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Despite agreement on the importance of adopting governance structures for developing competitive advantage, we still know little about why or how governance mechanisms are adopted in the first place. We also acknowledge that family businesses with formal governance mechanisms in place still resort to informal means to make decisions, and we lack knowledge about why certain governance mechanisms are sometimes, but not always, effective and functional. Given these research gaps, and drawing on institutional theory, we aim to explore: How are governance structures adopted and developed in family firms? Once adopted, how do family businesses perceive these governance structures?

Using Mokken Scale Analysis, a method suitable to uncover patterns/sequences of adoption/acquisition over time, we analyze a dataset of 1,488 Spanish family firms to explore if there is a specific pattern in the implementation of governance structures. We complement the analysis with descriptive data about perceived usefulness of such structures.

Our findings highlight two important issues. Family businesses follow a specific process implementing first business governance (board of directors, then executive committee), followed by family governance (family council then family constitution). We suggest they do so in response to institutional pressures, given the exposure they have to business practices, and their need to appear legitimate. Despite formal adoption of governance structures, family businesses do not necessarily consider them useful. We suggest that their perception about the usefulness of the implemented governance structures may lead to their ceremonial adoption, resulting in a gap between the implementation and functionality of such structures.

Our article contributes to the family business literature by bringing novel insights about implementation of governance structures. We take a step back to explain why these governance mechanisms were adopted in the first place. Using institutional theory we enrich governance and family business literatures, by offering a lens that explains why family businesses follow a specific process in adopting governance structures. We also offer a plausible explanation as to why governance structures are ineffective in achieving their theorized role in the context of family businesses, based on the family's perception of the unusefulness of such structures, and the concept of ceremonial adoption.

There is no single recipe that can serve the multiple needs of different family businesses. This indicates that family businesses may need diverse levels of development and order when setting up their governance structures. Accordingly, this study constitutes an important point of demarcation for practitioners interested in examining the effectiveness of governance structures in family firms. We show that an important pre-requisite for examining the effectiveness of governance structures is to start by investigating whether these structures are actually being used or are only adopted ceremonially.

Our paper expands current knowledge on governance in family firms by taking a step back hinting at why are governance structures adopted in the first place. Focusing on how governance is implemented in terms of sequence is novel and relevant for researcher and practitioners to understand how this process unfolds. Our study uses institutional theory, which is a strong theory to support the results. Our paper also uses a novel method to study governance structures in family firms.

This study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the capital structure of Latin American firms.

The sample included companies from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The authors collected data from 201 non-financial companies between 2009 and 2018, totalizing 1,716 firm-year observations. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and linear regression models with panel data.

The main results indicated that chief executive officer duality, legal protection system and corporate social responsibility voluntary disclosure impact the firm's total debt ratio, corresponding to a positive effect for the first two variables and a negative for the last.

This study advances in two main ways. Firstly, due to the broad approach in which the authors addressed corporate governance, involving board composition, ownership structure, minority shareholders legal protection system and information disclosure. Secondly, by presenting empirical evidence about the effects of corporate governance on capital structure from an extensive sample of Latin American firms, the authors expect to contribute to the international debate on the capital structure due to the unique characteristics of Latin America in this regard.

Prior studies on Islamic finance provide a limited linkage between organizational theory and the complex Shariah governance framework embraced by Islamic banks worldwide. This paper aims to show the relevance of the application of “institutional theory” in the Shariah governance framework of Islamic banks.

This study applied library research to investigate the application of institutional theory in the Shariah governance framework of Islamic banks. The authors also critically reviewed prior empirical and review papers for accomplishing the research objectives.

Based on the critical review, the authors found that institutional theory is the most influential in progressing Shariah governance as it contributes toward the organizational image, helps to achieve religious legitimacy, and inspires a more robust regulatory environment. In addition, a well-designed Shariah governance framework is driven by institutional theory and that could assist in providing guidelines, strategies and procedures for Islamic banks to better conduct; monitor and control their social, religious and accountability obligations. The authors also highlighted the societal, economic and legal environment of Islamic banks in relation to the propositions of institutional theory. They emphasize that a well-designed Shariah governance framework driven by institutional theory could assist in providing guidelines, strategies and procedures for Islamic banks to better conduct, monitor and control their social, religious and accountability obligations.

