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Despite agreement on the importance of adopting governance structures for developing competitive advantage, we still know little about why or how governance mechanisms are adopted in the first place. We also acknowledge that family businesses with formal governance mechanisms in place still resort to informal means to make decisions, and we lack knowledge about why certain governance mechanisms are sometimes, but not always, effective and functional. Given these research gaps, and drawing on institutional theory, we aim to explore: How are governance structures adopted and developed in family firms? Once adopted, how do family businesses perceive these governance structures?

Using Mokken Scale Analysis, a method suitable to uncover patterns/sequences of adoption/acquisition over time, we analyze a dataset of 1,488 Spanish family firms to explore if there is a specific pattern in the implementation of governance structures. We complement the analysis with descriptive data about perceived usefulness of such structures.

Our findings highlight two important issues. Family businesses follow a specific process implementing first business governance (board of directors, then executive committee), followed by family governance (family council then family constitution). We suggest they do so in response to institutional pressures, given the exposure they have to business practices, and their need to appear legitimate. Despite formal adoption of governance structures, family businesses do not necessarily consider them useful. We suggest that their perception about the usefulness of the implemented governance structures may lead to their ceremonial adoption, resulting in a gap between the implementation and functionality of such structures.

Our article contributes to the family business literature by bringing novel insights about implementation of governance structures. We take a step back to explain why these governance mechanisms were adopted in the first place. Using institutional theory we enrich governance and family business literatures, by offering a lens that explains why family businesses follow a specific process in adopting governance structures. We also offer a plausible explanation as to why governance structures are ineffective in achieving their theorized role in the context of family businesses, based on the family's perception of the unusefulness of such structures, and the concept of ceremonial adoption.

There is no single recipe that can serve the multiple needs of different family businesses. This indicates that family businesses may need diverse levels of development and order when setting up their governance structures. Accordingly, this study constitutes an important point of demarcation for practitioners interested in examining the effectiveness of governance structures in family firms. We show that an important pre-requisite for examining the effectiveness of governance structures is to start by investigating whether these structures are actually being used or are only adopted ceremonially.

Our paper expands current knowledge on governance in family firms by taking a step back hinting at why are governance structures adopted in the first place. Focusing on how governance is implemented in terms of sequence is novel and relevant for researcher and practitioners to understand how this process unfolds. Our study uses institutional theory, which is a strong theory to support the results. Our paper also uses a novel method to study governance structures in family firms.

We investigate the effect of the adoption of formal board structure and board processes on firm performance in Colombian family firms, in a context where firms can choose specific aspects of board structure and processes. We deploy insights from the behavioral governance perspective to develop arguments about how family businesses may choose board elements based on their degree of control over the firm (absolute control or less), and its effect on firm performance.

We use an unbalanced data panel of 404 firm-year observations. The data was obtained from the annual financial and corporate governance reports of 62 Colombian stock-issuing firms for the period 2008–2014 – due to change in regulation, data could not be added beyond 2014. Panel data technique with random effects was used.

The results show that board structure is positively associated with financial performance, however, this relationship is negative in businesses where family has absolute control. We also found that there is a negative association between board processes and performance, but positive association in family-controlled businesses.

Our research contributes to research streams on effects of family control in firm choices and on the interactive effect of governance choices and institutional context and more generally how actors interact (rather than react) with their institutional context.

The study evaluates the effects of governance and other regulatory structures on the development of financial institutions in the subregion of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

Data for the analyses were compiled from relevant sources from 1996 to 2019 from a sample of 36 countries in the subregion. Empirical analyses were carried out using the Prais-Winsten panel corrected standard errors panel estimation technique augmented by pooled ordinary least squares with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors model.

Findings from the study suggest that governance and institutional quality index, as well as individual governance and regulatory variables, have positive effect on the development of financial institutions among economies in SSA. Further empirical estimates show that output growth volatility has negative moderating impact on the relationship between effective governance, control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and development of financial institutions. Additionally, the results show that during periods of heightened macroeconomic risk, financial institutions could benefit from improved governance and effective regulatory structures.

Compared to related studies that have reviewed the discourse on financial institutions, this study rather focuses on how governance structures and institutions influence development of financial institutions instead of the impact of financial institution on the broader economy. The authors further augment this interaction by examining how the relationship in question may be moderated by macroeconomic shocks.

The purpose of this research is to reveal the impact of public legal protection on the efficiency of internal corporate governance in banks. In addition, this research proposes a new corporate governance index that could be employed by the banking sector to evaluate the performance of their internal corporate governance mechanisms.

Orbis database, annual reports and direct questionnaire are used to collect corporate governance data of 127 banks from 14 countries during 2020. The Mann–Whitney U-test is employed to compare the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms based on three subsamples of countries having different legal protection levels (weak, middle and strong).

This research suggests a new corporate governance index for banks based on seven constructs and 62 variables. This new non-parametric index could be used by bankers to improve the monitoring process and enhance the overall performance of banking. The results of this research show that the existence of a strong public legal protection environment within a specific country enhances the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in the banking sector and thus, leads to improve the protection of shareholders, depositors and other relevant stakeholders. However, in countries that are characterized by weak legal protection level, the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms is very low and there are possibilities of entrenchment, expropriation and extraction of private benefits. These findings could be interpreted within the prediction of agency, moral hazard, asymmetric information, political and entrenchment theories.

