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This paper contributes to the existing literature by extending the empirical work on the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure by analyzing the mediating role of cost of capital in the non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX).

The sample for this study includes non-financial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (formerly Karachi Stock Exchange) for the period of 2004–2016. Based on 1800 firm-year observations, three approaches of panel data analysis are applied for the step-wise analysis of the underlying study. Firstly, Pooled OLS is applied. Secondly, fixed and random effect panel regression followed by the Hausman test to check the unobservable individual heterogeneity of the data. Hausman test indicates that the fixed-effects model is the most appropriate model for the sample panel data.

The study's findings are that board size, board composition, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have statistically significant direct effect on the firm's financing decisions. However, CEO/Chair duality, institutional ownership and managerial ownership have significant indirect effect on firm's capital structure decisions. The interesting finding of the paper is on the evidence of mediating role of cost of capital in the nexus of corporate governance and capital structure. Moreover, some conventional determinants of capital structure, including the firm's size, asset structure of the firm, profitability, business risk and growth, are found as determinants of capital structure decisions of the firms.

There are a few limitations to our study which could be addressed by upcoming research. We did not include all the four mechanisms of corporate governance including board structure, audit structure, compensation structure and ownership structure. However, we used only five important attributes including board size, board composition and CEO/Chair duality form board structure, managerial ownership and institutional ownership form ownership structure of corporate governance as our explanatory variables to examine their impact on the capital structure choices of the firms. Future studies may fill this research gap by involving some other attributes of corporate governance and analyzing their effectiveness and impact on value relevant capital structure decisions. Further, due to limited time and resources, we only tested the mediating role of cost of capital, hence, future researchers can analyze the mediating and moderating roles of different variables which may influence the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure choices of the firms.

The study has many valuable guidelines and practical implications for the financial managers of the corporations. Our results will facilitate the policymakers in setting their corporate governance policies and practices and making the value relevant capital structure decisions in compliance with the implications of corporate governance mechanism. In addition, our study provides the empirical evidence in accordance with the argument that good governance practices, particularly the voluntary disclosures by the firm may reduce the information asymmetry which, ultimately, reduces the agency cost and the cost of capital for the firm. However, while deciding the financial policy of the corporations, managers can use our findings in order to assess the effectiveness of corporate governance practices employed by the firm in achieving the optimal capital structure at which the weighted average cost of capital is at its minimum level.

This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the mediating role of the cost of capital in the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure decisions of the firms. This paper provides empirical evidence that corporate governance indirectly affects capital structure decisions through the mediating role of cost of capital.

The study aims to yield evidence on the relation between the quality of governance characteristics and the firms' financial credibility involved in financial violations.

The study uses annual data ranging from 2000 to 2018. The sample consists of 154 nonfinancial firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange, comprising 77 fraudulent and 77 non-fraudulent companies. To examine the relationship between improvements in the governance structure and financial credibility of the firms, hypotheses are tested using the univariate analysis and multivariate regression model through the ordinary least square method.

The results affirm that fraud firms are possessed with poor governance structure compared to control firms in the pre-fraud year. The findings further imply that an improved governance structure brings foremost performance in stock price. The results of the study divulge that board of directors characteristic i.e. change in outside directors' percentage has a significant positive impact (β = 0.015, p = 0.05) on the financial credibility of the firms. The governance variables in terms of CEO-COB joint position has a significant negative (β = −0.824, p = 0.05) association with the financial credibility, which means that whenever CEO-COB joint position enhances, the financial credibility of the firms decreases. However, governance variables in the context of blockholders percentage has a significant positive (β = 0.13, p = 0.01) impact on financial credibility. The results of the study overall indicate that the governance structure has a significant influence on the financial performance of firms in the stock market.

The study provides an understanding of how fraudulent firms rehabilitate their governance structure and accrue economic benefits by the means of financial credibility after when the fraud is made public. It also adds to the literature in the area of corporate frauds specifically the role of governance structure in the financial performance of fraudulent firms in the stock market; this field is in its initial stage, even in developed countries, while, in developing countries, little work has been done.

