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The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of major non-economic events such as the results of five Greek national Parliamentary elections during 1996-2009 on the Greek banks’ stocks.

Using daily data from the Athens Stock Exchange, event study methodology and market model, the results of this paper claim that the five Greek national Parliamentary elections during the 1996-2009 period had no statistically significant effect on the Greek banks’ stocks. The results show that cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks’ stocks but not statistically significant at 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels.

Investors were not surprised and the political information caused no change and no influence on the future and course of the stock market. Expected winning political party was the same as the actual winning political party. Results showed that during pre-event period of 2000 and 2004 Greek national Parliamentary elections, CAARs for Greek banks’ stocks were slightly positive and after the event period were slightly negative but not statistically significant at all periods. During 2007 Greek national Parliamentary elections, the effect of elections changed because CAARs were generally slightly negative during the pre-event period and positive after the event period. Also, non-statistically significant CAARs indicate that there is no evidence that either political party was able to manipulate bank stocks’ prices for election purposes.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence about effects of national elections to bank stocks’ prices which have important implications for stockbrokers, investors, politicians and political analysts.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of major non-economic events, such as the announcement of Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009, and search for stock manipulation and methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets. The Financial Sector in Greece is one of the most important and fast growing sectors during recent years and accounts to about 16.17-17.74 per cent of gross domestic product. The ten largest Greek banks listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, accounted to 38.34 per cent of the whole capitalisation of the Athens Stock Exchange during year end 2009.

By using event study methodology and Market Model and analyzing data of all Greek bank stocks prices listed in Athens Stock Exchange, before and after the announcement of four Greek national parliamentary elections during period 2000-2009, we find interesting results about stock market manipulation.

Using daily data from the Athens Stock Exchange, the results of this paper claim that the four Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009, had no statistically significant effect on the Greek banks stocks. The results show that Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks’ stocks, but not statistically significant in 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels. Results show no manipulation effect in banks’ stocks even if single-party governments in Greece caused elections early, sudden or even opportunistic timing, having an incentive to attempt to manipulate stocks to increase their chances of re-election.

Results show that CAARs were slightly positive or negative for Greek banks stocks, but not statistically significant in 5 and 10 per cent confidence levels, but when illicit funds or assets have been acquired from stock manipulation, as small as can be, then one fact remains constant. Proceeds from illicit activities must be disguised in some way to avoid being discovered and then being recovered. Especially, during current the financial crisis, debt crisis and the extraordinary liquidity support measures taken by the European Central Bank (ECB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Commission to support Greek economy, using methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets are extremely important. Indirect methods such as net worth analysis, bank deposit analysis, expenditure method or sources and application of funds analysis, to detect ill gotten assets, and then when ill gotten income and assets from bank stock manipulation are found, a restraining order or court order will help to recovery assets by freezing and finally confiscating them by two types of forfeiture – criminal and civil forfeitures. Establishing a code of conduct informing employees of the risks and consequences of insider trading, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with off-shore companies trading, can help to recover ill gotten assets.

The paper examines if there is banks stocks manipulation around announcement of Greek national parliamentary elections during the period 2000-2009; suggesting methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets and improving the current position of the Greek economy. Findings offer important positive implications for investors, political analysts and society as a whole, as Greek banks stocks show that they are not subject to political risk and manipulation and that there are methods to detect and recover ill gotten assets. A stable bank sector is prerequisite for economy growth.

The paper's aim is to examine the influence of the Greek political elections on the course of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE). Using daily data from the ASE General Price Index, it seeks to empirically examine the effect of political elections (Parliamentary and European elections) on the course of the ASE over the period 1996‐2002.

This paper examines the relationship between Greek political elections and ASE using ordinary least squares (OLS) models. It concentrates on the pre‐election and the post‐election periods of the last decade. Daily closing prices of the General ASE index are used for the period 1996‐2002.

The results show that two months prior to the elections index performance increases on average and the mean daily fluctuation decreases. One month before the elections, index performance decreases, the mean daily fluctuation increases and the change of daily exchange value increases on average. During the three‐month post‐election period, there is a considerable increase of index progress. Furthermore, between three and six months after the elections, a decrease in performance is found, while for a collective six months after the elections, there is remarkably positive course. Using a simple OLS model with a dummy variable, it is found that there is a negative effect of the political elections on the course of the ASE. However, this effect is always insignificant.

The results have important implications for traders, investors and political analysts. The findings are strongly recommended to financial managers dealing with Greek stock indices.

The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence using data before and after the financial crisis of 1999‐2001 in Greece.

