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The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of audit committee characteristics on firm performance. In particular, the authors employ the random-effects variant of the Hunter–Schmidt meta-analyze procedure to analyze the effects of key audit committee attributes, namely audit committee independence, audit committee expertise, audit committee size, audit committee meeting along with big four impact on firm performance. The authors hope to gain a better understanding of the function of audit committees in enhancing firm performance and to uncover potential discrepancies in prior findings due to varying economic levels or performance metrics.

This study uses the Hunter–Schmidt method to conduct a meta-analysis of 39 previous studies published between 2012 and 2022 to investigate the relationship between audit committee characteristics and firm performance.

The results indicate that audit committee independence, expertise, size and affiliation with the big four have a significant and positive effect on firm performance, while audit committee meetings have a non-significant effect. Furthermore, findings suggest that companies should carefully consider the contextual factors that may impact the effectiveness of their corporate governance structures, such as economic level, when designing and implementing governance mechanisms.

This study is significant as it is the first to combine and analyze previous research on this topic and highlights the importance of certain audit committee characteristics in enhancing financial reporting quality and corporate governance.

The practice of management having control over auditor appointment and compensation is believed to be a fundamental cause for the lack of auditor independence. While researchers propose alternative auditor appointment procedures to improve auditor independence, there are a few settings that allow researchers to examine alternative auditor appointment procedures such as regulator designation of auditors. This research aims to investigate the effects of regulator designation of auditors and litigation risk on auditor independence in a Chinese setting

This study adopts a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. A total of 110 surveys were sent out and 81 were collected from eastern China.

The results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors indicate that regulator designation of auditors improves auditor independence. In particular, auditors designated by the regulator feel less pressure from the audited company, perceive themselves to be more independent and are more willing to challenge the audited company’s aggressive financial reporting compared with those directly hired by the company. In addition, litigation risk moderates the effect of regulator designation of auditors on auditor independence such that regulator designation of auditors has a stronger impact on auditor independence when the litigation risk is low.

This study is also subject to limitations. First, regulator designation of auditors in China was examined. While regulator designation of auditors seems to improve auditor independence in the Chinese context, it is unclear if the same results will be observed in other economies, as China is a unique setting. For example, the majority of listed companies in China are under the control of government-related agencies. Consequently, the government has significant power in influencing auditor appointment policy. In contrast, the majority of other economies are more market-oriented with less government influence. Future studies in other markets will further enrich the understanding on regulator designation of auditors. Second, only regulator designation of auditors for state-owned enterprises was examined. It is unclear how regulator designation of auditors would affect non-state-owned enterprises. Moreover, future research could investigate the designation of auditors in other forms such as the designation of auditors by investors. Third, auditor appointment procedure may affect perceived risk of loss of client which in turn influences auditor independence. Future research could further investigate the mechanism through which regulator designation of auditors affect auditor independence.

Results of an experiment with 81 Chinese auditors show that regulator designation of auditors can improve auditor independence. In a decision context where auditors must provide judgments relating to a proposed audit adjustment that is quantitatively material and will affect the client’s ability to meet debt covenants, auditors designated by the State-Owned Assets Management Bureaus are more resistant to management pressure and are less willing to accept the management’s aggressive financial reporting practice than those directly hired by the company.

This paper focuses on bank audit committees and examines whether audit committee members who are former auditors are associated with the acquisition of audit and non-audit services from their former employers.

The study empirically examines a sample of large banks that are included in the S&P Composite 1500.

The paper reports significantly lower audit fees and a higher proportion of non-audit fees to total fees when the audit committee chair is an alumnus of the incumbent audit firm. Moreover, additional analysis reveals that these findings are stronger for banks with more earnings management.

Overall, the findings indicate that audit firms might consider banks using their alumni as audit committee chairs to be less risky or easier to audit, thus requiring relatively less effort from the auditors. The reduced effort required to audit clients with audit firm alumni on their audit committees then has the effect of reducing the audit fees charged. Alternatively, their auditing experience and cognitive proximity might influence the assessment of the need for auditing or the ability to negotiate lower audit fees on the part of audit firm alumni.

This paper provides empirical evidence of the association between audit firm alumni in influential positions on an audit committee and fees paid to those audit firms in the banking industry. The findings contribute to the literature by suggesting that banks with affiliated former auditors chairing their audit committees not only have significantly lower audit fees but also a higher proportion is spent on non-audit services.