We investigate the effect of the adoption of formal board structure and board processes on firm performance in Colombian family firms, in a context where firms can choose specific aspects of board structure and processes. We deploy insights from the behavioral governance perspective to develop arguments about how family businesses may choose board elements based on their degree of control over the firm (absolute control or less), and its effect on firm performance.

We use an unbalanced data panel of 404 firm-year observations. The data was obtained from the annual financial and corporate governance reports of 62 Colombian stock-issuing firms for the period 2008–2014 – due to change in regulation, data could not be added beyond 2014. Panel data technique with random effects was used.

The results show that board structure is positively associated with financial performance, however, this relationship is negative in businesses where family has absolute control. We also found that there is a negative association between board processes and performance, but positive association in family-controlled businesses.

Our research contributes to research streams on effects of family control in firm choices and on the interactive effect of governance choices and institutional context and more generally how actors interact (rather than react) with their institutional context.

This paper aims to examine the nature of corporate governance systems in Ghanaian Family-owned Businesses (FOBs). Specifically, the study investigates the nature of boardroom decisions structures, sources of governance regulations and family roles in corporate governance.

Drawing on Bourdieusian perspectives of the field, capital, habitus and doxa, a case study design is used to gather detailed insights about the phenomena. Purposively, the study conducts 20 interviews with participants from 15 FOBs in Ghana. The interview data are complemented with secondary sources, such as FOB handbooks, website information, legal documents and scriptures. Subsequently, data gathered were thematically analysed.

The study finds that human actors blended traditionally tacit and legally expressed boardroom decisions structures in FOBs governance. Again, traditional values, social acceptance of religious sociology and regulatory frameworks of the field dictate corporate governance practices in FOBs. In multiple family ownerships, orthodoxy of doxa is challenged; hence, power struggles and family roles in governance depend on capital possessed by social actors.

To continue as a going concern, FOBs must be mindful of traditional, religious sociology of family and regulatory frameworks within the field in which they operate. This is because, without this, the going concern of FOBs becomes suspicious and highly unlikely, especially where there are multiple family ownership and generations.

The previous literature predominantly focussed on formal boardroom structures in addressing FOBs' corporate governance issues. Notwithstanding, family governance risk of domineering and distrust associated with traditional and relational governance mechanisms remain under-represented and inconclusive, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This study investigates the effects of elements of corporate governance along with firm specific variables on the financial leverage of listed Indian firms in the context of agency conflicts and new governance laws.

A series of panel ordinary least squares as well as fixed/random effects regression models of book and market value of financial leverage on variables of corporate governance (board size, board composition, board meeting, board attendance and board gender) along with a set of control variables (asset tangibility, firm size, growth, liquidity and profitability) were estimated by employing 113 listed Indian firms during 2010–2021. Dynamic panel generalized method of moments models were also estimated to check the robustness of empirical results. Further, the full sample of firms was divided into small and large board sized companies using the median approach to investigate differences between small and large board characteristics on financial leverage.

The evidence predominantly suggested that the governance variables have significant impact on leverage ratios of selected firms. Governance variables such as board size, composition, attendance and gender are significantly found to be reducing the financial leverage of firms indicating that in general these attributes in a way, through monitoring managers, put pressure on them to pursue lower financial leverage. Board meeting is found to be positive and significantly related with financial leverage suggesting that the frequency of meetings signals its monitoring ability that may influence lenders' risk assessment lowering borrowing cost. The results on small and large board sized companies indicate that firms with small boards relatively issue more debt compared to firms with large boards suggesting that small boards adopt high debt policy.

The main policy implication of the study is that elements of internal corporate governance is a significant governance tool that has the potential to reduce agency conflict between the managers and agents through monitoring and decision making that has tangible effects on critical corporate decisions such as capital structure choices.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by bringing new evidence relating to agency conflicts and capital structure decisions in an emerging market like India post adoption of new regulations related to corporate governance specified in Clause 49 of Securities and Exchange Board of India and Companies Act, 2013 as there is significant dearth of such empirical work.

