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This study aims to investigate the dual effects of commitment-based governance on the relationship between formal control and public–private partnership (PPP) project performance. Formal control and relationship governance are two primary forms of inter-organizational governance that affect project performance. However, little is known about the interplay between formal control and commitment and its effect on PPP projects. More specifically, previous studies have failed to distinguish the function routes of relationship governance resulting from different types of formal control (process and outcome control).

This study adopts a questionnaire survey to empirically investigate the mechanism that commitment-based governance influences the relationship between formal control and PPP performance. After collecting data from public and private sector professionals involved in 101 Chinese PPP projects, the theoretical framework proposed in this paper is verified by the empirical results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis.

The results show that process control has an inverted U-shaped effect and outcome control has a significant positive influence on PPP project performance. Furthermore, commitment moderates the effect of formal control on PPP project performance by increasing the relevance of outcome control and mediates the inverted U-shaped relationship between process control and PPP project performance.

Managers should recognize that process control is a double-edged sword and prevent the overuse of process control. Managers should direct their attention toward efforts to improve the commitment, which allows for the effectiveness of outcome control strategies. Additionally, this study new measurement method for relationship governance suggests that managers should be aware of the difference in parties' perceptions of the relationship.

This study allows for a comprehensive understanding of the relationship governance-control nexus from a commitment perspective. The authors bring into light the dual role of commitment-based governance in the relationship between the two types of formal control and PPP project performance. Moreover, the new approach to measure relationship governance offers valuable insight into the measurement of variables about individual's perception.

This study aims to examine the mediating effects of corporate governance mechanisms like the board of directors on the association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and the risk of material misstatements, including inherent risk and control risk. In particular, the authors study the mediating effects of board characteristics such as board size, independence and gender diversity.

Based on a sample of 100 audit clients listed on the FTSE 100 from 2015 to 2021, this study uses structural equation modelling to test the research objectives.

The findings indicate a significant and negative association between disruptive technology adoption by audit clients and inherent risk. However, there is no significant evidence observed for control risk. The utilisation of disruptive technology by the audit client has a significant impact on the board characteristics, resulting in an increase in board size, greater independence and gender diversity. The authors also find strong evidence that board independence mediates the association between disruptive technology usage and both inherent risk and control risk. In addition, board size and gender exhibit distinct and differential mediating effects on the association and across the two types of risks.

The study reveals that the significant role of using disruptive technology by audit clients in reducing the risk of material misstatements is closely associated with the board of directors, which makes audit clients place greater emphasis on the construction of effective corporate governance.

This study offers essential primary evidence that can assist policymakers and standard setters in formulating guidance and recommendations for board size, independence and gender quotas, ensuring the enhancement of effective governance and supporting the future of audit within the next generation of digital services.

With respect to relevant stakeholders, it is imperative for audit clients to recognise that corporate governance represents a fundamental means of addressing the ramifications of applying disruptive technology, particularly as they pertain to inherent and control risks within the audit client.

This study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the joint impact of corporate governance and the utilisation of disruptive technology by audit clients on inherent risk and control risk, which has not been investigated by previous research.

The study aims to add to the knowledge of governance and control aspects of intrafirm relationships by exploring a transaction costs economics perspective (TCE perspective) on governance and management control structure choices related to the development of a shared service center (SSC).

The notion of governance and control in SSC organizations is explored and a TCE model is developed to analyze management control structure choices for SSC governance. The nature of internal transactions is related to the dimensions of transactions. Then an example case study is used to illustrate the application of the theoretical model.

The theoretical analysis broadens existing frameworks of management control structures by particularly pointing to the possibility of including governance structures for internal transactions and exit threats (connected to a market mechanism) in the management control structure of an organization. Confrontation with the case example illustrates that the possibility of an exit threat was not explicitly considered by top management (“the designer” of management control). Although the TCE model may be a useful tool for analysis purposes, it has little explanatory power in this particular case. Organizational change processes toward SSCs are complex and can only partly be examined with conventional economics-based approaches such as TCE.

Governance and control of SSCs is conceptually theorized, using an instrumental economics approach. The case study is not generalizable but illustrates the use of the model in a particular situation. To understand governance and control change within SSC organizations, more longitudinal case studies are needed.

A TCE approach to governance and control choices regarding SSCs might provide practitioners with insights into the efficiency of specific management control structures.

This chapter contributes to the extant knowledge by both exploring and challenging a TCE perspective on SSC-related changes in management control.

This study aims to evaluate the moderating impact of corporate governance on the relationship between internal control mechanisms and financial performance.

