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Reverse logistics (RL) is a waste revaluation process aimed at reintroducing once-used materials back into the production cycle. Public administration (PA) plays a strong role in influencing the implementation of RL in the construction industry through policy and laws. While much research identifies PA as an important driver in RL, no research yet describes how this occurs.

A systematic literature review was conducted on the theme PA in RL with 93 relevant publications retrieved.

Six strategies used by PA to promote RL were extracted: (1) legislation, (2) government subsidies, (3) landfill disposal fee, (4) government inspection, (5) use in public construction works and (6) penalties and fines. Moreover, a typology built on these six strategies was developed, mapping 15 interactional relationships between strategies, according to three levels of influence: (1) encouragement (2) requirement and (3) regulation.

It was found that legislation and government subsidies prove to be the more effective strategies, with the remaining strategies greatly neglected. Importantly, however, this study reveals that a combination of strategies are most effective when appropriately combined.

This study confirms the importance of PA in RL, in construction, while documenting the extent of current research. The resulting proposed typology, along with 15 identified future research priorities, is expected to be of value to academics and policy makers looking to advance understanding in this domain.

This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports and uses the system dynamics model to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, aiming to promote the development of foreign trade of film copyright and innovation and development of the film industry so as to improve the overall social benefits of the film industry and provide policy enlightenment for enhancing the import power of foreign core enterprises to introduce domestic film copyrights.

In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, the core enterprises of film copyright export and imports is constructed, the evolution process of cooperation strategy is derived, the impact of innovation income coefficient, mixed incentive policy and single incentive policy on the evolution results is analyzed, and the system dynamic model is used to simulate to find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The results show that export-oriented core firms are more sensitive to mixed incentives, while import-oriented core firms respond more quickly to single incentives. The large innovation income coefficient has a negative impact on the willingness of import-oriented core enterprises to cooperate. The study proposes measures to increase the willingness of core companies to participate.

Due to the fact that numerical simulation is based on simulation, there may be a certain gap between it and the actual situation. Therefore, it is necessary to further use actual data to conduct empirical analysis on the theoretical model.

This article mainly focuses on analyzing the impact of strategy choices and related parameters of various entities on the incentive mechanism and studying the foreign trade cooperation strategies of film copyright export enterprises under policy support from a theoretical model perspective. Furthermore, research has proven that in order to effectively enhance the willingness of foreign import core enterprises to participate in the foreign trade of domestic film copyrights, the government needs to coordinate the use of single incentive policies and mixed incentive policies. This study provides a major contribution for policymaker to develop film copyright import and export trade.

Based on the research conclusions, this paper puts forward management countermeasures to further improve the development of the film copyright import and export trade. The first is to enrich government incentive methods and stimulate the vitality of film copyright and foreign trade market entities. The second is to guide the core enterprises of film copyright export to increase investment in innovation and stimulate the endogenous driving force of industrial development. Finally, lengthen the foreign trade industry chain of film copyright and increase the income of film derivatives.

Firstly, this paper applies the research methods of evolutionary game and system dynamics simulation to the field of foreign trade research on film copyright and expands the research perspectives and methods of the film industry. Secondly, by analyzing the “cost-benefit incentive” relationship of the evolutionary game of government export-oriented core enterprises and importing core enterprises, an evolutionary game model is constructed, the quantitative point of tripartite interest decision-making is solved and the research object of the evolutionary game method is expanded. Finally, the system dynamics model is used to simulate and find the optimal selection results of single and mixed government incentives under dynamic changes, so as to provide reference for the government’s dynamic incentive decision-making.

The paper aims to elucidate effective strategies for promoting the adoption of green technology innovation within the private sector, thereby enhancing the value of public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operational phase.

Utilizing prospect theory, the paper considers the government and the public as external driving forces. It establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government regulators, the private sector and the public. The paper uses numerical simulations to explore the evolutionary stable equilibrium strategies and the determinants influencing each stakeholder.

The paper demonstrates that government intervention and public participation substantially promote green technology innovation within the private sector. Major influencing factors encompass the intensity of pollution taxation, governmental information disclosure and public attention. However, an optimal threshold exists for environmental publicity and innovation subsidies, as excessive levels might inhibit technological innovation. Furthermore, within government intervention strategies, compensating the public for their participation costs is essential to circumvent the public's “free-rider” tendencies and encourage active public collaboration in PPP project innovation.

By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the paper comprehensively examines the roles of government intervention and public participation in promoting green technology innovation within the private sector, offering fresh perspectives and strategies for the operational phase of PPP projects.

Recycling and reuse of the electric vehicle (EV) batteries are ways to extend their limited lives. If batteries can be traced from production to recycling, it is beneficial for battery recycling and reuse. Using blockchain technology to build a smart EV battery reverse supply chain can solve the difficulties of lack of trust and data. The purpose of this study is to discuss the behavioural evolution of a smart EV battery reverse supply chain under government supervision.

This study adopts evolutionary game theory to examine the decision-making behaviours of the government, EV manufacturers with recycled used batteries and third-party EV battery recyclers lacking professional recycling qualification.

On the smart reverse supply chain integrated by blockchain technology, a cooperative recycling strategy of the third-party EV battery recycler is the optimal choice when the government tends to actively regulate. The probability of the EV manufacturer choosing the blockchain adoption strategy exceeds (below) the threshold, and the government prefers negative (positive) supervision. According to numerical analysis, in the mature stage in the EV battery recycling industry, when the investment cost of applying blockchain is high, EV manufacturers' willingness to apply blockchain slows down, the government accelerates adopting a negative supervision strategy and third-party EV battery recyclers prefer cooperative recycling.

