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The issue of corruption in the civil administration has gained importance in recent years; multiple anti‐corruption efforts have been initiated to solve the problem, however, desired success has not yet been achieved. The review of the causes of corruption reveals that two behavioural causes, namely the need for corruption and greed for corruption, are closely linked with other structural variables such as the pay structure, power of the officers, and the accountability mechanism. The research attempts to prove that proper balancing among the pay structure, power, and accountability might offer a sustainable solution to the problem. However, whether the solution is cost effective or not will largely depend on the government's success in developing proper ethics amongst public officials.

This research aims to study the recent changes in consumer behaviour and purchase pattern during the Covid-19 pandemic. Covid-19 pandemic has forced consumers to stockpile, which has its own consequences. The article proposes the importance of “minimalism in consumption” to avoid greed in consumer behaviour.

The data are collected from consumers across India using an online survey during the first lockdown from March 2020 to May 2020. A simple random sampling technique is used for data collection, and the collected data are analysed using SPSS version 26.

The study states that there will be a shift in the purchase pattern of the consumers if lockdowns are imposed in the future or during any other crisis. However, at present, consumers have developed a stockpiling mentality fearing the unavailability of essentials.

Pandemic has stimulated a drastic change in consumer behaviour, which is a situational effect. Each crisis affects consumer behaviour in a different way. In this research, we have considered only fear, greed and anxiety in the light of Covid-19. On the other hand, the research intends to draw realistic conclusions based on consumers' experiences during the lockdown.

The study proposes solutions that will help marketers frame exclusive strategies for a future crisis. Analysing the change in consumer behaviour and the shift in purchase patterns will emphasize the importance of market research to know consumer expectations during a crisis situation in order to cater to their new demands.

Consumers who stockpile should realize the unavailability of goods to other consumers who are in need. They also have to understand the importance of “minimalism in consumption” during a crisis.

The data are collected during the most taxing crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic. Data are collected at the peak time of the first wave of Covid-19 in India, during a major shift in consumers' behaviour and purchase pattern. The article brings to the larger consciousness and also preaches a life lesson to all consumers to execute their responsibilities in consumption without over-demands and expectations.

A Catastrophe Theory Model modified for the explanation of the evolution/revolution of behavior in the securities market can be classified in the realm of behavioral finance. An early model of the Cusp Catastrophe Model modified to explain speculative crashes appeared in Zeeman (1976, 1977). Later, Pruden expanded upon Zeeman’s use of the Cusp Model version of Catastrophe Theory to allow for “buying stampedes” as well as “selling panics”. Pruden also established connections between the Cusp Catastrophe Model and technical market analysis. Whereas the Catastrophe Theory Model, like other models from the behavioral sciences, provides a positive scientific theory as to the “why” of behavior in the stock market, technical market analysis furnishes a nominal theory of rules and principles about “how” a trader or investor may profit from the behavior observed in the stock market. Hence, the presupposition is that behavioral science models that explain the stock market behavior provide solid scientific foundations upon which to base the principles and practices of technical market analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to utilize a multi-method design for research on corruption in China. Corruption in any society is inimical to good governance. Singapore, despite her size, is argued to be a plausible model for China.

Taking a multi-method approach, the phenomena of corruption is investigated from: etymological analyses for corruption (European roots) and its Chinese equivalent, 贪污 (pinyin: tan wu) case studies taken from three periods: current, Qing Dynasty and to founding of China (zhong guo, Qin Dynasty) to ground our policy recommendation of China be modeling after Singapore on the basis of our analysis of statistical (2013 and longitudinal) data. In the process, the authors embark on inter-country comparisons (mainly Confucian China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan).

Here are the key insights: scholars are unaware the English word corruption is narrower in scope than the Chinese equivalent tan wu贪污. As far back as 3,000 years, the Chinese had attributed wu, 污 as filthy, polluting, dirty to psychological concept of greed tan, 贪. In English, corruption does not denote greed per se. Falsification of facts as a political ploy dates back to Qin dynasty. Destabilizing corrupt cases occurred in China today as in Qing Dynasty. Singapore rather Hong Kong is a better model for China in reforming society.