Justice perceptions describe an individual's evaluation of whether decisions or actions are fair or unfair. These perceptions are important because they affect individual attitudes and behaviors in different situations. Family firms develop and implement governance policies and structures (i.e., governance systems) to diminish the problems that can arise from the overlap between the business, the family, and the ownership systems of a firm. Governance systems help family firms have a clear structure of accountability and a clear understanding of the rights and responsibilities that family and non-family members have toward the family enterprise. Research on governance to date has focused on the practices and policies that exist and their effects on the family firm. However, in the governance context, individual perceptions are important because they are likely to affect the attitudes that family and other members have toward the family enterprise and the likelihood that they will follow the different policies when they are implemented. This chapter takes a receiver perspective to explain how individuals create justice perceptions based on governance mechanisms and the effects of these perceptions. The goal is to understand how we can use this information when developing governance practices in family firms.

This study serves two objectives; first, it examined the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics on firm value; second, the moderating effects of board gender diversity (women appearance on board) and board ethnic diversity (Chinese, Indian, and Foreign ethnicities) have been examined on the relationship between ownership structure, board characteristics, and firm value.

The dynamic model, system generalized method of moments (S-GMM hereafter), is employed to control potential dynamic endogeneity, reverse causality, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity persistent in corporate governance-performance relationships during 2006–2017 of 483 Malaysian listed companies.

Findings pertaining to objective one reveal that there is a weak linkage between ownership structure and firm value, whereas board characteristics significantly affect firm performance based on resource dependence theory. While considering the results of objective two, there is mixed evidence of moderating impact of board gender and ethnic diversity on ownership structure, board characteristics and performance nexus.

The findings of the study are practically significant for regulatory bodies, namely, Bursa Malaysia, Securities Commission (SC) Malaysia, and policymakers to develop guidelines for ownership structure variables. Moreover, Malaysian firms need to disperse their concentrated ownership structure for enhanced firm value. In addition, board characteristics significantly affect firm performance in Malaysian listed companies.

The paper contributes to multiple aspects: first, it examined the impact of ownership structure and board characteristics on firm performance. Second, the moderating effect of board gender and board ethnic diversity contributes to research significant and valuable for the researchers and practitioners. Finally, the study employed S-GMM, controlling for dynamic endogeneity considered a main econometric problem for CG-performance relationships.

The study aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance practices on enhancing firm value in manufacturing industries in Bangladesh.

The study sample consists of 131 companies from 10 manufacturing industries listed in Dhaka stock exchange (DSE). Using the multiple regression method, the study analyzed 1,193 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2021.

The outcome reveals that managerial ownership, foreign ownership, ownership concentration, board size, board independence, board diligence and auditor quality have a significant positive influence on firm value. In contrast, audit committee size has no significant influence on firm value.

The practical implications of the current study demonstrated that good corporate governance creates value and must be invigorated for the interest of all stakeholders. Policymakers should formulate specific guidelines regarding firms' ownership structure and audit quality issues.

Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants.

This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors’ understanding of family firm dynamics.

The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity.

This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy.

This paper aims to review empirical research on the relationship between institutional ownership (IO) and board governance (85 studies).

Based on agency and upper echelons theory, the heterogeneous monitoring function of specific types and the nature of institutional investors on board composition, compensation and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics will be focused.

The author found that most studies have referred to archival studies, analyzed the impact of board governance on IO, focused on CEO characteristics, neglected IO heterogeneity and advanced regression models to address endogeneity concerns. In line with the theoretical framework, the relationship between total IO and board governance is heterogeneous. However, specific types such as foreign, dedicated and pressure-resistant institutions represent active monitoring tools and push for increased board governance.

The author provided useful recommendations for future research from a content and methodological perspective, e.g. the need for analyzing the impact of IO on sustainable board governance and other characteristics of top management team members, e.g. the chief financial officer.

As many regulatory bodies implemented regulations to promote shareholder rights and board governance, this literature review highlights the connections of both corporate governance mechanisms. Managers should conduct a careful and timely investor analysis and change the composition and compensation of the board of directors in line with institutional investors’ preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on IO and board governance, whereas the author structured the heterogeneous variables and results within the structured literature review. The authors guides researchers, regulatory bodies and business practice in this corporate governance topic.