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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ownership structure on the goodwill impairment policy of Malaysian listed firms. In particular, the authors test whether the direction and magnitude of goodwill impairment are related to whether firms are government or family controlled firms. Given the highly concentrated ownership of firms in Malaysia, the authors suggest that the “entrenchment effect” will take precedence over the “alignment effect”, which will be reflected in the accounting policy on goodwill valuation and impairment.

This study utilizes logistic and Tobit regressions to test the prediction, controlling for a range of factors that might affect the goodwill impairment decision. The data were manually collected through 579 firm-year observations from the financial reports of companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia web site for the period 2003-2009.

The authors find that family controlled firms are more likely to record goodwill impairment than non-family controlled firms. The results are, however, not significant in government-controlled firms. Similar evidence in prior studies finds that Malaysian firms are more likely to recognize and record higher goodwill impairment loss in their first year of adoption than in the subsequent years. Interestingly, in contrast to prior studies, longer chief executive officer (CEO) tenure is found to be positively associated with the likelihood to recognize and record higher impairment of goodwill.

This paper is one of few studies that examine the role of ownership structure on goodwill accounting policy choice where ownership structure is highly concentrated and government owned firms play a significant role in the economy. The paper also examines goodwill policy choice before, during the transition and subsequent to the adoption of the goodwill standard in Malaysia, which has not been addressed before.

This study tests the signaling and tunneling models of dividend policies by examining the relationship between the ownership structure and the dividend payout in a setting where strong institutional governance and weak firm-level governance coexist.

Chinese American Depository Receipts (ADRs) listed in the US offer an excellent opportunity to study dividend policy where strong institutional governance and weak firm-level governance coexist. Using a sample of 161 Chinese ADRs from 2004 to 2018, this study examines the relationship between the firm's ownership structure and cash dividend policy.

This study shows that high levels of controlling shareholder ownership and high levels of state ownership are associated with high dividend payouts. A high level of controlling shareholder ownership has a negative effect on its firm value. Dividend payments in those firms mitigate the negative effect, consistent with the signaling (substitution) model. A high level of state ownership is beneficial to its firm value. However, high dividend payment in those firms decreases the benefit, supporting the tunneling model.

This study covers 161 Chinese ADRs listed in the US with a total market capitalization of over $2 trillion and reveals that dividend tunneling could occur in Chinese government controlled ADRs. Findings in this study would offer valuable insights for US investors and regulators.

This paper extends the tunneling hypothesis to the topic of dividend policy in a setting where strong institutional governance and weak firm-level governance coexist. This study shows that tunneling through dividends can happen among Chinese government controlled ADRs in the US. It also complements the literature by extending the examination of the dividend tunneling model from a relatively small universe of master limited partnership (Atanssov and Mandell, 2018) to a larger universe of Chinese ADRs listed in the US with a total market capitalization over $2 trillion US dollars.

This paper aims to investigate the interconnections between corporate ownership, tax system and controlling shareholder tunneling through intercorporate loans in an emerging market setting.

China’s Enterprises Income Tax reform in 2008 abolished its previous multiple-tiers tax system under which foreign direct investment (FDI) firms enjoyed preferential tax rates than domestic firms by introducing a new unified-rate tax system. Using difference-in-differences tests, the author analyzes changes of controlling shareholders tunneling through intercorporate loans among Chinese listed companies around this reform.

The author documents significant reductions of intercorporate loans after the reform. More importantly, the author reveals that foreign-invested firms experienced larger reductions of intercorporate loans than domestic firms. The author also shows that state association matters for domestic firms’ response to the reform. In addition, the author documents positive stock market reaction to the tax reform announcement for firms that exhibited higher level of tunneling prior to the reform, indicating market expectation of reduced principal-principal conflict post-reform.

The findings suggest effective corporate governance system is warranted to constrain intercorporate fund transfers in emerging markets where tax incentives are used for attracting inward foreign direct investments. Institutional reforms in emerging markets aimed at removing market frictions can alleviate the problem of controlling shareholder expropriations of minority interests or tunneling.

