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This paper investigates the relationship between (1) business cycle and use of personal contacts to obtain job and (2) use of personal contacts to obtain job and wages.

For this, we use data from the Monthly Employment Survey (2002–2015) from Brazil which has detailed information on individual and job characteristics. In addition, we investigate the impact of referrals on wage using quantile regressions.

Time-varying parameter estimates indicate that the relationship between business cycle and use of personal contacts became less countercyclical over time. In general, they show that there is more evidence of a slow changing relationship between personal contacts and the business cycle over time rather than a sudden and discrete one. Using quantile regressions, we observed that, controlling for similar observable characteristics, and including unobserved heterogeneity, wage differences between workers using personal contacts versus workers using others channels disappear. The evidences indicate that workers resort to personal contacts because of valuation of non-pecuniary job characteristics.

The results suggest that, in designing subsidy or affirmative action programs, attention to network effects is important. Social networks can help labor markets run more smoothly by alleviating information frictions.

This study extends the existing literature by providing empirical evidence of the use of personal contacts for the Brazil. Although there are many studies and methods for measuring use of personal contacts, to our knowledge, there are no studies using a time-varying parameters model.

The purpose of this paper is to use the instrumental game theory to understand the behavior of the front agents tax evasion and tax authority in Brazil.

In order to analyze the taxpayer’s behavior before the Brazilian tax system and tax actions aimed at reducing tax evasion, the authors developed a theoretical model based on the payoffs of Graetz et al. (1986) and increased with situations proposed by Siqueira (2004), Lipatov (2006) and Oliveira (2011).

Considering the cases with and without specialists, the main results show that in high dropout situation, penalize taxpayers with high fines or deprivations of liberty may not be as effective. Another result of the analysis is that the audit and inspection costs played an important role in driving the equilibrium system.

One limitation of this study is to consider how the exogenous tax authorities earnings (Federal Revenue of Brazil and Federal Police) and not as a function of the goals and certain enforcement policies for each public body.

The authors suggest the following policy: investing in tax inspectors and unbureaucratic the authorities of the cost structure become a more effective tool to combat non-compliance with tax obligations that the intensity of the penalties imposed by the act of evading.

This paper contributes to the literature insofar as it models for the first time, using game theory, the behavior of the evading agent and the tax authority in Brazil.