The study employs a structured questionnaire to collect data from 250 top managers of rural banks in the capital of Ghana. Cronbach alpha value and Fornell-Larcker tests were performed to assess the reliability and validity of the data used. The study adopted a partial least square structural equation model (PLS-SEM).

The results show that internal control and corporate governance both have a direct positive and significant impact on financial performance. Furthermore, the interaction of internal control and corporate governance also has a positive and significant impact on financial performance, thus confirming the moderating role of corporate governance in the relationship between internal control mechanisms and financial performance.

This implies that organizations need to strengthen their corporate governance procedures to increase the efficiency of their internal control systems, which would ultimately lead to an improvement in their financial performance.

The present study innovates by assessing the moderating role of corporate governance in the nexus between internal control mechanisms and financial performance. This moderating effect assessment implies that corporate governance may not only affect the technical implementation of the internal control structures but will subsequently make an impact on the overall performance of the organization.

This paper examines the governance function that incubators perform for entrepreneurial firms. The authors demonstrate that this governance function has both a consultative and a control dimension and illustrate how these are enacted in the interactions between incubators and entrepreneurs. The authors also show how these interactions come into being and how entrepreneurs assess the value of the governance role played by incubators.

The paper is based on a cross-sectional interview study with entrepreneurs of 21 start-ups that were hosted by three different incubators. The start-ups are all early-stage technology firms. The analysis in the paper follows an inductive approach.

The authors find that the governance role of incubators is about both consultation and control. Consultative forms of governance include providing input and advice as well as questioning ideas and assumptions. Controlling forms of governance comprise setting targets and tracking progress as well as enforcing structures and documentation. The authors furthermore show that governance episodes are triggered either by the entrepreneurs themselves or by the incubator. In the former case, such episodes are mainly about consultation, while in the latter one, they often have a pronounced control element, which materializes particularly through regularly enforced meetings. Most entrepreneurs seem to appreciate this control element, acknowledging that, in its absence, they would lack the self-discipline of doing some things that need to be done.

This study’s findings extend prior research on inter-organizational relationships and the types of governance mechanisms observed therein. The authors show that a strict separation between actors who offer consultation and those who exercise control is too simplistic. Incubators influence entrepreneurial firms both through consultative and controlling forms of governance. In terms of limitations, this study’s analysis focuses on the perspectives of entrepreneurs, and the authors did not include the perspectives of incubators nor did the authors directly observe meetings between these two parties.

This paper provides examples for how entrepreneurial firms can benefit from being part of an incubator.

This study contributes to the discussion of the governance of inter-organizational relationships by focusing on incubators. In so doing, the authors also complement extant literature on management control in entrepreneurial settings by showing how the incubator fulfills a control function for entrepreneurs before these implement control mechanisms themselves.

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between external audit fees, and board and audit committee characteristics of 736 Malaysian listed firms. It is hypothesised that good corporate governance practices reduce auditors' risk assessments, resulting in lower audit fees. Drawing on the existence of a clearly identifiable ethnic domination of board membership and ownership of Malaysian listed firms, the study also posits that Bumiputera‐controlled firms pay higher audit fees because of their weaker governance practices.

This study employs a cross‐sectional analysis of 736 firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia for the financial year ending in 2003. Multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the relationships proposed in the hypotheses.

Overall, the results of this study reveal that external audit fees are positively and significantly related to board independence, audit committee expertise, and the frequency of audit committee meetings. The study also finds a strong negative association between external audit fees and Bumiputera‐owned firms. An additional analysis into the internal governance structures of firms in the sample show that Bumiputera firms practice more favourable corporate governance practices compared to their non‐Bumiputera counterparts.

This study is a unique contribution in that it provides data on corporate governance practices in Malaysia for a large sample in the period after the corporate governance reforms taken by Malaysian capital market regulators and participants. Previous studies have shown that Bumiputera‐controlled firms pay higher audit fees than non‐Bumiputera‐controlled firms. These studies have not tested theoretical explanations for this fee differential. A theoretical explanation provided in the current study is that Bumiputera‐controlled firms pay higher audit fees than non‐Bumiputera‐controlled firms partially because of differences in corporate governance practices. The study finds conflicting results with previous research suggesting that corporate governance practices have changed in Malaysia since the amendments of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, 2001.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how information technology (IT) governance supports the process of enterprise risk management (ERM). In particular, the paper illustrates how the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) framework helps a company reach its objectives by integrating and supporting the Enterprise Risk Management by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO ERM) framework.

This paper explains how the integration between the two frameworks (COSO ERM and COBIT 5) can represent, for any organization, a good way to achieve the objectives of internal control and risk management and, more generally, corporate governance.

The paper identifies some gaps in the COSO ERM and illustrates how the COBIT framework facilitates the implementation of an adequate system of internal control.