This is a pioneering study that reveals the role of tax as a public governance mechanism in weak minority investor protection environment.

This research aims to examine the effect of ownership structure on dividend policy using the Indonesian context. The most common ownership structure is concentrated in the hand of family owners except in the UK and USA (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000). Family owners hold more than half of the companies in Indonesia (Carney & Child, 2013; Claessens et al., 2000). Family firms play an important role in Indonesia. Another important characteristic that emerges is the rise of government- and foreign-controlled firms in Indonesia. Thus, this research also divides ownership concentration into family firms, government-controlled and foreign-controlled firms.

Samples of this research consist of dividend announcements during 2006-2012 in Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research excluded financial data because these have characteristics that are different non-financial sectors’ characteristics. The final sample of this research consists of a 710 firm-year observation.

The result of this research shows that ownerships have a positive effect on dividend payout. This research divides the sample into family-controlled firms, government-controlled firms (GOEs) and foreign-controlled firms. This research shows that government- and foreign-controlled firms have a positive impact on dividend payout. However, family firms have a negative effect on the dividend payout. Family firms pay lower dividends because they prefer to control it themselves. Family firms earn benefit from those resources, but at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, family firms engage in expropriation to minority shareholders.

This study focuses on ownership structure of Indonesian listed firm. This study does not analyze the impact of other corporate governance mechanism such as board structure on dividend decisions. The owner of the companies (family, government and foreign firm) has an opportunity to put their member as part of board members. However, this study does not analyze the impact of board structure on dividend decisions.

This study provides evidence that ownership concentration positively affects dividend payout. However, there is a different effect of ownership structure (family-controlled firms, GOEs and foreign-controlled firm). Government- and foreign-controlled have a positive effect; however, family-controlled firm have a negative effect on dividend payout. Therefore, this study provides evidence of the importance of ownership structure on dividend decision.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether, and to what extent, corporate diversification into related and unrelated businesses affects capital structure choices, and whether ownership structure is germane to the understanding of corporate diversification strategies and debt‐equity financing choices.

Univariate approaches include the parametric two‐sample t‐test, non‐parametric Kolmogorov‐Smirnov test and Kruskal‐Wallis rank test, and cluster analysis. Multivariate approaches include panel data regressions to identify the sign and magnitude of the effect of diversification on capital structure, after controlling for a number of industry and firm characteristics as suggested in the literature.

Corporate diversification into related or unrelated industries has opposite effects on capital structure, after controlling for ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Consistent with the prediction of organizational economics, an increase in the degree of business relatedness is associated with a reduction in debt while an increase in business unrelatedness is associated with an increase in debt. In addition, there is strong evidence that government‐controlled firms use less debt financing and that government ownership weakens the positive relationship between unrelated diversification and leverage. The results are robust to different measures of capital structure.

Traditional finance literature has not been able to provide conclusive evidence on what affects corporate capital structure decisions. This paper shows that a corporate strategy perspective, with its emphasis on a managerial decision‐making process, can provide a behavioral basis for understanding capital structure choices.

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government control and firm value in China.

Government might extract social or political benefits from a state-controlled firm, thus decreases firm value. However, government’s monitoring on firm management reduces managers’ agency problem, which increases firm value. We first build a game-theoretic model to prove the existence of optimal government control given these two roles of government, and we then employ the OLS regression method to test the theory predictions using the length of intermediate ownership chains connecting the listed state-owned enterprises to their ultimate controllers as the measure of government control.

We find that firm values first increase then decrease as government control weakens. Moreover, we find that government usually retains a stronger control over state-owned enterprises than the optimal level. In addition, we show that government control can be further weakened in firms with good corporate governance mechanisms, which serve as a substitution of government monitoring.

Our results demonstrate that government control in China is still a necessary but costly mechanism to mitigate agency costs, especially when corporate governance system is underdeveloped.

We identify the substitution effect between government control and corporate governance using a unique measure of government control.

