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The “resource curse phenomenon” has received a lot of attention from researchers; however, there has not been any sound explanation to back this phenomenon since the main reason why natural resource should restrain economic growth instead of boosting economic growth remains unanswered. This paper contributes to literature on “resource curse hypothesis” by examining the role of government effectiveness in influencing the impact of gas resource rent on economic growth.

The study adopted the Cobb-Douglass production and incorporated gas resource rent, institutional quality (government effectiveness), inflation and exchange rate as additional variables that influences total output (gross domestic product). The author estimated the empirical form of the Cobb-Douglass production using autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) and Toda and Yamamoto (1995) as the main estimation strategies while other time series approaches were used as a robustness check.

The estimates from the ARDL short-run and the long-run dynamics suggest that the direct impact of gas resource rent on economic growth was positive but not statistically significant. At the same time, the interacting of gas resource rent and government effectiveness showed a positive and statistically significant effect of nearly 0.4123 and 0.8724 on economic growth in the long run and short run, respectively. The results from the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) also indicated that economic growth has a strong influence on gas resource rent while government effectiveness drives economic growth and not vice versa.

The findings from this study imply that government effectiveness plays a crucial role in averting the “resource curse phenomenon”. Hence, improving government effectiveness and efficiency through minimizing corruption among state institutions would be imperative in curbing the “resource curse phenomenon” in developing countries.

The influential role of government effectiveness on the relationship between gas resource rent on economic growth is examined.

This study aims to investigate the implications of natural gas rents and institutions as co-drivers of economic growth, focusing on the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) with panel data between 2001 and 2021.

This research paper uses a specialised two stage estimator, the panel instrumental variable technique (panel IV), which takes care of the potential endogeneity issues in the model.

The findings show that natural gas rent significantly impacts the economic growth of the GECF. On average, natural gas rent increases the sample’s growth rate by about 2.634% percentage points in the short run. The result indicates that the qualities of institutions (political and economic) have a significant positive long-term effect on the economies of the GECF. In addition, the study’s energy price volatility positively correlates with the countries’ growth.

There might be a need to investigate the effects of natural gas rents and institutions as co-growth drivers in each country within the GECF. The likelihood exists that the impact of natural gas rents and institutions on economic growth at the country’s level may differ from the outcome of such an experiment on the group level. Because of space and time limitations, this study could not carry out the specific country’s investigation of natural gas rents and institutions as a co-growth driver. That limitation may constitute further study to advance this study to a new height.

With good institutions, natural gas rent is likely to be an alternative growth driver for some economies that rely on fossil fuels like oil as a growth driver. By extension, the GECF has the potential to rival Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the global energy market, particularly in achieving Sustainable Development Goal number seven. In essence, evidence in this study suggests that natural gas rent has long-term positive effects on the growth of the GECF, conditioned on good institutions. Moreover, the drive of global energy consumption towards sustainable energy usage is an economic blessing for the GECF. By extension, the demand for natural gas would continue to rise, creating opportunities to improve natural gas rents. By implication, the GECF would continue to benefit from the pursuit of sustainability as the world shifts towards energy consumption with less CO₂.

Firstly, this study models the qualities of institutions for the GECF. Secondly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt to examine natural gas rents and the qualities of institutions as co-determinants of economic growth among the GECF (a potential cartel).

While the relationship between natural resource rent and economic growth is well documented in the literature, not much robust analysis has been done to estimate the causative relationship between oil resource rent and economic growth in Ghana. This might be due to the fact that commercial production of crude oil started not long ago in Ghana. This paper aims to examine the causal relationship between oil resource rent and economic growth for the period of 2011 to 2020 in Ghana.

The study incorporates economic growth as a function of oil resource rent, non-oil revenue, foreign direct investment, capital and interest rate in a Cobb–Douglass production function/model. The study used four different estimation strategies including the autoregressive distributed lags model, Toda–Yamamoto test approach, nonlinear autoregressive distributed lags model and nonlinear Granger causality.

The main finding revealed that 1% increase in oil resource rent generates 0.84% increase in economic growth of Ghana in the long run. Contrary, the authors find an insignificant positive effect of oil resource rent on economic growth of Ghana in the short run for the period under study. The result from the Toda–Yamamoto test approach also showed a unidirectional causality running from oil resource rent to economic growth of Ghana, providing evidence in support of the resource blessing hypothesis in Ghana. The results are robust to two different alternative estimation strategies.

The causal relationship between crude oil resource rent and economic growth is examined.

Despite the huge financial resources associated with oil, Nigeria has consistently recorded poor growth performance. Therefore, this study aims to examine how corruption and oil rent influence Nigeria’s economic performance during the 1996–2021 period.

Various estimation techniques were used. These include the bootstrap autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds-testing, dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS), the fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and the canonical cointegration regression (CCR) estimators and the Toda–Yamamoto causality.

The bounds testing results provide evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the variables. In addition, the results of the ARDL, DOLS, CCR and FMOLS estimators demonstrate that oil rent and corruption have a significant positive impact on growth. Further, the results indicate that human capital and financial development enhance economic growth, whereas domestic investment and unemployment rates slow down long-term growth. Additionally, the causality test results illustrate the presence of a one-way causality from oil rent to economic growth and a bi-directional causal relationship between corruption and economic growth.

Existing studies focused on the effects of either oil rent or corruption on growth in Nigeria. Little attention has been paid to the exploration of how the rent from oil and the pervasiveness of corruption contribute to the performance of the Nigerian economy. Based on the outcome of this study, strategies and policies geared towards reducing oil dependence and the pervasiveness of corruption, enhancing human capital and financial development and reducing unemployment are recommended.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals published by MCB University Press: Facilities Volumes 8‐18; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐18; Property Management Volumes 8‐18; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐18.

Studies concerning Soviet taxation demonstrate a diversity of opinions on the nature of turnover taxes. Four major views on the subject have emerged: (1) turnover taxes are simply a sales (excise) tax on articles' of consumption sold to the Soviet consumer; (2) not all turnover taxes are a sales tax, some of them are a substitute for rent on production of certain industrial materials; (3) in addition to being a sales (excise) tax on consumer goods and rent on some industrial materials, there exists a third type of turnover tax which is levied on agricultural production of the peasantry; (4) turnover taxes are a portion of the surplus product produced in industry and agriculture.

Index by subjects, compiled by K.G.B. Bakewell covering the following journals: Facilities Volumes 8‐17; Journal of Property Investment & Finance Volumes 8‐17; Property Management Volumes 8‐17; Structural Survey Volumes 8‐17.