The originality of the work presented here is in analyzing the COBIT 5 together with the COSO ERM framework. This paper highlights that is not enough to apply only an internal control framework for achieving the risk management and internal control system objectives. An IT governance framework, such as COBIT 5 is proposed as a tool that support risk management in order to develop an adequate system of internal control.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the direct and interaction effects of relational governance and two control mechanisms, output control and process control in the context of international exchange relationships. Cross-border exchange relationships receive growing attention in the literature. Yet extant research has mainly examined single governance mechanisms. Among the few studies that investigate the interaction effects of relational governance and control mechanisms, some believe that the two mechanisms have conflicting effects, whereas others argue that they are complementary in nature.

Based on a sample of 184 Chinese export ventures, the empirical paper adopts the hierarchical moderated multiple regression approach.

The authors find that relational governance contributes positively to export performance, while output control leads negatively to export performance. The findings further suggest that output control complements relational governance to enhance export performance when combined. However, process control and relational governance substitute each other and reduce effectiveness when used simultaneously.

The study sheds new light on the ongoing debate about whether control mechanisms substitute or complement relational governance.

The study is novel in addressing the issue of how relational governance interacts differently with two control mechanisms in the international exchange relationships.

The aim of this study is to explore and understand corporate governance patterns in family firms across Latin America. This is in response to several calls in the academic literature urging for more empirical studies in corporate governance in developing regions.

Following a configurative perspective, a hierarchical cluster analysis is applied to a sample of the 155 largest Latin American family firms.

The authors identify three main corporate governance configurations across Latin American countries. First, the exported governance model resembles many characteristics of Anglo-American and Continental Europe governance patterns of public listed control, having independence from the board of directors, and mainly hiring non-family management. Second, the super-familial governance model describes private ownership where one or multiple families control both the board of directors and the top-management team. Finally, the hybrid governance model is the largest cluster identified in the sample and combines governance characteristics of both of the foregoing configurations. This configuration exhibits ownership structured through public offerings of shares combined with leadership of the board of directors by a family member as well as moderate family influence on the board and management.

This is the first study to investigate corporate governance in the largest listed and privately-owned family firms in Latin America. The article extends the conversation on family firm heterogeneity and contributes to the configurative approach in the family business field by offering a cross-country perspective and identifying meaningful taxonomies that are applicable beyond national boundaries.

The purpose of this paper is to adopt “whole network” perspective and analyzes the governance and control mechanisms in the Universal Postal Union (UPU), one of the oldest and largest inter-governmental networks, through the lens of institutional entrepreneurship theory. The purpose is to introduce a typology of network governance forms to the accounting literature and to analyze the governance and management control mechanisms within the UPU, a “participatory federation” (Provan, 1983) type of network that has managed the challenges of collective collaboration since 1875.

The study benefits from unlimited access to all archival materials of the UPU such as minutes of Congress and committee meetings since 1875 as well as secondary documents and market studies related to the postal sector. The data reported in this study are derived from the archives of the UPU in Berne, Switzerland and interviews conducted with senior officials.

Drawing on the work of Provan (1983) and Provan and Kenis (2008) the authors identify five “ideal type” network governance forms based on such variables as differences in the relative power of network participants and whether these networks have arisen spontaneously or due to external coercion, the authors classify the UPU as a “participatory federation.” Within the theoretical boundaries of this typology the authors identify the multi level governance structures and the use of management control mechanisms by each level of governance. The authors introduce a distinction between the “network constitutional organization” that focusses on the socialization of network members and strategy-level orchestration of the overall network and the “network administrative organization” (NAO) that mobilizes management accounting and control mechanisms to monitor, encourage and facilitate member collaboration. The authors propose that control within a participatory federation is enacted through collective entrepreneurship by governance bodies using management accounting and control mechanisms as institutional carriers.

The paper is focussed on the current state of the UPU’s network structure and processes and did not explore the dynamics around the emergence of the different network governance and control mechanisms. An exploration of the collective construction by network participants of the need for these mechanisms would provide insights into how they emerge and might lead to a better understanding of the role of NAOs in networks.

The paper highlights the challenges faced by collaborative networks and identifies enabling characteristics of a participatory federation’s governance bodies. The empirical observations within the context of the UPU contribute to the theoretical understanding of the desirable characteristics of participatory federations that might be applicable to similar public and private collaborative networks

This study expands the knowledge of management accounting and control systems in networks. It bridges a gap in the accounting literature by adopting a “whole network” perspective and by differentiating types of network governance structures that use management accounting and control systems. This contributes to the understanding of accounting and control across the full range of organizational forms.