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Absent Chief Entrepreneur/Intrapreneur (‘Ntrepreneur) Officer (CNO) Churchill’s un wavering commitment of significant resources to the unproven radar (Decision to Dare) as early as the autumn of 1937, Great Britain would have not survived as a nation: No country survival. Absent Watson, Jr.’s unwavering determination to push IBM into computers, launching in 1951 the Defense Calculator, which at $3 million “was by far the most expensive project in IBM history,” IBM would not have survived: No corporate survival. From the [rather flimsy] briefing by Dr. R.V. Jones weaving fact and fancy, how did Churchill draw the firm conclusion that radar would be invented; and risk rewriting the entire plans for the air defense of Great Britain around radar? How did Watson, Jr. dismiss the unanimous recommendation of IBM’s 18 best systems experts that magnetic tape had no place at IBM; and launch the most expensive project at IBM to break into the unknown field of computers? Based on first‐person narratives, how could the single input of relatively flimsy data produce as the output, the certain realization of a futuristic technology? The most‐cited work on the psychology of decision‐making (Kahneman‐Tversky) is seen to be in applicable. Sigmund Freud’s Self‐Analysis offers a method of systematic introspection/ret rospection. We develop an established sequence of ordered procedures (Protocol) of memory management (Memory Management Disequilibria Dimensions (MD2) Protocol) which applies equally well to both the country and corporate survival decisions, and offers some suggestions to improve Memory Management for Decisions to Dare.

Can instances of empirical success/failure yield an established sequence of ordered procedures (Protocol): management of technology protocol (MOTEP) to improve the probability of corporate/country survival/success?Design/methodology/approach – The long established technology of Japanese Mitsubishi engines used by Proton, Malaysia’s national car‐maker, since September 1985, is due to be supplanted at the beginning of February, 2004 by the emerging technology of the all‐Malaysian Gen2 engine. Can Chacko’s MOTEP suggest how Proton should pro‐actively target Gen2 sales?Findings – MOTEP determined first year sales of Gen2 cars formally using the form of the sales curve of the established technology. It was projected substantively based on the system performance characteristics (SPC) which attracted customers to Gen2. The theory of concomitant coalitions (CONCOL) shows us how Proton can cooperate with their competitor, Perodua, on R&D for system performance characteristics‐improving technology while competing with Perodua in the market. How much R&D is justified? How should it be allocated? How can Proton and Perodua both enjoy R&D breakthroughs in the immediate instead of in the distant future?Originality/value – The paper selects from among the 12 MOTEP steps those which develop for Proton a systematic approach to anticipate, acquire and adopt high technology on a sustained basis to increase the probability of corporate/country survival/success, and illustrates it with respect to pro‐actively promoting the sales of emerging technology‐based Gen2 car sales.

Wireless communication, comprising telecommunication industry products and services which move voice, video, data, and graphics at the speed of the electron, is the back bone of the Internet. We have today a wireless world which two Chief ‘Ntrepreneur Officers (CNOs)‐American Sam Ginn (AirTouch) and Britisher Chris Gent (Vodafone)‐created by their Memory Management during the 16 years between Olympics in Los Angeles (1984) and Olympics in Sydney (2000).

US Vice President Albert Gore first used on March 21,1994, what later became the phrase: “Information Superhighway,” The phrase suggests that information traffic rolls right over the static, long‐suffering fixture of mud, concrete and asphalt. But with each new development of IT, it is as though the vehicles have to renegotiate with the roadway the right of passage, making it very much an interactive process. To underscore its dynamic nature, a transportation analogy seems appropriate. If we are today in the propeller airplane stage, Broadband Network Technology (BNT) is beyond Supersonic Concorde, to reach which we need to traverse through [1] turbo‐prop technology, [2] jet engine technology, [3] 747‐technology, [4]jumbo jet technology, and [5] supersonic technology to [6] supersonic+ technology. Information Superskyway should result in what Dertouzos, Director of MIT Computer Science Labatory, calls Information Marketplace: “the collection of people, computers, communications, software and services that will be engaged in the intraorganizational and interpersonal informational transactions of the future.” 3C firms jockey for position on the Information Superskyway. While they offer better access to the Internet, they also seek to restrict the access to products and services they control. Dertouzos says that all companies shoud cooperate with their competitors to build a shared information infrastructure, so that they can compete. It echoes our own definition of Concomitant Coalition: association of one party(ies) with and against the same party(ies) in the same game or activity. We discuss three CONCOLs: [1] Microsoft‐Netscape working together and in competition, as Bill Gates puts it, to define standards that will help overcome the Internet's limitations. They compete on supplying components of the software platform for interactive networks; but they cooperate in developing an industry standard, no matter whose components finally get accepted. [2] Sun‐NCR‐Intel working together against Microsoft which is pushing its Windows NT as a substitute for Sun's Unix operating system. [3] Intel‐SAP working together against Microsoft, IBM on business management software. Pandesic, the 50–50 joint venture between Intel (whose chips control the basic functions of 80 percent of the world's PCs), and Germany‐based SAP (the world's biggest publisher of business management software), will provide on‐line merchants the necessary hard‐and‐software, to tap into the projected US$234 billion economy on the Internet by the year 2002. We saw in Chapter 4 that the main players in 3C industries are racing each other on their own pathways to the Information Superskyway. In this chapter we find 3C firms entering into CONCOLs to tap into the rich bounty on the Internet. However, Dertouzos warns that none of the awesome powers of fiber optics, real‐time video, virtual reality, multimedia, and electronic commerce would be realized unless computers and software at diverse sites can “understand” one another. But he says: “Hardly anyone today is paying attention to shared conventions that will allow interconnected machines to understand and work with each other without the constant intervention of a human being.”

