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This chapter investigates the impact of the euro crisis on Asia’s short-term economic outlook. This chapter tries to answer this question by examining both the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission. More specifically, it looks at the effect of euro crisis on Asian exports and growth, contagion from EU financial markets to Asian financial markets, and influence of EU bank lending on credit growth in Asia. The chapter also touches upon Asia’s policy space to assess how well the region is positioned to weather another major external shock. This chapter finds that the impact of euro crisis on developing Asia points to a sizable but manageable short-term impact. Furthermore, our analysis points to a significant effect on the region’s financial systems, especially its banking sector. This chapter informs policymakers of the impact of the euro crisis and advice to continue to keep a close eye on eurozone developments and their ramifications for their economies.

The article provides a comparative critique of the financial underpinnings of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the recent wave of financial crises. The collapse of the financial systems in many developing nations, the bankruptcies in the Anglo-Saxon corporate sectors and a threat of more sovereign defaults on behalf of emerging markets suggest that the current wave of global financial fragility and recession rivals that of the Great Depression of the 1930s. The paper examines key elements that account for the crisis-prone nature of global capitalism: the political discipline of neo-liberalism, debt-driven expansion of the privatised financial markets, and the profound disarticulation of the financial and real economies. These factors suggests that the risk of a global depression is by no means hypothetical, and unless effective and collaborative efforts are made to tame the inherently unstable regime of global finance, even major world economies are faced with a prolonged period of financial turbulence and economic stagnation. The paper concludes by pondering the possibility of a paradigmatic shift in the transnational political consensus that can prevent a global repetition of the 1930s. While the increased awareness of financial instability and crisis may indeed prompt some ad hoc adjustments in national and foreign economic policies of major capitalist powers, in the long run these measures will be insufficient to prevent a major financial and economic disaster.

The chapter (re)assesses the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on global foreign direct investment (FDI). Based on updated data and renewed analyses, the author explores the crisis’ overall effects on global FDI flows, the different consequences on developed and developing countries, and the subsequent rise of emerging economies as both recipients and sources of FDI. Implications for policy and international business theory are delineated. By so doing, the author extends the theoretical and empirical studies on FDI determinants to the global level and provides lessons that are particularly useful against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The purpose of this study is to show how socially responsible investment (SRI) could represent a powerful tool (trust recovering in political and economic institutions) in the case of failure or stagnation of economic and financial growth. The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the current status of SRI in the context of the recent financial and economic crises. The main objective of this analysis is to consider the different benefits and challenges that this type of investment transactions bring into the international economy, and how SRI entrance could represent a major benefit not only for investors a different approach to corporate sustainability but as an important possibility in times of global economic and political crisis.

By analysing the literature about SRI, it has been developed a discussion regarding its benefits and obstacles in today’s financial scenario. By evaluating the performance of SRI in the context of the global financial crisis and the important opportunities regarding development, we would like to present the SRI as an important tool in today’s Post 2015 development agenda.

After revising the existent literature, it has been found that there are two important discussions in the field of SRI. The first one is related with the financial performance of SRI in contrast with the conventional investment funds while the second one is related with important considerations about the SRI in the context of the global financial crisis. After considering the arguments from the different authors, we address some conclusions regarding the importance of SRI in nowadays sustainable development discussion.

Due to failure in the traditional modus operandi of financial institutions and the recent global crises, investors, corporate executives and governments are increasingly paying more attention on the social, environmental and ethical behaviour of individual managers, shareholders and institutional investors. Therefore, it is being observed a shift and maturing process in SRI from an exclusive practice of few and specialised niche investment funds with minor financial implications and limited economic importance, to mainstream adopted by a growing number of institutional investors at the international level. This shift may influence companies and managers to adopt universal values and to assume a committed and strategic CSR agenda to respond to markets and societal expectations, in order to have guilt-free and sustainable investment and sustainable financial markets.

Within the context of the Post 2015 development agenda, the role of business and the private sector has become crucial for funding the new sustainable development goals (SDGs). This chapter not only discussed the relationship between SRI as an alternative to overcome financial crises and lack of sustainability in investment, but it does also conceptually demonstrates the potential of SRI to achieve the funding of the SDGs.

