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The political influence on the determinants of capital structure has been under-researched for a long time. Taking the turnover of secretary of municipal committee as a political factor in China, this paper studies the effect of local government officials' turnover on firm's capital structure.

Starting with all A-shares listed firms in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2018, this paper implements the OLS estimation, staggered difference-in-difference approach to investigate the effects of political turnover on the choice of capital structure.

The results show that, driven by government officials' turnover, firms will significantly reduce their leverage. When comparing between formal finance (bank loans) and informal finance (payables), the reduction of capital structure is mainly driven by banks, not by suppliers. Furthermore, two possible channels have been investigated. First, the reduction effects are mainly driven by the SOEs when classifying the types of corporate ownership into SOEs and non-SOEs. Second, the reduction effects exist in areas with the more intense government intervention when considering the heterogeneity of the development of institutional environment in provinces.

This paper first contributes to the literature on the determinants of corporate choice on capital structure. Second, this paper enriches the studies on the economic consequences of local government officials' turnover.

The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of local political uncertainty on the asymmetric cost behavior (i.e. cost stickiness) for listed firms in China.

In this study, the authors manually collect the turnover data of prefecture-city officials as a measure of exogenous fluctuations in political uncertainty and obtain firm-level financial information from the China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. To perform the analysis, the authors augment the traditional cost stickiness model by including the interaction terms of the prefecture-city official turnover, and firm-level and prefecture-city level control variables.

The authors find that political turnover leads to a higher degree of cost stickiness, implying that firms retain slack resources when political uncertainty is high. Moreover, the effect of political turnover on cost stickiness is more pronounced for firms residing in regions with weaker institutional environments, and firms that are privately owned and with smaller size. The authors further provide evidence that policy uncertainty and the threat of losing political connection are two underlying channels. Overall, this study documents that the local political process is an important channel that influences corporate operational decisions.

This study provides the first piece of evidence on the relation between political uncertainty and cost stickiness at the local government level. Moreover, the authors propose and demonstrate two underlying channels through which political uncertainty affects firms' asymmetric cost behavior.

This paper aims to identify and evaluate the limitations related to Xin et al. (2022). The discussant also provide suggestions for future research along this line.

In this discussion, the discussant will attempt to identify the main limitations and provide suggestions for future improvement. This written discussion focuses on three main points. First, the discussant will focus on the incremental contribution. Second, the discussant will discuss some remaining issues with the empirical design and propose suggestions for further improvement. Lastly, the discussant will go over the underlying reasons behind the documented results.

Xin et al. (2022) investigate the original and important question of whether local leadership turnover leads to lower financial leverage.

Xin et al. (2022) contribute to the research line of the economic impact of political uncertainty by investigating the turnover year effect of local top leadership in the Chinese setting. Future research can improve our understanding by investigating the underlying mechanisms behind the documented results.

The purpose of this study tests whether political instability influence financial decision-making behavior of Tunisian-listed firms, in particular dividend payout policy.

This paper uses dividend payout decisions announced over the period 2008–2015 by nonfinancial firms listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange. A logistic regression is applied to analyze the relationship between political instability and dividend payout decision “changes. These latter are: past non-payers” dividend initiation, past payers' dividend termination, dividend payout “increasing and dividend payout” decreasing. Political instability variables used are as follows: number of changes in government head and dummy variables indicating the changes of ruling party and election year.

This study shows that government head changes are positively related to dividend initiation decisions while changes in ruling party are negatively related to termination dividend decisions except for family controlled ones. These firms are more likely to stop dividend on period of ruling party changes. Moreover, firms become unwilling to increase dividend payment on the period of political instability (changes in ruling party and government head and elections) and become willing to decrease dividend payment only when the government head changes.

The empirical findings contribute to the current debate on the signaling power of dividend policy in emerging market where raising equity capital is difficult and controlling shareholders prefer reinvest benefit to pay dividends. In addition, this study has important implications for regulators and governments struggling to design policies to improve investors' confidence and boost market activity. Indeed, investors may use corporate payout as a signal for better governance.

To the author' best knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate and to compare the effect of three political instability sources; government head changes, changes in ruling party and elections, on dividend payout decision changes. This paper provides evidence that firms facing political unstable environment seek to achieve two goals when they make dividend policy: reducing financial distress probability and attracting minority owners.

This paper aims to examine whether government intervention acts as a substitution mechanism for laws and institutions in affecting firms’ long-term debt financing decision and the moderating effect of firm ownership on the relationship between law and finance in Chinese capital market.

This study uses ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the firm level in the regressions. To address the potential endogeneity problem, the authors also use the system generalized method of moments in their estimation.

The results show that both long-term bank debt and long-term bank debt maturity structure ratios are positively related to government intervention. The results also reveal that with improvement in the legal environment, public non-state-owned firms have more access to long-term bank debt in the regions where the level of government intervention is low.

Government intervention appears to replace laws and institutions in influencing the allocation of financial resources in China.