The singular success of Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. in rescuing IBM from dismemberment and destruction in terms of his shifting the institutional memory of 300,000 employees from corporate politics to customer service focus, has been expalined memory management explain failures as well?

Chacko (memory management in survival decisions of corportions 1956‐2003, Barmarick Publications, UK, 2006) published a sequence of ordered procedures (protocol) of memory management: memory management disequilibria dimensions (MD)² protocol. This paper applies the protocol to the birth and death of the GO computer.

The memory management disequilibria dimensions (MD)² protocol analyzes accurately the Jerry Kaplan narrative of founding on August 14, 1987, the GO corporation to AT&T firing the last remaining employees of EO, the spin‐off of GO on July 29, 1994. (MD)² Step 1: Chief Ntrapreneur officer will to win became a casualty, founder CTO/CNO Kaplan reflecting that money wasn’t the problem, but loss of faith of the chief financial officer on the viability, of the Software VP on the development schedules, of the CEO on market momentum, and of the CTO/ECO on the “stick‐to‐itveness” of the new management team.

The habit patterns of thought and action that make a corporation/country unique are instructed/inscribed in individual/institional memory. This paper demonstrates that the (MD)² protocol explains both success and failure, providing a basis to make memory management effective.

Case Studies generally ask: (1) What accounts for the success/failure of this real‐life “Case” (Corporation, Government or Organization)?; (2) How can we transport the lessons learned across time and space?; (3) What immediate/eventual issue/objective(s) should the “Case” pursue to enhance its survival/success; and How? The student is graded on the Case Study by the force of his/her reasoning and arguments, two diametrically‐opposite action plans both scoring “A”. But which one should the CEO implement? Why? Are there minimal criteria that any Case Study of management should fulfill? The raison d etre of management is the pre‐committing of scarce resources for unknown/unknowable results (e.g., market share, mind share), which are generated by interactions of variables and/or participants. Does the Case Study identify the cogent interactions; does it suggest how to allocate resources to achieve pre‐specified results? This Case Study has been checked by the corporation for accuracy. We structure the narrative by systems theory which provides a framework to assess what the company has achieved, and to formulate what it should do to improve its chances of survival/success. The theory is buttressed by illustrations of systems approach to complexity, ranging from Apollo lunar landing to the $91‐billion IT Services Company, IBM. According to National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM), exports rose 30.5 per cent to $12.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2003‐04 ending on March 31, 2004 from $9.6 billion in Fiscal 2002‐. Indian exports totaled $52.72 billion in 2003‐04. Applying the growth in the first five months, we estimate the total exports in 2003‐04 at $54.8 billion. The IT exports contributed 18.2 per cent in 2002‐03, rising to 22.8 per cent in 2003‐04.

The dominating role of corporate memory/corporate culture in instituting/impeding dramatic changes is highlighted in the first‐person narrative of Louis V. Gerstner, Jr. of his tenure as IBM CEO (1993‐2002). Gerstner, who had never worked in the computer business, was brought in to rescue IBM which had lost $16 billion in three years, and half its share value in eight years in which 175,000 employees lost their jobs. “I came to see in my time at IBM that culture is not just one aspect of the game‐it is the game... [When the original environment institutionalized in the corporate culture] shifts, it becomes an enormous impediment to the institution’s ability to adapt.” To overcome the impediment, Gerstner had to employ Draconian Measures to replace/rebuild the institutional memory: [1] organizationally by ripping power out of the entrenched bureaucracy, and giving it to 12 newly‐constituted customer‐centered industries, [2] operationally by tying Pay and Promotion to IBM stock performance (instead of individual units), [3] motivationally by rewarding individuals on their accomplishment of their plans to implement the Gerstner triad: “Win, Execute, Team,” and [4] strategically by making big bets on unproven technologies of CMOS and Net work‐centered e‐business. Our Memory Management Disequilibria Dimensions (MD)2 Pro ‐ to colanalyzes the Gerstner narrative accurately.

