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Changing political landscape often renews the call for dramatic changes to federal community and economic development grant-in-aid programs. The most dramatic proposal in recent years was President Bush’s 2006 call to consolidate federal assistance programs for communities into a new block grant known as the Strengthening America’s Communities Initiative (SACI). This conceptual study reviews key characteristics of intergovernmental transfers including grant types, features, changes in the intergovernmental fiscal environment, the fungibility/flypaper debate, and the symmetry/asymmetry response of governments to declining intergovernmental revenue. The effects of intergovernmental transfers on state and local governments are connected to differences in grant design features. Potential fallout from proposed or similar changes to grant structure is discussed using the SACI proposal as an example.

The purpose of this paper is to make policy recommendations for the current fiscal decentralization discussion by examining the operating mechanisms of local taxes, unconditional grants, and conditional grants within the fiscal relationships between the national government and local governments in Korea.

After examining the current fiscal relationships between the national government and the local governments, this paper analyzes trends of local taxes, unconditional grants from both national and high-level local governments, and conditional grants from both national and high-level (or provincial level) local governments between 2002 and 2015. Local governments are classified into high-level local governments, and three types of low-level local governments are: si, kun, and ku.

Since the structure of local government finances in Korea is very complicatedly intertwined, the present decentralization discussion regarding increasing the share of local tax revenues may not achieve its purpose of fiscal decentralization. The authorities in charge of revenue allocation should be first decentralized at high-level local governments; high-level local governments should then arrange unconditional and conditional grants from high-level local governments to low-level local governments while taking into consideration unconditional and conditional grants from the national government to low-level governments.

The dichotomy between the central government and local municipalities has been utilized in the existing discussion regarding fiscal decentralization in Korea, but this study highlights the important resource allocation roles of high-level local governments.

Australian fiscal federalism possesses a greater degree of vertical imbalance than comparable federations elsewhere due to a concentration of revenue-raising powers at the level of the Commonwealth government and a concentration of expenditure functions at the state and local government levels. Efforts to deal with this problem have focused on intergovernmental grants. While substantial literature exists on the financial nexus between the Commonwealth and state governments, little research effort has been expended on the local government grants process. The present paper seeks to remedy this by documenting the evolution and role of the local government grants process.

In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.

The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.

The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.

The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.

Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.

Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.

This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

An alternative system of local government finance is proposed based on two taxes—property and residents'—to finance different types of services and promote local accountability and decentralisation.

Predictive models of government spending behavior based solely on the median voter theory have demonstrated limited utility, particularly when intergovernmental grants are involved. Since the 1970s, research on the impact of intergovernmental grants and aids on recipient governments has demonstrated that spending increases greater than predicted by the median voter theory, a.k.a. the “flypaper effect.” One of the challenges facing those trying to empirically test for the flypaper effect is the limited availability of unconditional grants. This study attempts to fill that void in the literature by testing the relationship between spending in 581 Wisconsin cities and villages and state aid receipts through its Shared Revenue program. The findings are generally consistent with previous studies of the flypaper effect, meaning that recipient governments spend more than would be predicted by the median voter theory. As such, the authors suggest that pure economic theories of government spending are limited and that political and institutional factors need to be given greater consideration.

For individuals and organizations who seek grant money, this guide details major information resources useful to identifying sources of financial sponsorship. It covers grants made by government agencies, by private foundations, and by business and industrial concerns, and should be of interest to persons seeking financial support for organizational or community projects, or individual scholarly endeavors. Excluded from this guide are general materials that review the history of charitable giving, or the role of philanthropy in society, as well as information sources devoted exclusively to scholarships and loans for undergraduate education.