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The objective of the study is to determine if an over-borrowing bias emerges when the state fiscal base is shared by multiple general-purpose and special-purpose jurisdictions serving different groups of citizens.

This study uses panel data from all 50 states in the US from 1997 to 2007 to estimate models of total debt levels of state governments and total debt levels of all local governments aggregated at the state level. For comparison, it also estimates total debt levels of state and local governments taken together for the same years.

This study finds that jurisdictional overlap will increase state government debt, local government debt, as well as combined state and local government debt.

The finding from the study suggests that the fiscal common-pool model provides a more accurate analysis and more appropriate understanding of the institutional composition at the state and local public sector, especially for the vertical dimension of the local public sector where there are more specialized and overlapping jurisdictions.

Debt-related financial derivative usage by state and local governments became a very salient topic over the last few years in light of the Great Recession and its impacts on the efficacy of these financial instruments. However, there has been a dearth of systematic research on the types and kinds of derivatives state and local governments have actually employed in recent years. While anecdotes of financial derivative usage has grabbed the headlines (such as the case of Jefferson County, Alabama), there has been little research examining the derivative portfolios among states or local governments pre- and post-Great Recession. Using descriptive research, this paper attempts to rectify this gap in the literature for state governments as a means of better understanding how the recent financial crisis has impacted the critical debt management decision to use financial derivatives.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the financial determinants of local government debt in New Zealand.

To investigate the financial determinants of local government debt in New Zealand, the authors analyse the relationship between key financial variables with local government debt in New Zealand based on the theories of fiscal accountability and moral hazard using a panel data methodology, specifically the pooled ordinary least squares regression model.

The findings suggest that council income is the major financial determinant of local government borrowing in New Zealand rather than infrastructural spending and that during the global financial crises (GFC) borrowing levels of New Zealand local councils was not significantly impacted. However, the findings indicate that post the GFC, low interest rates have stimulated increased borrowing activity by New Zealand local governments to fund infrastructure.

This paper is the first to examine the determinants of local government debt in New Zealand. The findings of this study contribute to better understanding of local government/municipality debt in New Zealand and internationally by providing evidence on the financial determinants of debt of local governments and the indirect use of government policy to control local government borrowing. The findings of this study are anticipated to affect local government practices and national government policies in relation to local government finances.

With China’s economic growth slowing down and the growth rate of fiscal revenue decreasing, the pressure on local government debts is further increasing. Under this background, it is of great significance to clarify the relation between local government debts and China’s economic growth in order to give full play to the positive role of local debts in stabling growth. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

Therefore, this paper explores the impact of Chinese local government debt on economic growth from theoretical and empirical aspects, respectively, and compares the regional differences between different debts and economic growth dynamics.

In the theoretical model part, this paper constructs a three-sector dynamic game model, under the two circumstances of whether local government is subject to debt constraints, and examines the relation between local government debt and economic growth and other variables through numerical simulation. Research shows that when the government is not constrained by debt, there is an inverted “U” relation between government debt and economic growth. When the government is constrained by debt, the economic growth rate gradually decreases as the government debt increases.

In the theoretical analysis part, this paper tries to estimate the amount of local debts under different calibers and examines the impact of different types of local government debts on China’s economic growth and their regional differences. The results show that excessive accumulation of government hidden debts in the eastern region is not conducive to economic growth, while explicit debts in the central and western regions significantly contribute to local economic growth. The results of empirical analysis are basically consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.

This paper aims to present four blue-sky ideas for lowering the cost of the Government of Canada’s debt without increasing the debt’s risk profile.

The authors argue that each idea would improve the secondary-market liquidity of government debt, thereby increasing the demand for government bonds, and thus, lowering their cost at issuance.

The first two ideas would improve liquidity by enhancing the active management of the government’s debt through market operations used to support the liquidity of outstanding bonds. The second two ideas would simplify the set of securities issued by the government, concentrating issuance in a smaller set of bonds that would each be more highly traded.

The authors discuss the ideas and give an account of the political, legal and operational impediments.

This paper aims to investigate whether the amount of local governments’ debt can be predicted by the level of political competition.

The study uses the artificial neural network (ANN) to test whether ANN can “learn” from the observed data and make reliable out-of-sample predictions of the target variable value (i.e. a local government’s debt level) for given values of the predictor variables. An ANN is a non-parametric prediction tool, that is, not susceptible to the common limitations of regression-based parametric forecasting models, e.g. multi-collinearity and latent non-linear relations.