This paper illustrates a distinctively, in-depth approach to research on Chinese management. It shows why it is important to clarify key concepts: corruption in the West and tan wu贪污in the East. Historical cases are utilized to show the presence of a continuing Chinese mind set. The authors argued for China to embark on a city-by-city strategy (modeling after Singapore) toward becoming a corruption-free society. Now, as 3,000 years ago, the Chinese conceptualization of corruption embeds the psychology of greed.

China is at a crossroad of her economic development. There is a possible risk of China being destabilized through the corruption of the top rung of leadership. Chinese authorities must with urgency, rein in corruption. An approach is proposed in this paper.

In terms of style, approach and method of research, this paper is highly original. The integrative research here provides a rationale and basis for the Chinese leaders to implement a policy for a less corrupt society.

In the last decades, many of the most talented and promising young graduates in the developed economies have joined the financial industry. Simultaneously, ill-designed incentives’ schemes have favored the development of a culture in which excessive greed, free-riders’ behavior, unreasonable appetite for risk, and short-term decision making have endangered the economy and, potentially, have laid the foundations for financial, economic, social, and environmental crises.

In this chapter, we review current challenges in the financial industry from the lens of human and social capital. We examine some of the factors that allowed unethical behavior and a short-term financial focus in the financial sector, examining how compensation and an extremely competitive culture became key elements that favored greedy and manipulative behavior and ultimately generated socially harmful human and social capital in the financial sector. Finally, we discuss the emergence of a number of game-changers (namely, Brexit, FinTech, the growing relevance of ethical standards, and the increasing participation of women and millennials in the industry) that might represent potential promotors of change and help restructure and reshape the financial industry.

Subprime mortgage was a kind of high-risk and high-interest lending, especially targeted at low-income and minority borrowers. The majority of subprime mortgage loans were made to non-affluent, low-income and poor borrowers who were previously unable to buy properties and might have poor credit histories (Pitcoff, 2003; Schwarcz, 2009). Why did mortgage lenders compromise their lending standards and dare to take obviously huge risks in mortgage lending? It is clear that the origin of the aggressive subprime mortgage practices were linked to the US Government's policy for increasing national homeownership and encouraging lenders to provide mortgage loans and other credits to low-income and minority borrowers, as a specific stakeholder group.

Materialism is a consumer value that stresses the importance of acquiring more and more material goods. Success is defined in terms of the type and quantity of goods one owns and happiness is expected to result from physical wealth (Beutler, Beutler, & McCoy, 2008). Materialism as defined thus is closely tied to the idea of the pursuit of rational self-interest that has been associated with Adam Smith (1776).

Based on the findings of Aguinis et al. (2018) that only a few executives are properly compensated, the purpose of this paper is to examine potential causes and consequences of CEO overpayment and underpayment. Ineffective compensation of the CEO represents a governance failure by the board of directors. Better understanding the reasons for such failures may help boards to correct their processes and to enact more effective governance. Boards must look beyond the normally constrained focus of agency theory to examine executive characteristics and motivation. Thus, tailoring compensation plans and governance to the executive and organizational context requires attention to a broader set of theoretical notions.

Using the Aguinis et al. (2018) work, this paper conceptually identifies and explains the causes and consequences of CEO overpayment and underpayment along with their implications for governance and future research.

This paper identifies potential reasons for CEO overpayment and underpayment. For example, in addition to poor hiring decisions and inadequately designed compensation plans, CEO overpayment can occur because of executive hubris and greed. Alternatively, CEO underpayment may occur because of a poorly designed plan, inadequate information about the external labor market and the executive’s interests in non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. socio-emotional wealth, altruism). Without proper monitoring and oversight by the board, firm performance commonly suffers.