Despite the importance of research and development (R&D), information on its value is not readily available to managers. This study aims to explore the role of common auditors, who audit multiple peer firms in the product market, in clients’ R&D investment decisions. This study highlights common auditors as information intermediaries who affect corporate R&D investment, focusing on the importance of knowledge resources in R&D investment and the limited ability of peers’ public information to communicate the value of R&D.

This study employs pairwise data of firm-peer-year observations to identify a common auditor who provides audit services to the focal firm and its peer firm. This study examines how a firm’s R&D investment changes when the firm’s incumbent auditor provides audit services to peers and analyzes various factors that moderate the effect of common auditors.

Peer firms audited by the same auditor make similar R&D investment decisions. This effect is more pronounced when the auditor specializes more in auditing R&D, when the auditor has a long-term client relationship, and when the firms exhibit a higher level of demand for incremental information relevant to R&D investment. Consistent with the beneficial role of common auditors, firms that are more responsive to auditor-provided information engage more actively in innovation activities in subsequent years.

This study deepens the understanding of how networks created by common auditors facilitate information flow among client firms and shape these firms’ R&D investment decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between audit committee expertise and financial reporting quality. Since the Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002, there has been growing interest in the research concerning audit committee expertise, especially as the Security Exchange Commission requires firms to identify their audit committee financial experts.

Based on two theories, the resource dependence theory and agency theory, the study examines the association of audit committee experts with financial reporting quality, proxied by earnings management. Samples involved 2008 financial data of 300 firms that were ranked by highest market capitalisation. In total, four types of expertise are developed based on academic qualification, professional qualification and work experience.

Presence of non‐accounting experts and accounting experts is significant to reduce the magnitude of earnings management. Other than that, leverage and firms size are also found to be significant.

The findings show RDT is prevalent in accounting or auditing domain, where there is evidence showing directors bridge firms with external resources such as expertise and experience. Subsequently, contribute to the mainstream accounting literature that the resource dependence theory is also vital in explaining situations where directors' expertise and knowledge are involved.

The purpose of this paper is to employ agency theory to identify the determinants of the audit delay among Palestinian companies listed on Palestine Stock Exchange (PSE).

Drawing on the agency theory, eight hypotheses are tested using data collected from the year 2011 annual reports for all the 46 listed companies on PSE. Multiple regression analysis was performed to identify the influence of a set of company characteristics, ownership structure variables, and corporate governance mechanisms.

The result of the analysis demonstrated that the audit reporting delay is influenced by the board size, corporate size, status of audit firm, company complexity, existence of audit committee, and ownership dispersion.

The main shortcoming of the current study is that the analysis covered the Palestinian companies’ annual reports for only one year. A time series analysis might give fuller and understandable picture about the audit report lag (ARL) determinants. The outcome of the study can be used by companies’ managements and policy makers in Palestine to improve future disclosure.

This paper adds to the limited audit delay literature in Middle East countries in general and Arab World in particular. This paper not only examines the determinants of the audit delay but also attempts to theorize such delay.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between board diversity measured as relation-oriented, task-oriented and board overall diversity and firm’s investment efficiency.

This study estimates four dimensions of board diversity, including age, gender, tenure and education. The four dimensions are further categorized in relation-oriented diversity (i.e. age and gender), task-oriented diversity (i.e. tenure and education) and overall board diversity (relation and task oriented). Panel data analysis is used to examine the board diversity–investment efficiency relationship in Chinese listed firms during the years 2003–2018. The findings of the study are robust to a battery of econometric techniques.

This study finds relation-oriented, task-oriented and overall diversity of a board curb investment inefficiency by discouraging sub-optimal investment (over- or under-investment). In other words, board diversity improves firms’ investment efficiency.

The results suggest that board diversity plays a significant role in corporate decisions. The findings illustrate that board diversity disciplines the management, reduces agency conflicts and thereby improves corporate governance, resulting in higher investment efficiency.

This study has two important contributions. First, this study extends the prior literature of investment efficiency by considering socio-psychological dimension of the board diversity by constructing relation- and task-oriented diversity. Second, contrary to earlier studies on board diversity, this study takes four facets of board diversity, i.e. age, gender, education and tenure that improve corporate governance mechanism.

This study aims to examine the impact of internal corporate governance and audit quality on the level of COVID-19 disclosure in Egypt.

The authors use manual content analysis to measure levels of COVID-19 disclosure in the narrative sections of annual reports. The authors analyze all companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange over 2020–2021. The authors use different regression models to test the research hypotheses.