The results of this study provide opinions on the strength of government supervision and the conditions under which EV manufacturers and third-party EV battery recyclers should apply blockchain and cooperate. On the other hand, this study provides theoretical analysis for promoting the application of blockchain technology in smart reverse supply chain.

Compared with previous research, this study reveals the relevance of government supervision, blockchain application and cooperation strategy in smart EV battery reverse supply chain. In the initial stage, even if the subsidy (subsidy reduction rate) and penalty are high and the penalty reduction rate is low, the EV manufacturer should rather give up the application of blockchain technology. In the middle stage in the EV battery recycling industry, the government can set a lower subsidy (subsidy reduction rate) combined with a penalty or a higher penalty (penalty reduction rate) combined with a subsidy to supervise it. The third-party EV battery recycler is advised to cooperate with the EV manufacturer when the subsidy is low or the penalty is high.

Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.

To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.

Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.

Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

This study aims to identify group structural elements that should be assessed in e-Government strategy formulation processes at local government level for service delivery in South Africa. These elements influence the success or effectiveness of the strategy formulation process.

The theoretical framework of group structural elements by Asplund and nine other strategy formulation-related approaches are reflected upon. Weick’s approach of theory development is used to guide the theoretical analysis. A pragmatic approach is applied to conduct the empirical investigation using a case study of a digital citizen engagement project in South Africa.

The paper highlights the following group elements that influence the strategy formulation process: group member relations, degree of differentiation within the group and resources of the group. Not addressing these structural elements may result in a lack of creativity or a reluctance to participate in the context of public sector engagement.

The paper does not provide an exhaustive list of all aspects that necessitate assessment before and during a strategy formulation process, for example, organisational and environment structural elements.

Assessing group structural elements provides valuable knowledge on how to engage stakeholders in a joint problem-solving activity. This is particularly pertinent where citizen engagement is fundamental to addressing basic service delivery concerns.

In the South African local municipal context, there is no existing literature that discusses the need to assess group structural elements influencing the outcome of an e-Government strategy formulation process.

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the interactive conflicts between business and governmental authorities in the regulatory process of an emerging business model: sharing economy. Focusing on bike sharing system, the study also investigates the conflict-handling strategy of bike sharing companies and government regulation.

An evolutionary game model is introduced to illustrate the interactive conflict between bike sharing companies and government regulation, combined with system dynamics (SD) to simulate the evolutionary conflict-handling strategies between the two players.

The dynamic strategies of the two players are observed, and under five conditions the conflict outcomes are evolutionary stable states. Simulations show that each party sacrifices part of its interest and adjust its strategy according to that of the other, indicating the conflict-handling strategy as a compromising mode. Furthermore, the strategies of bike sharing companies are sensitive to additional operation and maintenance costs for producing low-quality bicycles and costs of positive regulation, which provides theoretical guidance for regulatory authorities.

The station-less bike sharing come up in China recently, and it is an important research field of entrepreneurship. Owing to the uniqueness and novelty of the phenomenon, conflicts and challenges exist during the regulation process. Thus, the study practically contributes to the conflict-handling strategies of businesses and government under the context of sharing economy. Methodologically, as a novel issue with less available data to carry out empirical research, this study combines evolutionary game theory with SD to shed light on the complex interactions between businesses and government. The research method can be applied to other entrepreneurial studies.

The construction industry is widely recognized as one of the most hazardous sectors in the world. Despite extensive research on safety management, a critical issue remains that insufficient attention is devoted to safety practices in rural areas. Notably, accidents frequently occur during the construction of rural self-built houses (RSH) in China. Safety management tends to be overlooked due to the perceived simplicity of the construction process. Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge that China currently lacks comprehensive laws and regulations governing safety management in RSH construction. This paper aims to analyze the behavior of key stakeholders (including households, workmen, rural village committee and the government) and propose recommendations to mitigate safety risks associated with RSH construction.

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the symbiotic evolution among households, workmen and rural village committee, in situations with or without government participation. Additionally, numerical simulation is utilized to examine the outcomes of various strategies implemented by the government.

Without government participation, households, workmen, and rural village committee tend to prioritize maximizing apparent benefits, often overlooking the potential safety risks. Numerical simulations reveal that while government involvement can guide these parties towards safer decisions, achieving the desired outcomes necessitates the adoption of reasonable and effective strategies. Thus, the government needs to offer targeted subsidies to these stakeholders.

Considering that during the construction phase, stakeholders are the main administrators accountable for safety management. However, there exists insufficient research examining the impact of stakeholder behavior on RSH construction safety. This study aims to analyze the behavior of stakeholders about how to reduce the safety risks in building RSH. Thus, the authors intend to contribute to knowledge in this area by establishing evolutionary game model. Firstly, this study carried out a theoretical by using tripartite evolutionary game to reveal the reasons for the high safety risk during building RSH. Practically, this research points out the important role of households, workmen and rural village committee in improving safety management in rural areas. Besides, some suggestions are proposed to the government about how to reduce construction safety risks in rural areas.

This study aims to explore Twitter use by Korea's central government by classifying the government's Twitter-based networking strategies into government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-government (G2G) strategies.

The study investigates the nature of social media interactions and networking strategies in the Korean government by extracting tweets, follower/following relationships, and hyperlinks for 32 ministries. Network patterns and networking strategies are reviewed through descriptive statistical analysis and social network analysis to map the government's Twitter activity.

The results indicate that the government's direct networking strategy targeting citizens does not necessarily motivate their participation in the government's social media activities but that it plays an instrumental role in reinforcing G2G relationships.

This study investigates the social media use patterns (e.g. network properties and co-link analyses) and strategies (e.g. the reciprocity of relationships and content-push strategies) in the context of G2C and G2G relationships in Korea's public sector.