Search results

This essay charts an intellectual journey. Geoffrey M. Hodgson became an institutional economist in the 1980s. He explains how he discovered institutional economics and what strains of institutional thought were attractive for him. Another issue raised in this essay is how institutional researchers organize and move forward. Hodgson argues for an interdisciplinary approach, but this is not without its problems.

This study is a comment on Geoffrey Hodgson’s “Discovering Institutionalism: One Person’s Journey.” In this self-description of the evolution of his thought, Hodgson distinctly acknowledges Thorstein Veblen’s influence on his own institutional perspective. This is the issue that I explore in this study. My argument is that Hodgson can be understood as a Veblenian, but he does not fit in the Veblenian notion that became popular in the mid-twentieth century. I argue that Hodgson’s notion of habits is the strongest Veblen’s influence on him, and his reconstitutive downward and upward causations are in line with Veblen’s institutionalism, albeit without the mid-twentieth century Veblenian writings. I also address the approach to the content of habits as a break between Hodgson’s and Veblen’s institutionalism. By offering an unprecedented Veblenianism, I argue that Hodgson’s institutional economics can be understood as a new institutionalist segmentation.

In his article on “What Is Still Wrong with Austrian economics?,” Peter Boettke considers matters of strategy for the Austrian school and stresses the importance of institutions and institutional analysis. This comment takes up both themes. Two possible strategies for institutional research are considered. Then the place and role of institutions in Austrian analysis are addressed. It is argued that Austrian thinking has been caught in a dilemma between making theory as general as possible, or of taking on board the historically specific character of key institutions in market economies. The different approaches of Ludwig Mises and Carl Menger to this quandary are compared, with attention to the central concepts of property and capital.

In much of philosophy and social theory since classical antiquity, human belief and reason have been placed in the driving seat of individual action. In particular, social theory has often taken it for granted, or even by definition, that action is motivated by reasons based on beliefs. In contrast, a minority has criticized the adoption of this ‘folk psychology’ that explains human action wholly in such ‘mind first’ terms. Critics point out that such explanations are a mere gloss on a much more complex neurophysiological reality. These dualistic and ‘mind-first’ explanations of human behavior are unable to explain adequately such phenomena as sleep, memory, learning, mental illness, or the effects of chemicals or drugs on our perceptions or actions (Bunge, 1980; Churchland, 1984, 1989; Churchland, 1986; Rosenberg, 1995, 1998; Kilpinen, 2000).

Markus Becker and Thorbjørn Knudsen have rendered a valuable service by bringing the attention of the English-speaking academic world to Joseph Schumpeter’s important 1928 article on the entrepreneur.

Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Ludwig Lachmann and George Shackle upheld that investigations of the causes of purposes, preferences, beliefs or behaviors by the social scientist were unwarranted. Shackle proposed that human agency is an “uncaused cause.” Others admitted that human volitions and actions are caused, but ruled out explanations of these causes from social science. By considering Darwinian insights from modern evolutionary psychology, this essay criticizes the view that causal investigations of human volitions and actions are beyond social science. These insights also point to the role of habit and instinct in human behavior.