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The paper aims to account for the substance of non‐linear governance change by analysing the importance of sector‐specific institutions and the pathways of governing they create.

The analysis uses recent reforms of the governance of medical performance in four European countries as a case, adopting an inductively oriented approach to comparison. The governance of medical performance is a good case as it is both, closely related to redistributive policies, where the influence of institutions tends to be pertinent, and is subject to considerable policy pressures.

The overall thrust of reforms is similar across countries, while there are important differences in relation to how individual forms of governance and the balance between different forms of governance are changing. More specifically, sector‐specific institutions can account for the specific ways in which reforms redefine hierarchy and professional self‐regulation and for the extent to which reforms strengthen hierarchy and affect the balance with other forms of governance.

The recent literature on governance mainly focuses on mapping out the substance of non‐linear change, whereas the development of explanations of the substance of governance change is less systematic. In the present paper, therefore, it is suggested coupling the notion of non‐linear change with an analysis of sector specific institutions inspired by the historical institutionalist tradition to better account for the substance of non‐linear governance change. Further, the analysis offers interesting insights into the complexity of redrawing boundaries between the public and the private in health care.

The rise of the sharing economy has brought with it a huge variety of new organizational forms and innovative business models. An integral part of these forms and models is the communities and members of sharing-economy organizations, since they significantly contribute to value creation for these organizations. Relying on community member contributions, though, is a challenge for these organizations because fluid community boundaries and voluntary membership makes it difficult to coordinate their activities. This chapter investigates the under-researched question of how sharing-economy organizations govern the actions of their community members. Following an abductive approach that included site visits, participant observations, and 67 interviews, we develop a framework that illustrates four different types of governance: pure market, pure clan, market-hierarchy hybrid, and clan-hierarchy hybrid. The framework explains differences among these types depending on the main activity (providing resources or producing jointly) and the primary aim of the community (business orientation or social orientation). This study thus contributes to research on both governance in general and to sharing-economy organizations in particular by capturing the variety and diversity of community forms, governance practices, and business-model configurations.

Networks are by now popular inter-organizational coordination modes. However, there is still much to know regarding how networks are governed and how their governance develops and changes through time.

This paper addresses the research question how does the governance form of networks develops over time by empirically studying the European telecommunications regulatory network using a case study approach.

We find that the network’s governance system is determined by the dialectical tension between network members (National Regulatory Agencies) and an external very influential body (the European Commission).

This tension unifies the group in the classic external conflict–internal cohesion fashion. We also identify a second dialectical tension internal to the network among its members. The tensions are triggered by evaluations carried out by an external actor (the European Commission). In general, the process observed confirms the propositions that predict a formalizing of the governance as the network grows older.

This research is based on a single case, a broader analysis of other regulatory networks among network industries at the European Union level will help researchers to establish a more comprehensive picture on the development of the governance form of this specific subset of goal-directed networks.

Purpose – The paper explains how internal reporting systems, as embedded practices informing organizational actions and “know-how”, contributed to the inertia in implementing a corporate form of governance in a transitional public organization in a developing country – Egypt.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper synthesizes an institutional theory framework in order to capture the case study mixed results. Drawing on DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) notions of isomorphic mechanisms, Ocasio (1999) and Burns and Scapens’ (2000) notions of organizations’ memory, history, cumulative actions and routines, Brunsson's (1994) notion of organizational institutional confusion as well as Carruthers's (1995) notion of “symbolic window-dressing” adoption of new practices, the paper explores the dynamic of a public hospital corporatization processes. Data collection methods include semi-structured interviews, documentary evidence and direct observation.

Findings – The case study evidence shows that the interplay between the new form of “corporate” governance and the intra-organizational power, routines and “know-how” created internal organizational confusion and changed organizational members’ narrative of risk and uncertainties.

Research limitations/implications – The paper does not reveal the role of reformers involved in the public sector “governance” reform in developing countries. Exploring such a role goes beyond the scope of this paper and represents an area of future research.

