and must limit and avoid a conflict of interest of its board membership for individuals who are actively involved in Greek commercial banks by implementing framework and rules about it. Also, as a consequence of obeying the regulatory framework, it is necessary to include as board members of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund only those banks that are subject to strong prudential supervision and regulation.

As a result of research, changes are necessary to immediately be made to cope with current financial crises and problems of Greek banking sector.

The originality of this paper is that it is the first description of the Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund and its results are important for economists, politicians and international community, who evaluate the regulatory framework of Greek Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund, especially at the current time when the Greek economy and the Greek banking sector are in a very weak fiscal position.

The Greek sovereign debt crisis had a substantial impact on the real economy and the Greek banking sector. From a period of growth in the economy and high levels of profitability, Greek banks experience a major decrease in demand in the local market, and a large increase in non-performing loans. This had a negative effect on the financing of the Greek firms and households, especially after the PSI and the recapitalisations of the Greek Banks. The Greek banking system has been restructured into four large systemic banking groups and after a long time of depression, the efforts are now being directed into restarting the economy through the financing of firms and individuals. However, the recent and on-going experience with substantial volumes of non-performing loans and strategic defaults, poses many challenges. The same can be said for stricter regulation that was introduced in the aftermath of the financial crisis, business model transformation, developments in the fintech and IT arena, and most recently COVID-19 pandemic, all introducing challenges to bank managers. This chapter provides an overview of these issues.

This study investigates the reasons behind the very high net interest margins in the Greek banking industry compared to the euro-area, focussing on the association between bank competition and recapitalisations.

The author conducts a dynamic panel analysis covering the period from the early 2000s to 2021, that controls for possible endogeneity and treats for heterogeneity. The author also employs local projections impulse response functions that control for structural changes in Greek banking.

The author finds that low bank competition has contributed to high net interest margins in Greece. Interestingly, the impact of recapitalisations conditional to low bank competition has had a significant further impact on increasing net interest margins, which is a noteworthy case due to several Greek bank recapitalisations in the last ten years. The author’s findings are supported by local projections impulse response functions.

To mitigate distortions in bank competition, the author argues to accelerate steps toward the direction of the banking union and a common bank regulation framework in the euro-area.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of major non-economic events, such as the announcement of Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009, and search for stock manipulation and methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets. The Financial Sector in Greece is one of the most important and fast growing sectors during recent years and accounts to about 16.17-17.74 per cent of gross domestic product. The ten largest Greek banks listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, accounted to 38.34 per cent of the whole capitalisation of the Athens Stock Exchange during year end 2009.

By using event study methodology and Market Model and analyzing data of all Greek bank stocks prices listed in Athens Stock Exchange, before and after the announcement of four Greek national parliamentary elections during period 2000-2009, we find interesting results about stock market manipulation.

Using daily data from the Athens Stock Exchange, the results of this paper claim that the four Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009, had no statistically significant effect on the Greek banks stocks. The results show that Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks’ stocks, but not statistically significant in 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels. Results show no manipulation effect in banks’ stocks even if single-party governments in Greece caused elections early, sudden or even opportunistic timing, having an incentive to attempt to manipulate stocks to increase their chances of re-election.

Results show that CAARs were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks stocks, but not statistically significant in 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels, but when illicit funds or assets have been acquired from stock manipulation, as small as can be, then one fact remains constant. Proceeds from illicit activities must be disguised in some way to avoid being discovered and then being recovered. Especially, during current the financial crisis, debt crisis and the extraordinary liquidity support measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Commission to support Greek economy, using methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets are extremely important. Indirect methods such as net worth analysis, bank deposit analysis, expenditure method or sources and application of funds analysis, to detect ill gotten assets, and then when ill gotten income and assets from bank stock manipulation are found, a restraining order or court order will help to recovery assets by freezing and finally confiscating them by two types of forfeiture – criminal and civil forfeitures. Establishing a code of conduct informing employees of the risks and consequences of insider trading, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with off-shore companies trading, can help to recover ill gotten assets.

The paper examines if there is banks stocks manipulation around announcement of Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009; suggesting methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets and improving the current position of the Greek economy. Findings offer important positive implications for investors, political analysts and society as a whole, as Greek banks stocks show that they are not subject to political risk and manipulation and that there are methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets. A stable bank sector is prerequisite for economy growth.

This paper aims to search for the factors that influence the profitability of Greek commercial and cooperative banks by examining other variables that have never been used before. It also seeks to examine bank performance before and during the economic crisis in Greece. The survey is based on previous similar research.

A multiple regression analysis has been used for the determination of the factors which influence the profitability of the Greek banking sector as well as the multicriteria method PROMETHEE for the examination of the Greek banking sector performance before (2007) and during the economic recession (2008‐2009).

The paper finds that: type of bank plays an important role in profitability; the indicator ROA is associated only with well‐capitalized banks with sufficient liquidity and cost efficiency; and cooperative banks in general at the beginning of the crisis were less influenced by the economic crisis than commercial banks.

This is the first time that the entire Greek banking system has been examined for the particular period regarding the factors that influence bank profitability. Up to now there has been no published research examining whether the type of the bank influences profitability or which of banks remained efficient and “durable” before and during the first two years of the economic crisis in Greece.

The paper seeks to examine whether or not wealth effects and changes in the systematic risk associated with the return structure of the Greek commercial chartered banks, investment firms and insurance companies resulted from the passage of the European Union Banking Directives over the period 1988‐1997.

Using monthly stock returns from the DataStream database for the period January 1988 to December 1997, the separate effects of each of the EU Banking Directives on Greek commercial chartered banks, investment firms and insurance companies are tested. The “seemingly unrelated regression” methodology is utilized to test three portfolios consisting of an equally weighted banking, investment and insurance index made up of major Greek banks, investment firms and insurance companies respectively. The Greek Market Index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. All the aforementioned indices were converted to returns using the log difference method.

Empirical results indicate that the systematic risk dramatically increased for Greek insurance and investment firms and moderately increased for Greek commercial chartered banks through the tabling of the Free Capital Movement Directive in the Greek Parliament. After controlling for systematic risk, the results suggest that the passage of the Free Capital Movement Directive did not create wealth effects for the shareholders of commercial chartered banks, investment firms and insurance companies. Conversely, the results demonstrate that the Second Banking, Investment Services and Capital Adequacy Directives produced no wealth effects for the investment firms and insurance companies, but not for commercial chartered banks' shareholders. The whole wealth effect on the Greek financial sector was neutral.

This article will be of value to academics, bankers, bank regulators, practitioners, and economic policy makers who are interested in the regulatory evolution of the EU banking industry.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the total factor productivity (TFP) change in the Greek cooperative banking industry over the period 2000‐2005.

The paper employs the Malmquist index and estimate two models, one based on the intermediation approach, and one based on the production approach. TFP change is disaggregated into technical efficiency change and technological change, whereas technical efficiency change is decomposed further into pure technical efficiency change and scale efficiency change.

The results are mixed. The first model indicates a small decrease (3 per cent) in TFP whereas the second model indicates an increase by 6.6 per cent. Comparing the results on the basis of banks' size finds that TFP growth is higher for smaller banks on average over the entire period of our analysis. However, this relationship between size and productivity is not robust across the years. Furthermore, the differences between the groups are not statistically significant.

The results can be of special interest to several stakeholders such as customers‐members, bank managers, local community, and of course bank regulators.

This paper is believed to be the first that examines the productivity growth of Greek cooperative banks.