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At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Boeing and Airbus, the leading manufacturers of large aircraft, were locked in a battle for market share that drove down prices for their new planes. At about the same time, the two industry heavyweights began developing new aircraft families to address the future market needs they each projected.

Aircraft take many years to develop, so by the time the new planes made their inaugural flights, significant changes had occurred in the global environment. First, emerging economies in the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere were growing rapidly, spawning immediate and long-term demand for more aircraft. At the same time, changes to the market for air travel had created opportunities for new products. These opportunities had not gone unnoticed by potential new entrants, which were positioning themselves to compete against the market leaders.

In October 2007, the Airbus superjumbo A380 made its first flight. The A380 carried more passengers than any other plane in history and had been touted as a solution to increased congestion at global mega-hub airports. Four years later the Boeing 787, a smaller long-range aircraft, was launched to service secondary cities in a point-to-point network.

The case provides students with an opportunity to analyze the profit potential of the global aircraft manufacturing industry in 2002 and in 2011. Students can also identify the actions of participants that weakened or intensified the pressure on profits within the industry.

Audio format (.mp3 file) available with purchase of PDF. Contact cases@kellogg.northwestern.edu for access.

In January 2008, Citi and Merrill Lynch are trying to steer their ships back to calm waters. The new CEOs, Vikram Pandit (Citi) and John Thain (Merrill), have been at the helm of their companies for less than three months. This case focuses on their steps to counteract the massive losses resulting from their firms' investments in subprime-mortgage structures. What actions have these leaders taken thus far and what actions should they consider going forward? See also “Warren E. Buffett, 2008” (UVA-F-1550).

In early 2004, residents of Inglewood, California, a working-class community just outside Los Angeles composed primarily of African- and Hispanic-Americans, were preparing to vote on a referendum that would change the city charter to allow Wal-Mart to build a supercenter on a huge, undeveloped lot in the city. Walmart had put forward the measure after the city council refused to change the zoning of a sixty-acre plot on which it held an option to build. Numerous community and religious groups opposed Wal-Mart's entry and campaigned against the referendum. Walmart promised low-priced merchandise and jobs, but these groups were skeptical about the kinds of jobs and compensation that would be offered, the healthcare that would be provided to employees, and the broader impact Walmart would have on the community. Inglewood was a pro-union community, so there was also opposition based on Walmart's anti-union position. On April 6 Inglewood residents voted to reject the referendum by a margin of 60.6 percent to 39.9 percent. Though smaller, less organized, and with fewer resources than Walmart, this coalition of community and religious leaders had defeated the global retailing behemoth.

After students have analyzed the case they will be able to (a) appreciate the importance of nonmarket factors to execute growth and market entry strategies, (b) understand how the decisions of political institutions depend on the issue context and the alignments of coalitions of interest, (c) formulate and assess strategies to overcome nonmarket barriers to entry.

This case describes the challenges faced by Amul in organising dairy farmers into a co-operative and creating continuous opportunities for value addition. Participants in the case discussion are required to review the developments in the organisation and recommend a strategy for the future.

Whole Foods and Wild Oats were both natural- and organic-food stores that competed for similar customers on values such as high-quality and healthy products, excellent customer service, knowledge of products, and an enjoyable shopping experience. In February 2007, Whole Foods announced that it would purchase a smaller but formidable competitor, Wild Oats. There was tremendous geographic complementarity involved: The merger would give Whole Foods the largest footprint within the natural- and organic-grocery industry in North America.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

By early 2009 Starbucks had nearly 17,000 stores worldwide, with about a third of these outside the United States. Despite multibillion-dollar annual revenues, the giant coffee retailer's yearly growth had declined by half, quarterly earnings had dropped as much as 97 percent, same-store sales were negative, and its stock price was languishing. Factors such as a global economic downturn and increasing competition in the specialty coffee market from large players such as McDonald's and Dunkin' Donuts had driven this decline, resulting in the closings of hundreds of domestic stores already, with many more planned. Founder Howard Schultz, who had recently returned as CEO, and his executive team were convinced that Starbucks's growth opportunities lay overseas, where the firm already had a strong foothold in markets like Japan and the United Kingdom and was preparing to open hundreds of new stores in a variety of locations. But recent international challenges, including the closing of most Australian stores due to sluggish sales, made clear that Starbucks had more to learn about bringing its value proposition—a combination of premium coffee, superior service, and a “coffeehouse experience”—to foreign soil. The key question was not whether Starbucks could transport its value proposition overseas, but how the value proposition's three elements would play in recently entered and new markets. And the stakes of making the right international moves rose with each U.S. store closure. Schultz and his team also faced a broader question, one that applied to both their U.S. and foreign stores: Could they “grow big and stay small,” remaining a huge retailer that delivered both high-quality products and a consistently intimate and enjoyable experience to consumers worldwide? This case presents this challenge in the context of Starbucks's history, well-established value proposition, and domestic and international growth and vision.

The key objectives of the case focus on the successful growth of local city brand, to a country brand, to a global brand, leaving the questions: 1. How much more can it grow? 2. Can it? 3. What is the impact of new competitors in a given market and/or the impact of the global economy on discretionary spending by a loyal customer base? 4. How important is it to the sustain a brand's core value(s) proposition when innovating for new audiences and customer preferences?

After decades of successful expansion, The Reader's Digest Association's products were mature. With an average readership age for the flagship Reader's Digest magazine of 50.3 in 2004, efforts to develop new products had so far failed to entice a significant number of younger customers. Following a financial downturn in 1996, positive financial results remained illusive. Several major changes instituted by Thomas O. Ryder, CEO since 1998, including acquisitions, re-capitalization, restructuring and systematic re-engineering of the corporate culture, had proven mildly successful, but RDA, as well as the entire publishing industry, faced a persistent decline in profitability. Could RDA fulfill its stated mission to create “products that inform, enrich, entertain and inspire people of all ages and cultures around the world”, and could it do this by continuing to rely on the 80-year old Reader's Digest magazine?

On April 4, 2007, Don Imus, one of the company&s most popular talk show personalities made comments on the air regarding the Rutgers women&s basketball team. According to the transcription from Media Matters for America, Imus said, “ That&s some nappy-headed hos there. I&m gonna tell you that now, man, that&s some … woo. And the girls from Tennessee, they all look cute, you know, so, like … kinda like … I don&t know.” At first, the comments did not seem out of the ordinary for one of radio&s “shock jocks.” However, as the public reaction grew, the situation changed considerably. Under pressure from the public, Moonves reluctantly suspended Imus. But it was too little too late. By the end of the day on April 11, analysts estimated that $2.5 million in advertising revenue was lost. On April 12, Moonves terminated Don Imus& contract.

After Moonves fired Imus, there was still a lot to consider. He really wanted a way for the company to meet the demands of the company&s stakeholders. In addition, he wanted to avoid any more distractions from the firm&s normal day-to-day operations.