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The author presents new estimates of the probability weighting functions found in rank-dependent theories of choice under risk. These estimates are unusual in two senses. First, they are free of functional form assumptions about both utility and weighting functions, and they are entirely based on binary discrete choices and not on matching or valuation tasks, though they depend on assumptions concerning the nature of probabilistic choice under risk. Second, estimated weighting functions contradict widely held priors of an inverse-s shape with fixed point well in the interior of the (0,1) interval: Instead the author usually finds populations dominated by “optimists” who uniformly overweight best outcomes in risky options. The choice pairs used here mostly do not provoke similarity-based simplifications. In a third experiment, the author shows that the presence of choice pairs that provoke similarity-based computational shortcuts does indeed flatten estimated probability weighting functions.

We examine the effects of pre-play communication in an experimental game with conflicting risk-dominant and payoff-dominant equilibria. We find that most players condition their choices on the messages received, and do so in an intuitive way, announcing an intention to play the payoff-dominant action, and choosing the payoff-dominant action if the opponent expresses the same intention. However, a significant minority of players misrepresent their intentions. In some sessions where these players appear, behavior converges to an equilibrium in which subjects misrepresent their intentions and play the risk-dominant equilibrium.

Trust involves making oneself vulnerable to another person with the prospect of receiving some benefit in return. Contemporary theoretical accounts of trust among strangers emphasize its instrumental nature. People are assumed to trust to the extent that they can tolerate the risk and are sufficiently optimistic that their trust will be reciprocated. We describe evidence from laboratory economic games showing that this account empirically fails. Participants often trust even though their risk tolerance and social expectations suggest they should not. We propose, instead, that trust is largely an expressive act. People trust because of dynamics that surround the act itself rather than its potential outcomes. Evidence for the expressive nature of trust comes in two forms. First, studies of the emotions surrounding trust indicate that it is significantly predicted by how people feel about the act itself, not how they feel about its potential outcomes. Second, trust rates rise significantly if people are placed in a relationship with another person, no matter how anonymous, fleeting, or minimal that relationship is – presumably because being placed in a relationship evokes social norms that promote trust. We end our discussion by explaining a curious fact that participants grossly underestimate the trustworthiness of others. We also discuss possible motives for reciprocating trust and questions for future research.