The finding suggests the necessity of increasing the protection of both creditors and investors, and shows the importance of a free and independent judiciary system in allocating funds to private firms. The results also imply that the non-state-owned Chinese firms also benefit from the improved laws and institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the government intervention and bank competition on small and medium enterprise (SME) external debt financing in Chinese capital market.

This study uses ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered at the firm level. In addition, the authors use the dynamic system generalized method of moments to address the possible endogeneity issue in the regressions.

Using a sample of 908 firms from 2000 to 2010, the authors found that SMEs are more likely to access bank loans only in regions with higher level of government intervention than median government intervention. Further, the result shows that the government is motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions where the level of bank competition is lower than the median bank competition index. Last, the authors found evidence that firms with politically connected CEOs are likely to access bank loans.

This paper highlights that government intervention enables the SMEs to secure more bank loans. Second, the authors’ results imply that the government is motivated to help SMEs to obtain more external debt in regions with low level of bank competition.

This study contributes to the current literature by revealing that government intervention is the driving force alleviating SMEs’ constraints in accessing external financing. Second, this study finds the evidence to supports the argument that government has a strong motive to help SMEs to secure long-term credits for political purpose (Fan et al., 2012), when the level of bank competition is low (Berger and Udell, 2006).

The purpose of this paper is to understand the role of exogenous drivers that seeks to foster endogenous resilience and climate adaptation policy and practice in developing countries. It particularly examines the role of Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network as an exogenous driver that sought to sustain urban climate adaptation and resilience agenda in a secondary city in Indonesia.

The research combines fieldworks and desktop research. Primary data collection includes participant observation, unstructured interviews with city stakeholders and project managers, semi-structured interviews with local communities and literature reviews. This research also used an ethnographic field research approach.

Exogenous drivers have temporarily fostered climate change adaptation at city level, but the question remains is how can international actors effectively create a meaningful transformation toward urban resilience in developing countries like Indonesia. Exogenous drivers can play significant roles as a catalyst for urban adaptation planning, including undertaking vulnerability assessment and city resilience strategy and implementing adaptation actions, and facilitates risk management. Further processes for mainstreaming climate adaptation and disaster reduction depend on how receptive and responsive local actors to co-facilitate and co-lead urban resilience buildings and development.

There is still lack of documented knowledge on local institutional change and policy making processes. This research shows challenges and opportunities in institutionalising urban climate adaptation and risk management agenda. It further shows that genesis of endogenous adaptation cannot be separated from the exogenous climate adaptation processes as well as internal dynamic of urban governance in developing world.

Due to environmental externalities, micro-enterprises with profit-seeking features do not develop sufficient motivation for environmental governance. In a fiscally decentralized system, local environmental protection authorities perform environmental supervision, and the intensity of the regulations that they implement has an important influence on corporate environmental governance. Based on the promotion tournament framework, this paper aims to discuss the driving mechanism of corporate environmental governance using turnover of environmental protection department directors (EPDDs) as an indicator.

Using samples of A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges from 2007 to 2014, this paper examines the impact of EPDD turnover on corporate environmental governance and its underlying mechanism.

The results show that corporate environmental governance exhibits a political periodicity that changes with the turnover of the EPDD, and the periodicity remains after controlling for the influence of changes in provincial party secretary and governor. Internal mechanisms analysis indicates that, without financial independence, local environmental protection departments rely on increasing sewage charges, not environmental protection subsidies, to promote corporate environmental governance. Further, considering heterogeneity among officials, it finds that the younger a new EPDD is, the more pronounced the periodicity of corporate environmental governance. However, there is no significant difference between in-system and out-system turnover.

In general, this paper describes the mechanisms of corporate environmental governance from the perspective of political economics, and the results have implications for the potential improvement of the government’s environmental supervision functions and the development of ecological civilization in China.

This chapter examines one of the most contested issues in Public Administration, namely political–administrative relationships. The first part of the chapter begins with a brief overview of the features of an ideal-type bureaucracy. Next is a literature review of political–administrative relationships. This is followed by an analysis of typologies of political–administrative relationships, with particular reference to developing countries. The second part of the chapter analyses the evolution of political–administrative relationships since the dawn of South African democracy in 1994. It examines the growing politicisation of the public service, the weakening of the powers of public officials vis-a-vis Ministers and the emasculation of the PSC. Data indicate that the government is unable to fill posts at the Senior Management Service (SMS) level and that there are a high number of acting HoDs, an indicator of instability. Finally, it uses Dasandi and Esteve’s typology of political–administrative relationships in developing countries to interpret the South African case.

Studies concerning Soviet taxation demonstrate a diversity of opinions on the nature of turnover taxes. Four major views on the subject have emerged: (1) turnover taxes are simply a sales (excise) tax on articles' of consumption sold to the Soviet consumer; (2) not all turnover taxes are a sales tax, some of them are a substitute for rent on production of certain industrial materials; (3) in addition to being a sales (excise) tax on consumer goods and rent on some industrial materials, there exists a third type of turnover tax which is levied on agricultural production of the peasantry; (4) turnover taxes are a portion of the surplus product produced in industry and agriculture.