Should we produce a product not produced before? With trade occupying as much as 94.8% of GNP in some ASEAN countries, their entry into the domestic market to displace a foreign import is a vital issue‐which is seldom, if ever, discussed in the literature. Our innovative use of Monte Carlo simulation estimates the market share of a FUTURE Malaysian product, enabling a preliminary decision on market entry to displace imports.

We said in Chapter 1 that unless hitech and higher—tech are available from the internal research facilities of the corporation/country, they have to be acquired from external source(s) through techtransfer. But there is an inherent conflict in techtransfer. The transferee is with the transferor on technology, but against on trade. Without a definition of techtransfer, protagonists can argue that Malaysia receives excellent techtransfer, while detractors can argue, with equal justification, exactly the opposite. Therefore we need a proper definition of techtransfer: Duplicating on a self‐sustained basis, a foreign process of multiplying manyfold, the output/input ratio in converting physical/mental, matter/energy inputs into directly useable output(s). To assess the role of techtransfer in Malaysian development, it would be instructive to learn from possibly another Developing Asian country with comparable population, size, stability, and geographic location. Since Taiwan enjoyed the current per capita GDP of Malaysia ten years ago, Taiwan techtransfer experience ten years ago would be an instructive parallel for Malaysia today. Since trade is 94.8% of Taiwan GDP, the three leading export industries of Taiwan were chosen‐electric and electronic; textiles, and plastic industries. A sample of eight Taiwanese firms from these industries was selected; so also two multinationals with long‐standing ties with Taiwan. The top management was interviewed in depth on techtransfer as defined above. Six elements of progress and six problems were identified in techtransfer in the mid‐80s. The elements of progress were: (1) Higher‐value manufacture, (2) Spawning of competitive companies, (3) Overseas hitech training, (4) Learning to operate hitech machinery, (5) Indirect acquisition of Know‐Why, and (6) Hitech contacts within the multinationals. The problems were: (1) Manufacturing segmentation, (2) Segmented technical assistance, (3) Overseas manufacture of critical components, (4) Short‐run improvements, (5) Inability to innovate, and (6) Ignored marketing. One of the self‐preservation techniques of the hitech transferor is to provide the glitter and not the gold. If the hitech transferor can make the transferee believe that hitech is transferred in substance while only doing so in form, that would help preserve the former's territory (market) without jeopardizing technology.

Bill Gates, Chairman and CEO of Microsoft Corporation, holds that the Information Highway does not exist, and that it would not be available to most US homes for at least a decade. Where one of the most knowledgeable authorities on Information Technology (IT) fears to tread, wordsmiths rush in. Don Tapscott, for one, affirms that the dominant economic sector in the Digital Economy is being created by three converging industries and that convergence is becoming the basis of all sectors. Convergence in mathematics is the progressive approach of a function to a pre‐specified value(s). If a thousand coins are tossed, the number of heads in a single toss could vary from 0 head to 1,000 heads. If the coins are not loaded, the number of heads in each toss could be high or low, but in successive tosses, the fraction of heads will approach closer and closer to 0.5 (Converge( as n, the number of tosses, tends to infinity. Tapscott provides no measures of convergence — conceptual, theoretical, empirical, or operational — without which we would not know if convergence has indeed descended upon us; what is more, we have no idea if we are/are not progressing toward the consummation of convergence upon which Tapscott's Digital Economy is predicated. Even more damaging to the Tapscott thesis of “three converging industries … becoming the basis of all sectors” is the conspicuous absence of any movement toward convergence on the part of the leading firms in the three industries. On the contrary, we find that each of them is racing on its own Divergent path of high and higher tech. Both the CEOs of IBM and Microsoft believe that high‐speed, high‐bandwidth is the future; and both swear by the Internet. But they race toward the Information Super Highway in their own separate, individual tracks. Product and service differentiation are the rule of the day; not standardization. Open architecture is a distant dream. Turning from the giant of hardware (IBM) and of software (Microsoft) to the giant of communications (AT&T), what is the story of convergence? AT&T entered the field of computers under the MFJ [Modified Final Judgment] of 1982. It beat a decisive path of retreat from convergence five years later by breaking up on January 1, 1997, into three communications and computer companies. How can the 3Cs converge? Not by their own volition. It is clear from the strategies of IBM, Microsoft, and AT&T that each of them is racing on its own path of high and higher tech. There is little evidence of convergence by default. If we want to achieve convergence by design, we have to emulate Hannibal. Facing the European Alps with his army of elephants, Hannibal said: “I will either find a way or invent one.” We will have to invent an appropriate methodology of convergence.