This study highlights institutional theory to serve best the development of operational strategies and structures of Islamic banks including the roles, functions and powers of the various stakeholders including regulators and those involved in the Shariah governance process of Islamic banks. The authors recognize the institutional theory to perform a key role in enriching the structural framework of Islamic Financial Institutions. This study is heavily dependent on prior research rather than empirical investigations. The authors did not cover other Islamic finance areas (such as Islamic insurance, Islamic microfinance and Halal industries). Thus, future researchers can apply institutional theory in Shariah governance practices and implementations of setting up rules by the regulators and respective institutions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to show the importance of the application of institutional theory in Shariah governance of Islamic Banks. Thus, this study, therefore, adding a novel dimension to the literature by arguing why institutional theory, is more pronounced (as compared to the other theoretical frameworks) in the formation and discharge of the roles, powers and functions by the different governance organs (such as regulators, the board of directors, management and Shariah supervisory board) operating in this unique corporate governance landscape.

Justice perceptions describe an individual's evaluation of whether decisions or actions are fair or unfair. These perceptions are important because they affect individual attitudes and behaviors in different situations. Family firms develop and implement governance policies and structures (i.e., governance systems) to diminish the problems that can arise from the overlap between the business, the family, and the ownership systems of a firm. Governance systems help family firms have a clear structure of accountability and a clear understanding of the rights and responsibilities that family and non-family members have toward the family enterprise. Research on governance to date has focused on the practices and policies that exist and their effects on the family firm. However, in the governance context, individual perceptions are important because they are likely to affect the attitudes that family and other members have toward the family enterprise and the likelihood that they will follow the different policies when they are implemented. This chapter takes a receiver perspective to explain how individuals create justice perceptions based on governance mechanisms and the effects of these perceptions. The goal is to understand how we can use this information when developing governance practices in family firms.

This paper aims to increase the current understanding of the connection between operational level information and communication technology (ICT) projects and national level digital transformation by researching how project governance structures and practices are applied in an e-government context.

An elaborative qualitative study through public documentary analysis and empirical multi-case research on Finnish central government is used.

The study constructs a multi-level governance structure with three main functions and applies this in an empirical setting. The results also describe how different governance practices and processes, focusing on project portfolio management, are applied vertically across different organizational levels to connect the ICT projects with the national digitalization strategy.

This study integrates project governance and portfolio management knowledge into public sector digitalization, thus contributing to project management, e-government and ICT research streams by improving the current understanding on the governance of ICT projects as part of a larger-scale digitalization. This study also highlights perceived gaps between current governance practices and provides implications to managers and practitioners working in the field to address these gaps.

This paper aims to demonstrate gender diversity in the structure of corporate governance and test the effect of diversity on the firm performance suffering from financial distress.

The paper is quantitative using a sample of 467 public firms in Indonesia. Data were analyzed into statistics descriptive and the hypothesis was tested using the test of logistic regression.

The preliminary results of the paper demonstrate the number of firms employing women and men in the structure of corporate governance of 13% on the commissioner board, 7% on the director board and 5% on the audit committee. Based on the test of effect, this paper further found that firms employing women and men (gender diversity) in the structure of the board of commissioners, tend to suffer from financial distress lower than firms only employing men (non-gender diversity).

This paper is not an effort to make the proportion of voices of women equal to men, however the representation of women at least exists in the structure of corporate governance as part of workforce diversity and inclusivity. In addition, this paper is considered not to use panel data with the purpose of avoiding repetitive data because of the use of a nominal scale in the logistic regression model.

The finding of the paper is addressed to deliver insights into the current conversation on the issue of women's day with the theme of Each for Equal and to firms in positioning women in the structure of boardrooms.

This paper extends the limited scholarly work on the nexus between gender diversity and financial performance. The framework of social identity theory and the tenet of corporate governance are elaborated to disclose the finding that firm shareholders tend to benefit from gender diversity in the structure of the commissioner board.

The purpose of this paper is to explore board functions and their location in family firms.