Originality/value – The paper provides a comprehensive account of public sector “governance” reform in a developing nation, while exploring the role of management accounting and costing systems in facilitating or otherwise that reform processes.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which scholars have proposed organizational forms combining elements of markets and hierarchies. These hybrid forms are based on networked connections and bottom‐up entrepreneurship, fostering knowledge sharing among semi‐independent units. Despite their suitability to knowledge‐intensive companies, scholars are divided on their views on governance in internal hybrids. While knowledge management scholars emphasize soft community‐like dimensions, organizational economists seek to reduce opportunism through hard hierarchical governance. Because these views act as complementaries, this paper synthesizes them to present organizational governance in internal hybrids.

A case study with 56 interviews describes the functioning of soft and hard governance mechanisms in the Japanese company Maekawa Manufacturing Ltd.

The case study indicates that soft and hard governance mechanisms work in complementary ways in a successfully implemented internal hybrid.

Internal hybrids tend to function most efficiently with a mix of soft knowledge management practices and hard control devices.

Instead of taking an “either/or” perspective, this paper seeks to synthesize contrasting views of knowledge management and organizational economics.

Over the past few decades, the subject of governance has come to the fore in many public discussions, notably with regard to reforms of the social protection system. Without entering into various debates the concept has generated, we shall use it in its positive sense (Gilly, Leroux, & Wallet, 2004), to designate all of the interactions between various public and private actors in the elaboration and implementation of public policies to attain shared objectives of general interest (Enjolras, 2008; Le Galès, 1998). Governance thus reflects a change in the forms of collective action – which certainly would qualify as modernisation – and the growing importance granted to management strategies in this change. It also brings out the complexity of the interrelationships between the different levels of decision-making (horizontal and vertical), which might be characterised as ‘poly-governance’ (Eme, 2005). And governance also permits a simultaneous approach to the new territorial, productive and partnership arrangements emerging in response to the different levels of constraints and socio-demographic changes. These issues lie at the heart of the transformations of the welfare state and related policies for rationalising public intervention and stabilising public finances. Studies dealing with welfare mix and welfare pluralism (Evers & Svetlik, 1993; Esping-Andersen, 1999; Ascoli & Ranci, 2002; Pestoff, 2006; Richez-Battesti, 2008) bring out different ways of combining sources of risk protection or other forms of solidarity. Such research reinforces analyses of co-ordination, as well as those of management and decision-making.

The purpose of this paper is to adopt “whole network” perspective and analyzes the governance and control mechanisms in the Universal Postal Union (UPU), one of the oldest and largest inter-governmental networks, through the lens of institutional entrepreneurship theory. The purpose is to introduce a typology of network governance forms to the accounting literature and to analyze the governance and management control mechanisms within the UPU, a “participatory federation” (Provan, 1983) type of network that has managed the challenges of collective collaboration since 1875.

The study benefits from unlimited access to all archival materials of the UPU such as minutes of Congress and committee meetings since 1875 as well as secondary documents and market studies related to the postal sector. The data reported in this study are derived from the archives of the UPU in Berne, Switzerland and interviews conducted with senior officials.

Drawing on the work of Provan (1983) and Provan and Kenis (2008) the authors identify five “ideal type” network governance forms based on such variables as differences in the relative power of network participants and whether these networks have arisen spontaneously or due to external coercion, the authors classify the UPU as a “participatory federation.” Within the theoretical boundaries of this typology the authors identify the multi level governance structures and the use of management control mechanisms by each level of governance. The authors introduce a distinction between the “network constitutional organization” that focusses on the socialization of network members and strategy-level orchestration of the overall network and the “network administrative organization” (NAO) that mobilizes management accounting and control mechanisms to monitor, encourage and facilitate member collaboration. The authors propose that control within a participatory federation is enacted through collective entrepreneurship by governance bodies using management accounting and control mechanisms as institutional carriers.

The paper is focussed on the current state of the UPU’s network structure and processes and did not explore the dynamics around the emergence of the different network governance and control mechanisms. An exploration of the collective construction by network participants of the need for these mechanisms would provide insights into how they emerge and might lead to a better understanding of the role of NAOs in networks.