The study finds that “political competition” is a useful predictor of a local government’s debt level. Moreover, a positive relationship between political competition and debt level is indicated, i.e. increases in political competition typically leads to increases in a local government’s level of debt.

The study contributes to public sector reporting literature by investigating whether public debt levels can be predicted on the basis of political competition while discounting factors such as “political ideology” and “fragmentation”. The findings of the study are consistent with the expectations posited by public choice theory and have implications for public sector auditing, policy and reporting standards, particularly in terms of minimising potential political opportunism.

This paper aims to investigate the effects of contractionary fiscal policy shocks on major Greek macroeconomic variables within a structural vector autoregression framework while accounting for debt dynamics.

The sign restriction approach is applied to identify a linear combination of government spending and government revenue shock simultaneously while accounting for debt dynamics. Additionally, output and unemployment responses to fiscal shocks under different scenarios concerning the amalgamation of austerity measures are considered.

The results indicate that a contractionary consumption policy shock, namely, a 1 per cent decrease in government consumption and a 1 per cent increase in indirect taxes, is preferred, as it produces a minor decrease in output and substantially decreases public debt, while a contractionary wage policy shock is suitable only when the government aims to sharply reduce public debt, as the consequences for the economy are harsh. A contractionary investment policy shock is not recommended, as it triggers a rise in unemployment and a fall in output, while the effect on the public debt is minor.

Policymakers should focus their efforts on reducing unproductive government consumption on the expenditure side. Concerning revenues, the reinforcement of tax administration is recommended to ensure that indirect taxes will be collected.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by providing a disaggregated analysis of the effects of fiscal policy actions in Greece by implementing several fiscal policy scenarios and accounting for the level of public debt. All scenarios are in the vein of the economic adjustment programs guidelines.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the size of government and public debt on real economic growth, for a panel of 175 countries around the world.

The paper utilizes the fixed‐effects and random‐effects techniques to estimate the panel regressions.

The results indicate that both the size of government and the extent of government indebtedness have negative effects on economic growth.

The findings suggest that the authorities ought to take the necessary steps to curtail excessive government spending and public debts, in order to promote economic growth.

The contribution of the paper is its application of the fixed‐ and random‐effects techniques in modeling the relation of real economic growth to the size of government and public debt, for a panel of 175 countries around the world.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the redistributive effect of domestic public debt: lenders to the government lie on the higher end of the income distribution, but the burden of debt financing falls on the entire tax base, to the extent that taxes are used to service debt. Because domestic debt is typically held by domestic lenders, this involves a redistribution of resources.

The author uses cross-country panel data on debt composition, and run regressions of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, using various specifications, controlling for a variety of macroeconomic, fiscal and political variables.

The author finds that the composition of public debt is consistently a significant determinant of income inequality: the domestic share of public debt is regressive and significant across all specifications, even controlling for total and external debt servicing, political conflict, corruption and a variety of government spending variables.

The data span 18 years (1990-2007) which means that long-run effects are hard to track. While the author has a good mix in the sample of observations from low-, middle- and high-income countries, the author is constrained in the choice of countries by the availability of data on inequality and on the composition of public debt.

This is the first paper to examine the composition of public debt in terms of domestic and external debt, and any bearing it may have on income inequality. The finding is also new for both the public debt and income inequality literatures: cross-country panel data are consistent with the belief that domestic debt redistributes resources from the entire tax base to wealthy holders of government debt in a way that external debt does not.

This chapter addresses the issue of the Global South external debt by mobilizing insights from Modern Monetary Theory, Ecological Economics, and Dependency Theory. It argues that the external debt problem of Southern governments is a reflection of their subordinate economic and monetary status. It shows why the argument of foreign currency shortage often used to explain the need for Southern governments to issue foreign currency debts remains superficial. In contrast to the usual focus on creditors, the chapter highlights the role played by foreign direct investment in the genesis of the chronic external indebtedness of most Southern countries. It argues then that the external debt of the South must be understood holistically not only as a manifestation of the unequal ecological exchange between the North and the South but also as an instrument that has contributed to reproducing and amplifying this pattern. Under these conditions, the cancellation or restructuring of the South's external debt stock and a few other unlikely concessions by the Northern countries will not be enough to abolish the “debt system.” This is an important lesson from the antiimperialist critique of the mid-1970s New International Economic Order (NIEO) agenda that current movements for Southern debt cancellation and Climate Justice would do well to remember.