Through structured induction in a four-case study of medium-sized Swedish family firms, the authors demonstrate that board functions can be located in other arenas than in the common board and suggest propositions that explain their distribution.

(1) The board is but one of several arenas where board functions are performed. (2) The functions performed by the board vary in type and emphasis. (3) The non-family directors in a family firm serve the owners, even sometimes governing them, in what the authors term “bidirectional governance”. (4) The kin strategy of the family influences their governance. (5) The utilization of a board for governance stems from the family (together with its constitution, kin strategy and governance strategy), the board composition and the business conditions of the firm.

Being a case study the findings are restricted to concepts and theoretical propositions. Using structured induction, the study is not solely inductive but still contains the subjectivity of induction.

Governance agents should have an instrumental view on the board, considering it one possible governance arena among others, thereby economizing on governance.

The institutional pressure toward active boards could paradoxically reduce the importance of the board in family firms.

The board of a family company differs in its emphasis of board functions and these functions are performed with varying emphases in different governance arenas. The authors propose the concept of kin strategy, which refers to the governance importance of the structure of the owner and observations on bi-directional governance, indicating that the board can govern the owners.

The study aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance practices on enhancing firm value in manufacturing industries in Bangladesh.

The study sample consists of 131 companies from 10 manufacturing industries listed in Dhaka stock exchange (DSE). Using the multiple regression method, the study analyzed 1,193 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2021.

The outcome reveals that managerial ownership, foreign ownership, ownership concentration, board size, board independence, board diligence and auditor quality have a significant positive influence on firm value. In contrast, audit committee size has no significant influence on firm value.

The practical implications of the current study demonstrated that good corporate governance creates value and must be invigorated for the interest of all stakeholders. Policymakers should formulate specific guidelines regarding firms' ownership structure and audit quality issues.

This study aims to explore the relationship between risk governance characteristics (chief risk officer [CRO], chief financial officer [CFO] and senior directors [SENIOR]) and regulatory adjustments (RAs) in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development public commercial banks.

Using principal component analysis (PCA) and regression models, the research analyzes a representative data set of these banks.

A significant negative correlation between risk governance characteristics and RAs is found. Sensitivity analysis on the regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital ratio indicates mixed outcomes, suggesting a complex relationship that warrants further exploration.

The study’s limited sample size calls for further research to confirm findings and explore risk governance’s impact on banks’ capital structures.

Enhanced risk governance could reduce RAs, influencing banking policy.

The study advocates for improved banking regulatory practices, potentially increasing sector stability and public trust.

This study contributes to understanding risk governance’s role in regulatory compliance, offering insights for policymaking in banking.

Multiple disciplines such as finance, management and economics have contributed to governance research over time. However, the full intellectual structure of the governance “field” including the exchange of knowledge across disciplines and the large variety of governance topics remains to be uncovered. To appreciate the breadth of corporate governance research, it is necessary to understand the disciplinary sources from which the research stems. This manuscript focuses on the interdisciplinary underpinnings of corporate governance research.

This paper employs bibliometric analysis to trace the evolution of corporate governance using articles included in the ISI Web of Science database between 1990 and 2015. Journals included in these categories encompass a full range of business disciplines and provide evidence of the multi-disciplinary nature of corporate governance. It also uncovers the topics treated by disciplines under the governance umbrella using a machine learning method called latent Dirichtlet allocation (LDA).

Corporate governance research deals with a number of strategy-related topics. Unlike strategy topics that reside in a single discipline, corporate governance crosses disciplinary boundaries and includes contributions from accounting, finance, economics, law and management. Our analysis shows that over 80% of corporate governance articles come from outside the field of management. Our LDA solution indicates that the major topics in governance research include corporate governance theory, control of family firms, executive compensation and audit committees.

The results illustrate that corporate governance is far more interdisciplinary than previously thought. This is an important insight for corporate governance academics and may lead to collaborative research. More importantly, this research illustrates the usefulness of LDA for investigating interdisciplinary fields. This method is easily transferable to other interdisciplinary fields and it provides a powerful alternative to existing bibliometric methods. We suggest a number of topic areas within library and information science where this method may be applied, including collection development, support for interdisciplinary faculty and basic research into emerging interdisciplinary areas.