Search results

The financial crisis at the end of the past decade resulted in downturns in stock markets and the collapse of many large banks around the world. It encouraged economists worldwide to consider alternative financial solutions. Attention has been focused on Islamic finance as an alternative model. This study examines the performance of Islamic banks in 10 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries over the period of 2005–2010.

It is an intertemporal analysis where it compares the profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and efficiency of 43 Islamic banks before and after the financial crisis.

The results show that the financial crisis negatively affected the performance of Islamic banks. The profitability and liquidity of Islamic banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries decreased drastically after the crisis. Islamic banks in non-GCC countries were efficient and more profitable compared to GCC countries. However, they took excessive risk during and after the financial crisis. The chapter concludes that Islamic financial institutions are not immune from the effects of the global recession.

The financial crisis has led to a greater recognition of the importance of liquidity risks. Reinforcing regulations and setting up a strong liquidity management framework are needed to improve the Islamic financial industry.

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.

In this chapter we study the intra-group transactions between the parent bank and its foreign subsidiaries in European Union (EU) countries during the crisis. We use hand-collected data from annual statements on related party transaction and find that they may create a serious problem for the stability of the foreign banks’ subsidiaries. Moreover, as some of those subsidiary banks were large by assets in some of the member states the related party transactions with the parent bank created a serious threat to the host countries’ financial system stability. We attribute this transaction to the weak governance in foreign subsidiaries. We suggest improvements in governance as well as greater disclosure of related party transactions in bank holding companies in Europe.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically assess the effect of the factors contributing to the recovery from this crisis in terms of national GDP growth among the G7, Asian7, and Latin American7 countries.

The author uses a multivariate regression analysis of the determinants of the global financial crisis recovery.

Based on data from 21 developed and developing emerging market economies the author found that good macroeconomic fundamentals together with more open financial policy, financial liberalization, financial depth, domestic performance, and favored global conditions do linearly influence national GDP growth. Over 85 percent of cross-country variations in GDP growth during the recovery phase of the global financial crisis can be explained by its linear dependency on pre-crisis national GDP growth, financial liberalization, financial depth, domestic performance, as well as interaction terms between various explanatory variables. Cross-country differences in national GDP growth also linearly depend on macroprudence and on favorable global conditions.

Results of such empirical examination may enable governments in developing countries devise resilience strategies that may serve as powerful tools for dealing with future global financial crises.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of union responses to globalisation and, in particular, the global financial crisis; the consequences of the financial crisis for workers; and lessons from the experience.

The authors examined numerous union statements, declarations, reports and actions as well as extensive documentary evidence from other sources. The focus was on the behaviour of supranational trade unions, including the European Trade Union Confederation, the International Trade Union Confederation and Global Unions.

The supranational unions’ methods gradually shifted in the 2000s from reliance on institutional politics to collaboration with broader alter‐globalisation protest movements, though this carried risks. The global financial crisis appeared to be a strategic opportunity for trade unions, but while they developed sophisticated policy packages, they were unable to change the behaviour of global institutions. This accentuated the shift in union strategy. Governments initially set aside free market ideology for stimulus packages, but failed to regulate to prevent future crises. Workers bore the brunt of the crisis. The experience highlighted the contradictions facing unions dealing with global issues.

The outcomes of crises depend on the actions, strategies and prior strengths of the parties. Different outcomes emerged from prior crises and may emerge from future ones.

Few studies have examined the role of supranational unions in the context of the financial crisis. A clearer understanding of the weaknesses of and impediments to supranational union responses may increase the likelihood that future crises will be better understood and be followed by more effective responses.

This study identifies measures to recover economic growth and build sustainable societies and markets in post-COVID-19 scenarios – with a perspective of resilience and adaptability to climate change and massive biodiversity loss. Additionally, this study uncovers the interventions implemented to address economic, environmental and social consequences of past crises based on a systematic literature review. Specifically, this chapter provides answers to the following six questions:

1. What has been done in the past to rebuild social, economic and environmental balance after global crises?

2. Where (geographical region) did the analysis on measures taken concentrate?

3. When have scholars analysed past measures to rebuild business and society after a global crisis?

4. How did the past measures to rebuild business and society after the global crisis take place?

5. Who promotes the measures to rebuild business and society after a global crisis takes place?

6. Why is it important to study the previous literature on past measures to rebuild business and society after a global crisis takes place?

What has been done in the past to rebuild social, economic and environmental balance after global crises?

Where (geographical region) did the analysis on measures taken concentrate?

When have scholars analysed past measures to rebuild business and society after a global crisis?

How did the past measures to rebuild business and society after the global crisis take place?

Who promotes the measures to rebuild business and society after a global crisis takes place?

Why is it important to study the previous literature on past measures to rebuild business and society after a global crisis takes place?

Finally, this chapter identifies future research opportunities to rebuild business and society after the past global crises.

We propose a novel dynamic factor model to characterise comovements between returns on securities from different asset classes from different countries. We apply a global-class-country latent factor model and allow time-varying loadings. We are able to separate contagion (asset exposure driven) and excess interdependence (factor volatility driven). Using data from 1999 to 2012, we find evidence of contagion from the US stock market during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and of excess interdependence during the European debt crisis from May 2010 onwards. Neither contagion nor excess interdependence is found when the average measure of model implied comovements is used.