This work extends our understanding of why CEOs may be overpaid (e.g. hubris, greed) and why some executives may accept underpayment (e.g. desire for non-pecuniary benefits from SEW or altruism). This paper explains the consequences of ineffective corporate governance practices that allow inefficient CEO compensation. Finally, this paper explores several contingencies that can affect the governance practices and research needed to enhance our knowledge of this important area.

Partiendo de los resultados de Aguinis et al (en prensa) de que solo unos pocos ejecutivos están retribuidos correctamente, examinamos las causas y las consecuencias potenciales del pago excesivo y pago insuficiente a los CEO. Una retribución inadecuada al CEO es un fallo de gobierno por parte del consejo de administración. Comprender mejor las razones de dichos fallos puede ayudar a los consejos a corregir sus propios procesos y desarrollar un gobierno corporativo más eficiente. Los consejos de administración deben mirar más allá de la teoría de agencia para examinar las características de los ejecutivos y su motivación. Por tanto, ajustar los planes de retribución y gobierno a los ejecutivos y al contexto organizativo requiere prestar atención a un conjunto más amplio de conceptos teóricos.

Utilizando el trabajo de Aguinis et al (en prensa), identificamos y explicamos las causas y consecuencia del pago excesivo y pago insuficiente a los CEO, junto con las implicaciones para el gobierno corporativo y la investigación futura.

Identificamos las posibles razones para el pago excesivo o insuficiente a los CEO. Por ejemplo, además de malas decisiones de contratación y planes de retribución mal diseñados, el pago excesivo puede deberse a la arrogancia y codicia de los ejecutivos. Alternativamente, el pago insuficiente puede generarse por un plan de retribución mal diseñado, por inadecuada información sobre el mercado laboral externo y el interés del ejecutivo en beneficios no pecuniarios (e.g., riqueza socio-emocional, altruismo). Sin una supervisión adecuada, los resultados de la empresa normalmente sufren.

Este trabajo amplia nuestra comprensión sobre porque los CEOs pueden recibir una retribución excesiva (e.g., arrogancia, codicia) mientras otros pueden aceptar un pago insuficiente (e.g., deseo de beneficios no pecuniarios o altruismo). Explicamos las consecuencias de un gobierno corporativo inadecuado que permiten una retribución ineficiente del CEO. Finalmente, exploramos varias contingencias que pueden afectar a las prácticas de gobierno y que la investigación deben considerar para mejorar nuestro conocimiento en esta importante área.

A partir dos resultados de Aguinis et al. (em imprensa) que apenas alguns executivos são pagos corretamente, examinamos as causas e as consequências potenciais do pagamento excessivo e do pagamento insuficiente ao CEO. Uma compensação inadequada ao CEO é uma decisão governamental do conselho de administração. Uma melhor compreensão das razões para tais falhas pode ajudar os conselhos a corrigir seus próprios processos e desenvolver uma governança corporativa mais eficiente. Os conselhos de administração devem olhar além da teoria da Agência para examinar as características dos executivos e sua motivação. Por conseguinte, ajustar a remuneração e os planos governamentais aos executivos e ao contexto organizacional requer atenção a um conjunto mais amplo de conceitos teóricos.

Usando o trabalho de Aguinis et al. (em imprensa), identificamos e explicamos as causas e consequências do pagamento excessivo e do pagamento insuficiente ao CEO, junto com as implicações para a governança corporativa e a pesquisa futura.

Identificamos as possíveis razões para pagamento excessivo ou insuficiente ao CEO. Por exemplo, além das pobres decisões de contratação e dos planos de compensação mal projetados, o excesso de pagamento pode ser devido à arrogância e ganância dos executivos. Alternativamente, o pagamento insuficiente pode ser gerado por um plano de compensação mal concebido, por informações inadequadas sobre o mercado de trabalho externo e o interesse do executivo em benefícios não-pecuniários (por exemplo, riqueza sócio emocional, altruísmo). Sem supervisão adequada, os resultados da empresa geralmente sofrem.

