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Leadership for public sector reforms in Indonesia involves both national level efforts and leadership from local levels that have been empowered by prior decentralization…
Leadership for public sector reforms in Indonesia involves both national level efforts and leadership from local levels that have been empowered by prior decentralization. This chapter focuses on reforms made by the national government, which has been guided by the values of serving public, increasing efficiency and becoming corruption-free. Although the National Development Agency and the Ministry for Administrative Reform provided central impetus and coordination, reforms were seen as quite fragmented across ministries with uneven results. The authors are concerned about reform effectiveness and sustainability. Reform leadership is challenged by human capital and legally mandated but inefficient bureaucratic processes and structures as well as challenges of public distrust and disobedient civil servants. The latter is sometimes dealt with by using patronage to insert allies for reform, and they take note of leaders gaining leverage from working across boundaries and jurisdictions, and by improving their authorizing environment. The chapter describes a strategy of leaders-led efforts that are cascaded through ministries through institutionalization (e.g., of policies) and obtaining support from successive reform champions at different levels and locations. The authors argue for increasing the number of ‘champion leaders’ who pragmatically, transactionally and successfully get subordinates to commit to reform efforts.
Reforms in corporate governance in selected Asian countries were introduced after the financial crisis of 1997–1998. After the financial collapse, several crisis-affected…
Reforms in corporate governance in selected Asian countries were introduced after the financial crisis of 1997–1998. After the financial collapse, several crisis-affected economies overhauled their corporate governance, strengthening market forces, implementing tougher regulations and focusing on transparency in decision-making and accountability. Since then, a commitment to improving corporate governance has grown as governments recognised the need to protect investors’ interests, reduce systemic market risks, maintain financial stability and enhance investors’ confidence to encourage the return of capital to the region through better accountability and transparency. The incentive for corporations to follow best practice is to boost their corporate performance and attract investment. Effective corporate governance is also recognised as essential for economic growth. Governments are realising that good governance of corporations is a source of competitive advantage and critical to economic and social progress.
Since the financial crisis, corporate governance has become a key policy issue in most of Asia. Progress in reforming corporate governance, however, has been uneven across Asia. This paper documents that progress.
The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the hidden process of collusion among power holders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an emerging economy, which endures…
The purpose of this paper is to illuminate the hidden process of collusion among power holders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in an emerging economy, which endures despite comprehensive reforms towards democracy and good governance. Why are mechanisms of checks and balances not functioning in the way they should?
The analysis is based on in-depth interviews with board members, executives, politicians, bureaucrats and representatives from auditing boards involved in the management of SOEs in Indonesia.
The findings reveal practices of collective conservatism, reciprocal opportunism and normalisation of corruption. The costs of getting into powerful positions are so high that conglomerate business owners gain control over the management of SOEs. The authors use the terms “wall-building and gatekeeping” to explain such cases.
There is a continuous process of wall building and gatekeeping occurring among business oligarchs, bureaucrats and elected politicians in Indonesia. New entrants into the system are co-opted by the established elite.
This study shows collusion, rent-seeking and corruption among political and business elites as well as top officials in the government hinder good governance reforms in state-owned Indonesian enterprises.
Collusion and illicit business practices in SOEs are clearly grounded on wall building and gatekeeping. Tackling this problem is a precondition for good governance and an improved legal and regulatory business environment in Indonesia. The ideal separation of powers and the checks and balances for good governance apparently need more than a democracy to break through. A further strengthening of the free press and critical academics will be one crucial contribution.
There is generally a lack of understanding of the context of corruption, such as the influence of institutional and organisational structures. The topic of corruption is also under-researched due to the difficulty of finding empire evidence. This paper contributes to explaining why new political and organisational structures, such as a democratically elected parliament and a particularly designed corruption eradication commission, are not able to hinder rent-seeking practices and illicit political business in state agencies.
Post-crisis policy measures in Asia have focussed on banking sector and market reform. The paper argues that in order to propel growth, banking and market reform in Asia…
Post-crisis policy measures in Asia have focussed on banking sector and market reform. The paper argues that in order to propel growth, banking and market reform in Asia must be undertaken with the view that they are not mutually exclusive competitive tradeoffs. Rather banks and markets must be viewed as complementary supportive pillars in a financial system. Additionally, legal and functional reform must be undertaken simultaneously. The paper proposes that a likely consequence of doing so will enable creating a four-pillared multi-dimensional growth paradigm in the region to help restore and promote growth.