This study aimed at investigating the influence of corporate governance on firm risk during the Chinese state enterprise reform. The purposes of this study are to examine the effects of board independence, state ownership and other governance variables on firm risk and to check the influence of controlling shareholder types on firm risk.

This study uses the dynamic and static panel model to estimate the effects of board independence, state ownership and other governance factors on return volatility. To examine the influence of controlling shareholder types on corporate risk-taking, this study further used the treatment effect model (or sample selection model) to analyze the effect of private, state-owned enterprise (SOE) entity, central government and local government controls on corporate risk-taking.

It was found that the enforcement of board independence significantly increases firm risk. The strategy of decentralizing state enterprises (from central government to local government) is a good way to achieve stable stock returns.

This study contributes to existing knowledge in several ways. First, it focused on independent directors rather than on the size of the corporate board. Second, it highlighted the impacts of state ownership and control on corporate risk. Instead of treating all types of state ownership as homogenous, SOEs are further classified into directly controlled and indirectly controlled, in line with prior studies.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of state shareholding and control versus institutional investors on tax aggressiveness of Chinese listed firms.

By exploring recently available tax reconciliation data required under 2006 Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises on a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms, the authors calculate a direct measure of tax aggressiveness and investigate the influence of firm ownership structure on their tax aggressiveness.

The authors find that state ownership and control are positively associated with corporate tax aggressiveness. A positive link between the collective shareholding by the top ten shareholders and firm tax aggressiveness is also found. In contrast, institutional share ownership is negatively associated with corporate tax aggressiveness.

The results indicate that political connections and ownership concentration empower firms to pursue aggressive tax planning, whereas institutional investors partially mitigate such influences.

This paper complements recent studies on tax aggressiveness in the USA by analyzing tax planning activities of Chinese listed firms. The authors highlight firm ownership and control factors that encourage aggressive tax planning in China. This paper has important implications for both public policy and corporate governance in emerging markets similar to China.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the market reactions and its determinants of the releasing of restricted non‐tradable shares and to provide some useful information for the coming releasing peak of IPO‐restricted shares in China.

The paper employs event study and empirical analysis.

It was found that the cumulative abnormal return during the releasing windows is significantly negative, and firm quality, agency problems, and the market trading activity play important roles in explaining the negative market relations. This evidence shows that the cumulative abnormal returns during the releasing windows are positively associated with firm performance, assets turnover ratio, assets quality and trading turnover ratio, and are negatively associated with market‐to‐book ratio, financial leverage, the local government or private character of the ultimate ownership controller, and sum of trading on the announcement day.

The paper's value to investors is to show that one should choose firms with good financial position, not controlled by local government or private, and refer to the market trading activity in releasing windows. The paper's value to regulation parties is that they should regulate disclosure quality of financial reports, and avoid arbitrage due to information asymmetry during the releasing process to reduce the negative wealth effects to investors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of independent directors on firm performance in Vietnam and identify how different types of ownership structure and the presence of controlling shareholders influence the relationship.

For a sample of 217 non-financial Vietnam-listed companies during the period from 2010 to 2014, this study uses the ordinary least squares regressions to estimate the relationship between independent directors and firm performance. Two econometric techniques – the fixed effects estimation and the difference in difference estimation – are used to control for endogeneity. The results are also robust to the lag variable of independent directors.

The results reveal that independent directors have an overall negative effect on firm operating performance. This finding may be because of information asymmetry, expertise disadvantage and the dominance of ownership concentration that prevent independent directors from fulfilling their monitoring function in governance. The negative relationship between independent directors and firm performance is stronger in firms where the State is a controlling shareholder.

Findings suggest that changes relating to independent directors, as a response to the new corporate governance code in 2012, do not have a positive effect on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Further reform is required to improve internal control mechanisms and corporate governance systems in Vietnam.

This is the first study to provide a robust evidence on the relationship between independent directors and firm performance in Vietnam as well as to explore the impact of the type of controlling shareholders on the relationship.