Este trabalho amplia o conhecimento sobre porque os CEOs podem receber a retribuição excessiva (por exemplo, arrogância, avidez) quando outros podem aceitar o pagamento insuficiente (por exemplo, o desejo por benefícios não-pecuniários ou altruísmo). Explicamos as consequências de uma governança corporativa inadequada que permite uma compensação ineficiente do CEO. Finalmente, exploramos várias contingências que podem afetar as práticas govern

Business schools increasingly have come into the spotlight following a range of corporate scandals, challenged to find a new approach to business education that goes beyond financial bottom lines, and results in the responsible corporate leadership. This article seeks to address the area of “how a Catholic university deepens and revitalises its culture and institutionalises its mission and identity in business education.” It aims to do so by focussing on the marketing for and nature of the student body in a postgraduate Master of Business Administration (Executive) (MBAE) program offered intensively by the Australian Catholic University, through an analysis of scholarship applications.

This qualitative study used latent coding which reflected its interpretative nature and was based on the classic content analysis sensitive not only to the explicit, manifest content, but also to the implicit, not obviously present content. To arrive at a trustworthy interpretation of the latent content, the method required familiarity with the contexts of the researched. In the case of the study, the analysed applications of the scholarships were placed in the larger context of the in‐depth interviews with the prospective students. As a result, a number of themes were induced from these texts.

The findings demonstrate that candidates enter the program with a balance of self and social interest, and a different focus of self‐interest, moving beyond negative greed as excessive materialism or career pursuit for money's sake. There emerged a picture of the MBAE applicant as a caring and skilled global citizen, wishing to make a positive difference to society and characterised by a sense of humility, a heightened sense of awareness, personal transformation and a sense of interconnectedness with others.

This small study and approach suggests that individuals are seeking more meaning not only in their workplaces, but also from their business education. It depicts the intent of the Business Faculty staff to move beyond the cultural biases of self‐centred and unrestrained individualism in order that a sole self‐interest is transcended into benefits for the organisation and broader society, including the sustainability of the natural world.

The purpose of this paper, a set of two studies, is to elaborate on the concept of scansis and its effects upon crisis communication theory and practice. A scansis represents the intersection of a scandal and crisis, essentially when a crisis becomes a scandal. A new term was created due to the varied ways in which the term scandal is used and misused. The effects of scansis on crisis communication are examined through two studies. A scansis is unique because it creates moral outrage and is a function of a perception of injustice coupled with greed.

Experimental design is used in both studies to test for the effects of specific crisis response strategies used during a scansis. The crisis response strategies were manipulated to determine whether or not corrective action with moral recognition is more effective at helping organizations during a crisis than those crisis response strategies that do not contain a moral component.

The two studies found no short-term effect for crisis responses during scansis. This included no difference between corrective action with moral recognition and the other three response conditions for the short-term factors of organizational reputation, negative word-of-mouth intentions, purchase intentions and anger. However, Study 2 found that corrective action with moral recognition was perceived as the most empathetic response and created the lowest levels of moral outrage. The authors postulate that corrective action with moral recognition has a long-term effect after a scansis by creating a positive response that moves organizations away from being stigmatized.

The results raise questions about the current configuration of the intentional crisis cluster articulated in situational crisis communication theory (SCCT). When just consider assessments crisis responsibility, a scansis would be part of the preventable crisis cluster. However, the evaluation of justice and greed suggest a scansis may be a unique crisis type that does not fit within the intentional crisis cluster and the prescribed short-term effects of crisis response strategies recommend by SCCT. The scansis establishes a boundary condition for the limits of crisis response strategies on short-term effects such as reputation and purchase intention. These findings require us to rethink elements of current crisis communication theory.

The lack of short-term benefits should not be an argument for abandoning accommodative crisis response strategies. Practitioners need to realize the limits of crisis response strategies for creating short-term benefits and think about the potential long-term benefits offered by crisis response strategies.

Scansis is a new concept for crisis communication and provides a link between the crisis communication and organizational stigma literatures. The two studies are the first attempts to empirically examine scansis and opens new avenues of thinking and research for crisis communication and organizational stigma researchers.