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the interrelationships that exist between politicians' Twitter agendas, news websites agendas and public agendas at the first level during the 2019 Greek Parliamentary elections for the two front-runners of the elections, Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Alexis Tsipras. Three researches were conducted to assess the issues agendas of candidates' tweets, news websites coverage as well as the issue importance of the public for an 18-day period prior to the elections. At the issue level, although Twitter and media agendas align more, they are distinct from public agenda. Overall, Twitter proved to be an ineffective tool for influencing the news websites and public agendas during the 2019 Greek Parliamentary elections with online media agendas being slightly more powerful. Moreover, the public agenda did play a role in shaping Twitter as well as media content but in a counterbalancing manner. In addition, this study confirmed that agenda building and setting dynamics at both levels vary based on the issue and candidate being analysed.

From a relational political brand perspective, newly elected governments are primarily concerned with maintaining the trust of the electoral coalition that brought them in office in order to secure their re-election. Hence, as Needham (2005) has suggested, governing parties tend to employ a political communication strategy aimed at promoting an effective brand consisted of six components: simplicity, uniqueness, reassurance, aspiration, values and credibility. In this context, this study examines the communication strategies of three Greek governments (PASOK, New Democracy and SYRIZA) in the period 2009–2019 that failed to be re-elected once they implemented the bail-out packages, against the six branding criteria. Following a qualitative methodological approach, this chapter analyses the key speeches of the respective prime ministers along with polling evidence and secondary data. It argues that all these three governments failed to be re-elected once they implemented the memoranda, not only because of the unpopular nature of the austerity measures but also because of their failure to fully retain their political brands in office since they hardly succeed to deliver on their promises, though it is unclear whether they employed self-consciously such a branding strategy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine politically exposed persons and major Greek political parties' funding sources as well as the anti-money laundering regulatory framework for political parties' funding sources.

This paper aimed at investigating data about Greek political parties' funding by identifying new problems and developing solutions.

The main findings are that Greek political parties' major sources of revenues are public subsidies and bank loans. Also, data show that two major Greek political parties cannot easily repay their bank loans (especially PASOK) and must renegotiate terms with banks and must agree for a new, long-term and lower payment schedule at a lower interest rate. Extending the period of repayment is necessary for viability of debts, and banks will protect themselves against default and total losses of about 253.1 million euros from the two major political parties. Public subsidies are the only collateral that Greek political parties offer to banks.

As a result of research, structural changes are necessary to immediately be made in order to cope with politically exposed persons and political parties' corruption and funding in Greece, especially during the current fiscal crises. Greek political parties need to raise funds from other sources than only public subsidies. Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework have to stop conduit contributions and force banks to apply Know Your Client Principle for donors. Also, to include on Suspicious Activity Report a checkbox of “Political Finance Violations”. Establishing a code of conduct informing employees of the risks and subsequences of political corruption, creating a culture of honesty and high ethics and implementing Controlled Foreign Corporation legislation to cope with corruption in political parties' funding can help to recover ill-gotten assets. Finally, implementing Business Principles for Countering Bribery and UK Bribery Act will increase transparency in funding of Greek political parties.

The paper examines corruption and funding sources of Greek political parties, especially during the period 2009-2011, suggesting policy measures to deter and detect money laundering and illegal funding to politically exposed persons and political parties. Findings offer important measures for political analysts, government and society as a whole. A stable political system is prerequisite for a healthy society and for economic growth.

This chapter explains how SYRIZA managed to build international support up to the January 2015 election with very limited resources, and against mainstream coverage, by relying essentially on grassroots movements and social media. It also shows how, approaching to power, SYRIZA's political, but also communication strategy, became more institutionalised and relied less on grassroots campaigning. Methodologically, our research is based on the following research techniques: First, interviews with activists and members of the party as well as observations inside its social media team. Second, the study of online content and data from 2006 to 2015. Overall, this chapter shows that SYRIZA's campaign on the Internet relied mainly on alternative media activists who acquired a specific savoir faire and developed international networks during the intense antiausterity social movement that took place in Greece between 2010 and 2013. The campaign was also supported by young experts from the private sector that contributed on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless, its success was mainly due to the European political context and the opportunities it offered to the radical Left, rather than the communication strategy, which in any case suffered from a lack of means and from a somewhat chaotic (non) organisation.

This chapter theorises the Internet in Greece by placing it at the centre of Greek media offering a political economy which recasts it in a culturalist fashion. To achieve this, it critically addresses the country's alleged lag in cyberspace and asks why the Internet's hegemonic role in the advance of neoliberal policies and technoliberalism worldwide was never performed in Greece. It places the countrywide disdain for the technoliberal subject at the core of understanding of why the web mediations where so neatly denied over three decades across industry, policy and research. It centres around Internet remediations to argue that the Internet in Greece has been conceptualised as a nonmedia through the idea of lagging behind, essentially a construct veiling neoliberalism at work. It situates the advent of the web in Greece's media boom to argue that media power, as articulated in Greece, necessarily excluded the web, fetishising terrestrial broadcasting on the way to the neoliberal dismantling of culture, the media and everyday life, way before the Troika.