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This study aims to examine the impact of December 2012, New Zealand (NZ) stock exchange operator listing rule change that introduced compulsory disclosure about gender…
This study aims to examine the impact of December 2012, New Zealand (NZ) stock exchange operator listing rule change that introduced compulsory disclosure about gender diversity on NZ boards.
A quasi-natural experiment setting with a clearly identifiable exogenous event.
The rate of growth in female-held directorships increased significantly after the introduction of the new rule, resulting in, by 2016, the average female board representation being more than double what it had been in 2012. However, this paper finds no relationship between this response and company performance.
This study cannot attribute causality to the observed jump in female directorships following the 2012 listing rule change due to the absence of a control group of firms not subject to this change.
The results are consistent with an efficient director appointment process in NZ.
Low-key regulatory changes can have a significant impact on company behaviour.
From 2007, New Zealand firms must report the cost of granting employee stock options (ESOs). Market‐based option pricing models assume that option holders are…
From 2007, New Zealand firms must report the cost of granting employee stock options (ESOs). Market‐based option pricing models assume that option holders are unconstrained in their portfolio choices and thus are indifferent to the specific risk of any firm. By contrast, ESO holders are frequently required to hold portfolios that are over‐exposed to the firm that employs them and so adopt exercise policies that reflect their individual risk preferences. Applying the model of Ingersoll (2006) to hypothetical ESOs, we show that ESO cost can be extremely sensitive to employee characteristics of risk aversion and under‐diversification. This result casts doubt on the usefulness of any market‐based model for pricing ESOs, since such models, by definition, produce option values that are independent of employee characteristics. By limiting employee discretion over the choice of exercise date, vesting restrictions help reduce the magnitude of this problem.
This paper examines the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) for aggregate New Zealand share market returns, as well as the CRSP NYSE‐AMEX (USA) index during the 1980‐2001 period…
This paper examines the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) for aggregate New Zealand share market returns, as well as the CRSP NYSE‐AMEX (USA) index during the 1980‐2001 period. Using several indices, we rely on the variance‐ratio test and find evidence to support the rejection of the RWH with some evidence of a momentum effect. However, we find evidence to suggest the behaviour of share prices to be time‐dependent in New Zealand. For example, we find the indices tested were closer to random after the 1987 share market crash. Further analysis showed even stronger results for periods subsequent to the passage of the Companies Act 1993 and the Financial Reporting Act 1993. We also find evidence that indices based on large capitalisation stocks are more likely to follow a random walk compared to those based on smaller stocks. For the USA index, we find stronger evidence of random behaviour in our sample period compared to the earlier period examined by Lo and Mackinlay (1988)
The purpose of this paper is to uncover the stylised facts about NZ corporate boards and identify unanswered questions about their composition, activity and incentives…
The purpose of this paper is to uncover the stylised facts about NZ corporate boards and identify unanswered questions about their composition, activity and incentives during the 16-year period between 1995 and 2010.
The paper uses annual report data to document the evolution of 22 NZ board characteristics. The paper also informally compares these trends with those occurring in other countries.
Unsurprisingly, the representation of non-executive, independent and female directors on NZ boards rose during the period, as did real chair and director fees and the importance of board committees, while average board size fell. Perhaps more surprisingly, much of this movement occurred before NZX governance reforms in 2003. Moreover, there are some intriguing differences between New Zealand and other, mainly larger, countries.
The analysis is largely descriptive and focuses on identifying questions rather than answering them.
The paper fills an obvious gap in the governance literature, which largely ignores small, open economies, and hence provides little clue as to the overall state and evolution of NZ boards. The paper also identifies a number of questions for further research.