The analysis adds to the literature in two crucial respects. First, it provides a measure for COVID-19 disclosure in Egypt. Second, it provides evidence that governance mechanisms (board diversity, audit committee [AC] independence), auditor type and audit opinion affect the level of COVID-19 disclosure. The higher level of COVID-19 disclosure is associated with firms with more female directors on the board, being audited by one of the big four audit firms and receiving standard clean audit opinion. While the inexistence of an AC and more executives on the AC negatively affect COVID-19 disclosure levels.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is the only paper that examines COVID-19 disclosure in the Egyptian context. It is also the first paper that provides evidence on the impact of internal governance and audit quality on COVID-19 disclosure.

This study aims to examine the link between boards and audit committees and firm performance in Kuwaiti listed firms in the context of recent and extensive corporate governance regulatory reform.

Panel data regression analysis with fixed effects and clustered standard errors of firm performance for 61–97 listed industrial and services firms in Kuwait over a seven-year period. The dependent variables are the returns on assets and equity, the debt-to-equity ratio and leverage and Tobin’s Q and the independent variables comprise board of directors and audit committee characteristics, including size, the number of meetings and the numbers of independent and outside board and expert committee members. Firm size, subsidiary status and cash flow serve as control variables.

Mixed results with respect to the characteristics of the board of directors. Board size and independent and outsider board members positively relate only to Tobin’s Q and insiders only to debt to equity. For audit committee characteristics, committee size, independence and expertise positively relate to the return on equity and committee size and expertise only to Tobin’s Q. Of the five performance measures considered, board and audit committee characteristics together best determine Tobin’s Q.

Data from a single country limits generalisability and control variables necessarily limited in a developing market context. Need for qualitative insights into corporate governance reform as a complement to conventional quantitative analysis. In combining accounting and market information, Tobin’s Q appears best able to recognise the performance benefits of good corporate governance in terms of internal organisational change.

The recent corporate governance code and guidelines reforms exert a mixed impact on firm performance, with audit committees, not boards, of most influence. But recent reforms implied most change to boards of directors. One suggestion is that non-market reform may have been unneeded given existing market pressure on listed firms and firms anticipating regulatory change.

Kuwait’s corporate governance reforms codified corporate governance practices already in place among many of its firms in pursuit of organisational legitimacy, and while invoking substantial change to audit committees, involved minor change to firm performance, at least in the short term. Some firms may also have delisted in expectation of stronger corporate governance requirements. Regardless, these direct and indirect processes both improved the overall quality of listed firm corporate governance and performance in Kuwait.

Seminal analysis of corporate governance reforms in Kuwait, which have rapidly progressed from no corporate governance code and guidelines to an initially voluntary and then compulsory regime. Only known analysis to incorporate both board of directors and audit committee characteristics. Reveals studies of the corporate governance–firm performance relationship may face difficulty in model specification, and empirical significance, given the complexity of corporate governance codes and guidelines, leads in changing firm behaviour and self-selection of firms into and out of regulated markets.

This study aims to examine the impact of Financial Accounting Standard Board’s Accounting Standard Update (ASU) 2014–15 on auditors’ going concern reporting. ASU 2014–15 provides accounting guidance for managers related to going concern issues, but there is evidence that regulatory changes affect auditor behavior. The authors examine if auditors’ propensity to issue going concern opinions (GCOs) for non-bankrupt, financially distressed firms changes after ASU 2014–15 became effective, and if the proportion of client bankruptcies with prior GCOs changes after ASU 2014–15 became effective.

The authors examine audit reports for non-bankrupt, financially stressed firms three years before and after the effective date of ASU 2014–15 to see if the propensity to issue a GCO differs in the pre- vs post-period. The authors then examine bankrupt, financially stressed firms to determine if the proportion of bankruptcies preceded by a GCO differs in the pre- vs post-period.

The authors find a significant increase in GCO reporting for non-bankrupt, financially stressed firms in the post-ASU 2014–15 period, suggesting auditor conservatism increased. The propensity for auditors to issue a GCO to bankrupt firms also increased significantly in the post-ASU period, providing evidence that auditors became more accurate, as more bankruptcies were preceded by a GCO than in the pre-ASU period.

This study uses new legislation which creates an exogenous shock to going concern reporting. Models and techniques are combined from prior literature and extended to investigate auditors’ reporting behaviors using two important and distinct samples.