Search results

Governments function differently from business organizations. Thus, performance or operational auditing becomes necessary to replace the measure of success evidenced by the latter through the measurement of profit. Governments are evaluated through performance auditing by measuring efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. Unique planning, specialized staffing, government oriented scope and government management reporting constitute the parameters of a performance auditing model appropriate for government officials and stakeholders.

This chapter describes the audit of local government in Italy. In Italy, as elsewhere, local audit has been affected by the implementation of new public management based reforms. There is an increasing trend towards collaboration and cooperation between the audited authority and the auditor. Audit has begun, as in other jurisdictions to widen its remit, so that it focusses on performance as much as financial and compliance issues. This change in role brings with it opportunities for the auditor to help public sector improvement but also challenges – as new skills are required for the new roles that the auditor takes on and audit independence is complicated by the cooperative nature of modern local government audit.

English local government audit has gone through fundamental change in the last decade and this period of instability looks certain to continue. Since 2014, councils have been audited by private sector auditors appointed theoretically by the councils themselves (though an overwhelming majority of councils have delegated this responsibility). The scope of audit after 2014 reduced to focus mainly on top-down financial management, rather than value for money or inspection. After growing concerns about the scope and quality of audit however, in 2020, the government commissioned Sir Tony Redmond to review local audit arrangements in England. The Redmond review identified several problems with the reformed structure and made recommendations for change. Currently, the sector is uncertain about what changes will be adopted to solve the issues discovered by Redmond.

This chapter provides an overview of local government auditing in New Zealand by outlining the nature of local government, particularly the legislative requirements in respect to financial and service performance reporting and those for external audit. It also summarises the role and powers of the Controller and Auditor-General and their office in respect to local government audit in New Zealand.

This chapter captures and summarises the public sector auditing practices of Swiss subnational and local governments. Following the federal structure of Switzerland and the constitutional principle of decentralisation, lower government levels independently self-elaborate their audit institutions and structures, which is why a large variety of public sector audit arrangements exists. Local government audit mainly varies between the subnational states/cantons regarding the allocation of the external audit function and the qualitative requirements underlying the constitution of the auditing bodies. Depending on the cantonal legislative framework, local government audit is performed by a body of direct-democratically elected lay-auditors, a professional audit firm, an own independent auditing office or in a shared arrangement involving multiple of these actors.

This chapter examines China’s corporate governance and accounting environment that shapes the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards. Specifically, it examines international influences, including supranational organizations; foreign investors and international accounting firms; domestic institutional influences, including the political system, economic system, legal system, and cultural system; and accounting infrastructure. China’s convergence is driven by desired efficiency of the corporate sector and legitimacy of participating in the global market. Influenced heavily by international forces in the context of globalization, corporate governance and accounting practices are increasingly becoming in line with internationally acceptable standards and codes. While convergence assists China in obtaining legitimacy, improving efficiency is likely to be adversely affected given that corporate governance and accounting in China operate in an environment that differs considerably from those of Anglo-American countries. An examination of the corporate governance and accounting environment in China suggests heavy government involvement within underdeveloped institutions. While the Chinese government has made impressive progress in developing the corporate governance and accounting environment for the market economy, China’s unique institutional setting is likely to affect how the imported concepts are interpreted and implemented.

This article analysed how data collection systems (DCS) developed by governmental audit organizations (Court of Accounts) affect budgetary planning within local governments.

Eighteen semi-structured interviews complemented by six time-lagged interviews via WhatsApp were carried out with the actors involved in the preparation and auditing of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in Brazilian local governments. Documents such as the structured layouts of Courts' DCS and the publicised MTEF prepared by local governments were also analysed.

The findings indicate that Courts' DCS structured layouts reduce local governments' budgetary planning autonomy in elaborating their MTEF. It happens as the Courts' main driver is to make MTEF information auditable and not to improve the usefulness of information by governments. As a result, the planning choices of the local governments end up limited, not by the general legislation but by the rules established by the computerized systems of the Courts.

The paper's originality relies on demonstrating that the digitalisation of audit processes ultimately affects local governments' practices through structured layouts for the data collection on MTEF information - that impose rigidity on the budget planning process of local governments. The authors highlight the role of public sector auditing organisations as potential catalysts of reforms; however, this should be considered cautiously since the drivers and motivations of the organisation that sponsors public financial management reforms matter for overall reform effectiveness.

The study focusses on explaining why advocates for reform to state audit in the United Kingdom (UK) in the early 1980s, focussed on improving the links between the new National Audit Office (NAO) and Parliament, rather than on traditional notions of audit independence. The study shows how this focus on the auditor's link to Parliament depends on a particular concept of liberty and relates this to the wider literature on the place of audit in democratic society.

Understanding the issue of independence of audit in protecting the liberties and rights of citizens needs addressed. In this article, the authors investigate the creation of audit independence in the UK in the National Audit Act (1983). To do so, the authors employ a neo-Roman concept of liberty to historical archives ranging from the late 1960s to 1983.

The study shows that advocates for audit reform in the UK from the 1960s to the 1980s were arguing for an extension to Parliament's power to hold the executive to account and that their focus was influential on the way that the new NAO was established. Using a neo-Roman concept of liberty, the authors show that they believed Parliamentary surveillance of the executive was necessary to secure liberty within the UK.

The neo-Roman republican concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, the preservation of liberty and democracy.

Public sector audit can be a fundamentally democratic activity. Auditors should be alert to the constitutional importance of their work and see parliamentary accountability as a key objective.

The neo-Roman concept of liberty extends previous studies in considering the importance of audit for public accountability, preservation of liberty and democracy.

This research determines the impact of local government’s internal audit process on the audit client management’s adoption of audit recommendations. Publicity of financial and operational problems in government in recent years has led to concerns about the quality of government audits, the extent of public managers’ adoption of audit recommendations, as well as citizen demand for accountability in government. In spite of this, the importance of the government audit process in ensuring accountability has gained little attention in public management research. A survey of local government audit executives was conducted to determine various aspects of the local government internal audit process and their relationships with audit client management’s adoption of audit recommendations. Results show that client management’s adoption of audit recommendation is a function of auditor professional designation, due diligence, client relations, documentation and tracking of audit recommendations, as well as of follow-up audits to verify implementation of agreed-upon action plans.

The authors examine how political players attempt to rationalise arguments for and against the expansion of auditing into governmental affairs, and how state audit authorities respond to politically motivated boundary work. This study is motivated by growing evidence of political involvement in attempts to both expand and undermine state audit oversight of government affairs.

The authors present an interpreted history (covering relevant events from 1995 to 2016) of political rationales and associated boundary work that led to the expansion of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario's (OAGO) mandate to audit government advertising campaigns for partisanship as well as attempts to modify this new audit remit over time.

The authors reveal substantive, formal and practical ways in which political players sought to rationalise/counter-rationalise expanding the OAGO's authority to the unfamiliar territory of advertising probity. The authors show how such justification claims ebb and flow in accordance with changeable political interests, and how state auditors react to the fraught nature of politically motivated boundary work.

The authors conceptualise important forms of rationalising rhetoric (which cannot be reduced to expressions of neoliberal government) that can be mobilised to deem state auditor authority legitimate in overseeing otherwise novel, unfamiliar and controversial government affairs. The authors also reveal a hitherto unrecognised resolve in state auditor responses to political intervention and shed further light on generalised forms of rationale that can underpin boundary work at the margins of accounting.