The global financial crisis has magnified the role of Financial Sector Surveillance (FSS) in the International Monetary Fund's activities. This chapter surveys the various steps and initiatives through which the Fund has increasingly deepened its involvement in FSS. Overall, this process can be characterised by a preliminary stage and two main phases. The preliminary stage dates back to the 1980s and early 1990s, and was mainly related to the Fund's research and technical assistance activities within the process of monetary and financial deregulation embraced by several member countries. The first ‘official’ phase of the Fund's involvement in FSS started in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis, and relates to the international call to include financial sector issues among the core areas of Fund surveillance. The second phase focuses on the objectives of bringing the coverage of financial sector issues ‘up-to-par’ with the coverage of other traditional core areas of surveillance, and of integrating financial analysis into the Fund's analytical macroeconomic framework. By urging the Fund to give greater attention to its member countries' financial systems, the international community's response to the global crisis may mark the beginning of a new phase of FSS. The Fund's financial sector surveillance, particularly on advanced economies, is of paramount importance for emerging market and developing countries, as they are vulnerable to spillover effects from crises originated in advanced economies. Emerging market and developing economies, which constitute the majority of the Fund's 187 members, are currently the recipients of over 50 programmes of financial support from the Fund (including those of a precautionary nature), totalling over $250 billion.

The global recession has strongly affected the credibility of the international banking system, damaging also the real economy.

Developing countries, not fully integrated with international markets, seem less affected and local microfinance institutions might also allow for a further shelter against recession, even if foreign support is slowing down and collection of international capital is harder and more expensive.

Intrinsic characteristics of microfinance, such as closeness to the borrowers, limited risk and exposure and little if any correlation with international markets have an anti-cyclical effect. In hard and confused times, it pays to be little, flexible and simple.

The financial crisis at the end of the past decade resulted in downturns in stock markets and the collapse of many large banks around the world. It encouraged economists worldwide to consider alternative financial solutions. Attention has been focused on Islamic finance as an alternative model. This study examines the performance of Islamic banks in 10 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries over the period of 2005–2010.

It is an intertemporal analysis where it compares the profitability, liquidity, risk and solvency, and efficiency of 43 Islamic banks before and after the financial crisis.

The results show that the financial crisis negatively affected the performance of Islamic banks. The profitability and liquidity of Islamic banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries decreased drastically after the crisis. Islamic banks in non-GCC countries were efficient and more profitable compared to GCC countries. However, they took excessive risk during and after the financial crisis. The chapter concludes that Islamic financial institutions are not immune from the effects of the global recession.

The financial crisis has led to a greater recognition of the importance of liquidity risks. Reinforcing regulations and setting up a strong liquidity management framework are needed to improve the Islamic financial industry.

This chapter examines how foreign banks respond to domestic monetary policy in host countries during crisis periods, in particular, the response shown toward the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1999 and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. By observing 283 domestic and foreign banks in seven emerging Asian economies, we find that foreign banks are slower than domestic banks in adjusting the growth of their loans to changes in host monetary policy. This inertia by foreign banks is found to be more pronounced in the recent 2008–2009 global crisis than in the 1997–1999 Asian regional crisis, suggesting that the buffering/hampering effects of foreign banks on the effectiveness of the domestic monetary policy transmission mechanism become stronger in a recent global crisis originating from outside Asia than a regional crisis imploded within Asia a decade earlier. We also find that foreign banks’ lower sensitivity than domestic banks to host monetary policy during the crisis periods is heterogeneous, depending on factors such as the extent of the adverse impact of crises on parent banks, the scope of business operation by parent banks, and foreign banks’ mode of entry into host banking markets.

The global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 had far-reaching consequences for the global economy, triggering widespread economic turmoil. We use the event-study method to investigate whether investors priced the effect of significant events before the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in European and Asia-Pacific banks. Abnormal returns on the event days range from −4.32% to 5.03% in Europe and −5.13% to 6.57% in Asia-Pacific countries. When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt on September 15, 2008, abnormal returns averaged the lowest at −4.32% in Europe and −5.13% in Asia-Pacific countries. The significant abnormal returns show that Lehman Brothers' collapse was a turning point, and investors paid attention to the precrisis events as warning signs of the oncoming crisis.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.