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The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

In June 2016, a clear majority of English voters chose to unilaterally take the United Kingdom out of the European Union (EU). According to many of the post-Brexit vote analyses, the single strongest motivating factor driving this vote was “immigration” in Britain, an issue which had long been the central mobilizing force of the United Kingdom Independence Party. The chapter focuses on how – following the bitter demise of multiculturalism – these Brexit related developments may now signal the end of Britain's postcolonial settlement on migration and race, the other parts of a progressive philosophy which had long been marked out as a proud British distinction from its neighbors. In successfully racializing, lumping together, and relabeling as “immigrants” three anomalous non-“immigrant” groups – asylum seekers, EU nationals, and British Muslims – UKIP leader Nigel Farage made explicit an insidious recasting of ideas of “immigration” and “integration,” emergent since the year 2000, which exhumed the ideas of Enoch Powell and threatened the status of even the most settled British minority ethnic populations – as has been seen in the Windrush scandal. Central to this has been the rejection of the postnational principle of non-discrimination by nationality, which had seen its fullest European expression in Britain during the 1990s and 2000s. The referendum on Brexit enabled an extraordinary democratic vote on the notion of “national” population and membership, in which “the People” might openly roll back the various diasporic, multinational, cosmopolitan, or human rights–based conceptions of global society which had taken root during those decades. This chapter unpacks the toxic cocktail that lays behind the forces propelling Boris Johnson to power. It also raises the question of whether Britain will provide a negative examplar to the rest of Europe on issues concerning the future of multiethnic societies.

THE British Tourist Authority, which entered its second decade of operations in 1980, traces its origins to the Come To Britain Movement inaugurated in 1926 by Sir Francis Towle, the managing director of a chain of hotels. Like countless other private initiatives, before and since, this soon attracted government interest and, after a public meeting at the Mansion House in December 1928, when it was agreed that an organisation designated as the Travel Association of Great Britain and Ireland should be formed, the President of the Board of Trade announced that the government intended to ask Parliament for the sum of £5000 during the forthcoming financial year to support the association's activities. The official purposes of the new body, formally registered in April 1929, were to increase the number of visitors from overseas and to stimulate the demand for British goods and services.

Introduction: It is commonly observed that the ratio of food prices during the war times had become significantly more important than usual periods within the countries including Turkey, known as the Ottoman Empire that previously defeated in Balkans just before the Great World War. The scope of the study is to analyze increased or decreased wheat prices together with price fluctuations during the war period.

Aim: This study investigates the food pricing progress during The Great World War and its relationship with wheat prices.

Method: A model for the behavior of time series is applied to compare the important days of the war data against the timeline of wheat prices for British, German, and French. The statistical test named Holt–Winters uses exponential smoothing technique to encode the various values from the past and predicts “typical” values for the present and the future.

Findings: As a result, it can be said that wheat prices had anomaly patterns during the specific dates in war for French, British, and German sides. Great Britain’s wheat prices increased significantly on April 1915 when landings began on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Wheat prices in Great Britain and Germany dropped significantly just before on July 1916 when the first Battle of the Somme began. However, it increased in Great Britain whilst decreased considerably in Germany in March 1918 when the Soviet Government signed a separate peace agreement with the Central Powers. A significant increase for France was observed only at the end of this war.

We analyse the labour market position of the second-generation minority ethnic groups in Britain and the United States in 1990 and 2000 on the basis of micro-data from the two most recent censuses of the population. We find that they were making progress, although some groups were still facing considerable disadvantages. The second-generation men were doing better in the United States than in Britain at both time points but the gaps were being narrowed. The second-generation women in Britain lagged behind their American counterparts in the first period, but they were doing equally well in the two countries in 2001. The overall pattern is one of small but notable progress and shows somewhat greater support for the revised straight-line theory than for the segmented assimilation theory.

Based on representative longitudinal data (CNEF 1980–2013) the paper analyzes gender differences of the level and the determinants of earnings dynamics in the work life of different cohorts of employees in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Notwithstanding country differences concerning the existing welfare state regime constituting the institutional settings of the labor market, the educational system, and family role models, the empirical results show decreasing earnings mobility in the work history. The earnings level, educational attainment, family size, the occupational choice, the career stage, the birth cohort, and the macroeconomic fluctuations significantly influence earnings mobility. In the United States, earnings mobility is significantly lower and gender differences are less pronounced than in Germany and Great Britain. The gender gap of earnings mobility is less expressed for younger cohorts of German employees. The increase of the gender gap of earnings dynamics in the course of the work career indicates continuing heterogeneity of labor market behavior and outcome of women and men which contribute to persistent economic and social stratification.

The welfare state as suggested and recommended by the Beveridge Report of 1942 and as subsequently applied since the mid 1940s, is a far cry to the welfare state which exists today in Great Britain, for, as a result of economic pressures, the recession, various other factors, and particularly the political ideology of the present Tory government under Mrs. Margaret Thatcher and Mr. John Major which has been in power since 1979, it becomes clear that the golden age of the welfare state has lost much of its shine. Should the present government continue in office after the next general election, it could well be that the welfare state will dwindle into non‐significance. Indeed, there is currently a crisis in the British welfare state when compared with the ideals of Beveridge of freedom from want and providing people with their needs.