The paper highlights the challenges faced by collaborative networks and identifies enabling characteristics of a participatory federation’s governance bodies. The empirical observations within the context of the UPU contribute to the theoretical understanding of the desirable characteristics of participatory federations that might be applicable to similar public and private collaborative networks

This study expands the knowledge of management accounting and control systems in networks. It bridges a gap in the accounting literature by adopting a “whole network” perspective and by differentiating types of network governance structures that use management accounting and control systems. This contributes to the understanding of accounting and control across the full range of organizational forms.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the governance structures of two distinctive governance forms: the family firm and the leveraged buyout (LBO). The paper also explores the relative performance of these two organizational forms over the course of the economic business cycle.

The paper provides a theoretical treatment of the family firm and the LBO using the stewardship perspective and agency theory. The analysis anticipates the board structure for each organizational form and relates family firm and LBO governance to performance over the business cycle.

From a conceptual treatment, the family‐owned concern exhibits board characteristics reflecting the longer‐term orientation of the firm, with boards empowered to include non‐economic, as well as economic, goals. LBOs are structured to maximize shareholder value over a shorter time horizon. LBOs may take advantage of expansionary environments whereas family firms may be better prepared for economic down‐cycles.

The paper takes a holistic approach to contrasting two organizational forms that fit their respective theoretical frames and compares some of their more salient governance characteristics and performance over the business cycle.

Managers and boards can structure governance to manage the business cycle. Stakeholders can selectively engage firms that portray vital governance characteristics for their benefit and may also pressure boards and top management to make necessary governance improvements.

The paper offers an introductory comparison between family firms and LBOs in terms of governance and managing the firm over the business cycle. This paper makes the case that some organizational forms are better suited to certain types of economic climates.

This study examines the process of establishing a viable brand in a new foreign market through successful market entry governance by utilizing various types of branding alliances to transfer corporate brands. Drawing from corporate illustrations and building upon Ghosh and John's (1999) governance value analysis (GVA) model, a decision model for managers is developed providing theory-based guidance for market entry strategies. Relational governance can be considered as a continuum ranging from strong relational (i.e., joint ventures, co-branding) to weak relational (i.e., joint promotion, marketing alliance) forms. Firms should organize their market entry strategy based upon brand equity resources, specific investments made by the partner, and environmental uncertainty (market volatility and cultural distance), so as to transfer the desired brand image and associations into local markets by maximizing the level of value created and value claimed. This study contributes to the international marketing literature by providing a theoretically strong decision model, supported by corporate examples, of how firms enter markets using various types of brand alliances. It also advances the practice of international marketing in regard to branding by providing insights as to how managers in the global marketplace can effectively transfer brand images and build global brand equity, minimizing firm costs while maximizing the value created and claimed from the brand.

This paper aims to examine corporate governance and consequences of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) in the US from a socio‐political perspective.

The author employs neo‐liberalism and its related mentality of governmentality to develop an analysis of how corporate governance and reforms such as SOX are socially constructed through autonomous agents, including managers and accountants, and various power relationships that comprise government.

This paper theorizes that legislative reform, such as SOX, represents pervasive mechanisms of disclosure, surveillance and power, and an insurance rationality designed to manage the new and significant risks of corporate governance. A framework is established which conceptualizes SOX as the intersection of neo‐liberalism, political rationalities and governmental techniques, and accounting practices which lead to the elements of security, quantification and shareholder value. Through this framework a model of risk as governance is developed that examines SOX through technologies of the self, calculation and insurance, designed to act upon managers using knowledge about control or financial statement weaknesses. Such mechanisms identify corporate governance risks, which can be acted upon by outside experts, such as accountants.

The major inference from this paper is that corporate governance research in accounting should pursue new lines of inquiry, which will permit the more profitable extension of existing research. Such inquiry should focus less on empirical corporate governance factors and more on the relationships, and power constructs of corporate governance, as well as how legislative reforms employ tactics to normalize the behaviour of not only managers, but also accountants.