To examine the impact of corporate governance on Cost of Capital (COC) and financial distress in the ASEAN countries.
To examine the impact of corporate governance on Cost of Capital (COC) and financial distress in the ASEAN countries.
We compiled a list of the 50 largest publicly listed firms by market capitalization in each of the following five East Asian countries, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Furthermore, we then divided the five countries into two distinctive categories – (i) Malaysia and Singapore (Common Law/strong legal protection countries) and (ii) Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Civil Law/weak legal protection countries). The annual data is collected for the time period ranging from 2006 to 2015, allowing a total observation of 1,317 firm years.
Overall, the paper supports the findings of many researchers that Board independence, promulgating good corporate governance, leads to better access to capital at lower cost, thus providing growth opportunities for ASEAN region. Taking lead from Simpson and Gleason (1999) and similar, we emphasize that during financial distress CEO duality will strengthen control systems and reduce internal discord in ASEAN firms.
The paper is one of the niche studies that has incorporated the difference between civil and common law rule in the study of corporate governance and its impact on financial measures of firms' in the ASEAN countries.
This paper examines whether public sector reforms in a developing country is consistent with the principles of new public management (NPM). It examines whether Indonesian…
This paper examines whether public sector reforms in a developing country is consistent with the principles of new public management (NPM). It examines whether Indonesian public sector reforms from the late 1990s to 2015, specifically the adoption of accrual accounting, are motivated by NPM philosophy. Reviewing and analysing Government regulations and reports, the study finds that the reforms are an attempt to implement NPM, specifically in relation to five financial management aspects (i.e. market-oriented, budgeting, performance management, financial reporting and auditing systems). However, the reforms are inconsistent with the NPM philosophy of efficiency and effectiveness in public service provisions. By requiring the use of the existing system, the reforms actually created inefficiency. This research is novel in investigating the gap between 'ideal concepts' and examining practices in an emerging country context.
Why reform government? The answer to this question varies relative to context and timing. Sometimes reform is stimulated by a shortage of financial resources. Sometimes it…
Why reform government? The answer to this question varies relative to context and timing. Sometimes reform is stimulated by a shortage of financial resources. Sometimes it is brought on by a change in political power. At other times it may be forced by citizen demand. And, at times it results as a response to corruption and scandal. Moreover, in many cases, more than one of these aspects work together to push forward government reform. This is also why reformers adopt various strategies ranging from institutional reorganization, rationalization of administrative procedures, introduction of new managerial techniques, and more recently, implementation of e-government.
Willard A. Hanna's astute observation above about the institutionalization of corruption in Indonesia was published in August 1971, five years after President Soeharto assumed power. The origins of corruption in Indonesia can be traced to the Dutch colonial period as bribery was rife among the lowly paid personnel of the Dutch East India Company (Day, 1966, pp. 100–103). However, corruption became institutionalized during President Soeharto's 32-year reign as his cronies and family “made an art form of creaming off many of Indonesia's most profitable ventures … while being protected by monopoly regulations and their relationship to the president” (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 202). Raymond Bonner (1988, p. 80) has used the euphemism “the family business” to describe “the corruption surrounding members of the Suharto family,” which was “a public secret” in 1988.
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the roles of corporate governance reforms in Malaysia following the 1997/1998 Asian crisis from the perspectives of…
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to understand the roles of corporate governance reforms in Malaysia following the 1997/1998 Asian crisis from the perspectives of corporate managers.
Design/methodology/approach – The primary evidence used is drawn from a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with Malaysian corporate managers involved in the overseeing of the governance structures within their companies.
Findings – This study shows that most interviewees believed that an appropriate corporate governance system could play a role in resolving the problems associated with the interlocking and concentrated corporate ownership structure in Malaysia. However, the effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms in dealing with this issue is questionable. It also reveals that Malaysian companies ‘changed’ their corporate governance practices predominantly to recover (foreign) investor confidence lost during the crisis and to fulfil the legal requirements enforced by the government, where the latter was under pressure from the international community (especially, the World Bank and IMF) to ‘improve’ the Malaysian corporate governance practices after the crisis.
Originality/value of paper – This paper adds to the literature on corporate governance, especially in the context of developing countries. Prior research investigating corporate governance issues in developing countries has been limited, particularly the lack of in-depth examination of corporate governance practices from the perspectives of corporate managers. This paper will be of great value to researchers and practitioners seeking to gain a better understanding of the roles of corporate governance in Malaysia.