This research paper provides information that bankers and other relevant stakeholders in the banking sector working in MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) and European countries. A strong public legal protection level could improve the efficiency of internal corporate governance mechanisms within banks.

The purpose of this paper is to explore board functions and their location in family firms.

Through structured induction in a four-case study of medium-sized Swedish family firms, the authors demonstrate that board functions can be located in other arenas than in the common board and suggest propositions that explain their distribution.

(1) The board is but one of several arenas where board functions are performed. (2) The functions performed by the board vary in type and emphasis. (3) The non-family directors in a family firm serve the owners, even sometimes governing them, in what the authors term “bidirectional governance”. (4) The kin strategy of the family influences their governance. (5) The utilization of a board for governance stems from the family (together with its constitution, kin strategy and governance strategy), the board composition and the business conditions of the firm.

Being a case study the findings are restricted to concepts and theoretical propositions. Using structured induction, the study is not solely inductive but still contains the subjectivity of induction.

Governance agents should have an instrumental view on the board, considering it one possible governance arena among others, thereby economizing on governance.

The institutional pressure toward active boards could paradoxically reduce the importance of the board in family firms.

The board of a family company differs in its emphasis of board functions and these functions are performed with varying emphases in different governance arenas. The authors propose the concept of kin strategy, which refers to the governance importance of the structure of the owner and observations on bi-directional governance, indicating that the board can govern the owners.

This study aims to identify the significant scientific actors, reveal the intellectual structure and explore essential features for future research direction in Sharia governance studies.

The study applies a hybrid review combining bibliometric analysis and content analysis. It uses Rstudio (biblioshiny), VOSviewer and Microsoft Excel to analyze 457 articles published in 206 journals indexed by Scopus and/or Web of Science during the period of 1985 until the end of 2022.

The paper discovered four distinct streams of Sharia governance studies: structure of Sharia governance, Sharia governance and risk management, Sharia governance and sustainability and the effect of Sharia governance toward firm’s financial performance. Furthermore, it derives and summarizes 26 main research questions for future studies.

In terms of theoretical implications, the finding contributes to the general literature on Sharia governance by conducting bibliometric analysis and content analysis. In terms of practical implications, this study suggests that Sharia governance should be strengthened by the management of Islamic banks and other Islamic-based businesses.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the early studies using a hybrid review on the topic of Sharia governance, allowing future researchers in this field to capture the trends and progress of current literature as well as the research gaps to be filled in by future researchers.

This study aims to explore the effect of the board of directors on the capital structure of listed non-financial firms on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX).

Using a panel data set of 208 financial Pakistani enterprises from 2015 to 2020, regression analysis is employed to examine the data utilizing independent variables such as board size, outside directors, directors' remuneration and managerial ownership to evaluate board characteristics and the total debt ratio for capital structure.

The results show that the board size positively impacts the debt ratio. However, outside directors, directors' remuneration and managerial ownership are negatively connected with the capital structure. The empirical findings indicate that corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in the capital structure decision of Pakistani non-financial companies.

This research contributes to the literature by addressing the function of the board of directors in the governance of Pakistani enterprises.

Few studies in Pakistan focus on board characteristics and those that do utilize different variables. This research aims to fill a critical gap by investigating the effect of the board of directors' attributes and the capital structure of the listed non-financial sector of Pakistan.

The study aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance practices on enhancing firm value in manufacturing industries in Bangladesh.

The study sample consists of 131 companies from 10 manufacturing industries listed in Dhaka stock exchange (DSE). Using the multiple regression method, the study analyzed 1,193 firm-year observations from 2012 to 2021.

The outcome reveals that managerial ownership, foreign ownership, ownership concentration, board size, board independence, board diligence and auditor quality have a significant positive influence on firm value. In contrast, audit committee size has no significant influence on firm value.

The practical implications of the current study demonstrated that good corporate governance creates value and must be invigorated for the interest of all stakeholders. Policymakers should formulate specific guidelines regarding firms' ownership structure and audit quality issues.

Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants.

This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors’ understanding of family firm dynamics.

The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity.

This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy.

The literature has dealt with the relationship between board characteristics (BC) and firm performance (FP) on a large scale. However, it yielded inconsistent results. Thus, this paper aims to examine the indirect relationship between BC and FP through the mediating role of the capital structure (CS).

This study used a sample of 528 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2015 to 2019. Also, a two-step system generalised method of moments estimation technique was applied.

The results show that board diversity and the frequency of board meetings positively affect financial performance, and it is negatively influenced by board turnover, size and independence. Also, the results indicate a positive relationship between the independence of the board and all CS variables. Importantly, the findings support the policy-setting role of the board of directors where CS (measured by total debt and short-term debt) suppresses some governance mechanisms’ detrimental effect on FP. Hence, the board of directors, apart from the monitoring function, introduce various policies (financial and non-financial) that enhance the overall performance of companies.

These results are consistent with the agency’s perspective that management practices in selecting the optimal capital reduce agency costs and improve performance. The findings contribute to developing a broader theoretical framework that accounts for the policy-setting role of the board of directors. The current study model of corporate governance offers insight for policymakers into the role of corporate governance other than monitoring functions in organisations and how CS should be taken into consideration with corporate governance and FP association.