Search results

The purpose of this paper is to identify whether personality traits can help explain the outcomes that arise in bargaining outcomes.

Experiments with subjects playing the alternating-offers bargaining game are considered. Both full information and asymmetric information treatments are considered. Subjects also complete standardized Myers-Briggs Type Indicator assessments.

Personality type measurements are shown to help explain the opening offers, rejections, and resulting wealth in the negotiations. It is shown that interactions between the personality dimensions are important and that the interaction between personality and information play a key role in bargaining outcomes.

The research utilizes laboratory experiments to generate data. This expands our understanding of individual-level behavior, but suffers from the limitation of not replicating realistic bargaining situations.

The work should serve as a guide to organizations to identify traits of effective negotiators.

Bargaining is a central economic activity. Being able to identify the root of differences in outcomes from negotiations should be able to inform institutional design issues.

Little work has been done connecting the rich literature in social psychology and management on personality to economic outcomes. The research on bargaining neglects to incorporate individual-level traits into the process. This research begins to bridge this gap and informs both bargaining theory as well as emphasizes on the importance of personality in application.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

In the complex ecosystem of mobile applications multiple factors have been used to explain users’ behavior, without though focusing on how different combinations of variables may affect user behavior. The purpose of this paper is to show how price value, game content quality, positive and negative emotions, gender and gameplay time interact with each other to predict high intention to download mobile games.

Building on complexity theory, the authors present a conceptual model followed by research propositions. The propositions are empirically validated through configurational analysis, employing fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) on 531 active users of mobile games.

Findings identify ten solutions that explain high intention to download mobile games. Alternative paths are identified depending on the gender and the time users spend playing mobiles games. The authors highlight the role of price value and game content quality, as well as that of positive emotions, which are always core factors when present.

To identify complex interactions among the variables of interest, fsQCA is employed, differentiating from traditional studies using variance-based methods, leading to multiple solutions explaining the same outcome. None of the variables explains the intention to download on its own, but only when they combine with each other. The authors extend existing knowledge on how price value, game content quality, emotions, gender and gameplay time combine to lead to high intention to download mobile games; and present a methodology for how to bridge complexity theory with fsQCA, improving our understanding of intention to adopt mobile applications.

In this paper, the author develops a game theoretical model to understand why Union Government of India, as a third party, has used different schemes at different times in history to assist the State Governments in fighting the Naxalite insurgency. Comparing across schemes, it was found that though Matching Security Grants scheme was preferred in general, during asymmetric information scenario it led to an emergency situation wherein the Union Government had to provide the less preferred Bulk Security Grants. Later, it became difficult to withdraw these grants as the State Governments free rode by reducing own security contribution. The author finds that instead, in this scenario, Matching Development Grants are more suitable, as they incentivize the State Governments to reveal private information and help the Union Government exit its third-party role. For a practitioner involved in conflict resolution, these conclusions imply that as the desirability of policies can change diametrically overtime, Union Government must spend resources only on those heads of expenditure that provide both security and development benefits provided they aid in preventing flow of resources to Naxalites. Further, to end its assistance, the Union Government’s expenditures should also complement the capabilities of the State Government rather than substituting them. These results can also guide policy in other protracted civil wars with substantial third-party intervention, which are common these days.

The paper is an historical analysis of strategies used by Union and State Governments and Naxalites. The analysis is based on game theoretic tools supported with examples.

The Union Government must provide matching grants instead of bulk grants such as Central Armed Police Forces, and the grants should be aimed at building complementarities with the state governments’ security contributions. Under asymmetric information scenario, the Union and State Governments reduce their expenses incurred to fight the Naxalites. A Matching Development Grants scheme would have done better. Union Government must spend resources on heads of expenditure that provides both Development and Security benefits, to curb flow of resources to Naxalites, besides complementing the Security Contributions of the State Government.

The research is limited by disaggregated data to test the hypotheses. It is also limited by the data on hidden variables like the contribution of the Naxalites to fighting. The research is also limited to the extent that individual groups in the war like police commanders, politicians and Naxalite commanders are not incorporated. Multiple asymmetric parties are also not considered; that may generalize the model to other theaters of insurgency.

Certain heads of expenditure such as roads, mobile communication, improving quality of investigation, preventing human rights violations by the security forces, etc. are both security and development enhancing. The Union Government's expenditures must be directed toward this end. Therefore, from a practitioner's perspective, the debate between greed and grievances exists not as a limitation but as a guide. The relevant articles of Constitution of India must be redrafted on these principles. Third-party interventions in other insurgencies may be revisited under these conclusions.

Security and Development policies are tools for controlling Naxalite insurgency, which can also be used to prevent flow of resources to Naxalites. Security and development policies to resolving insurgencies are useful at different information scenarios. Therefore, information neutral policies should be preferred.

This paper has contributed theoretically in modeling continuing conflicts like Naxalite insurgency, explicitly. The author also shows that though the field of civil wars may have evolved along the Greed vs Grievance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), for a practitioner, the lines blur when it comes to solutions, as many heads of expenditures have features of both security and development. This paper also shows that when the Union Government faced asymmetric information scenario, the policy of matching development grants would be beneficial in long run though of limited value in short run. This is an important conclusion as the most intense period of violence was preceded by the asymmetric information scenario. Besides, it has relevance for the other civil wars with third-party intervention, such as NATO in Afghanistan.

The study aims to show how several factors interact to promote mobile game download: the number of games released by a publisher, the quality of the games released, the popularity of a game's genre, the quality of borrowed intellectual property, the frequency of recommendations, intragenre ranking, consumer rating and review quantity.

Signaling theory was used to classify the mobile game information displayed on the Apple App Store into four groups. A conceptual model was proposed to illustrate the complex relationship between the information and download. Based on information on 203 mobile games in the seven days following their release, the model was empirically tested to identify the influence of information configuration on game download by combining fuzzy qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and a fuzzy cognitive map (FCM).

Three solutions were identified for high game download and two for low/medium. The number of previous games released by a publisher, intragenre ranking, consumer rating and review quantity are core conditions that reinforce high game download. The effects of one information type on another and on downloads change as coexisting information types change.

This study enriches existing knowledge about how combinations of multiple types of game information lead to game download and extends previous variance-based research. Combining an FCM with fsQCA can facilitate one’s understanding of the complex causal relationships between game information and download.

In the context of sharing economy and online shopping, establishing a stable urban joint distribution alliance (JDA) is extremely necessary for the entire logistics service market. The purpose of this paper is to rationally allocate the profits and determine the most stable allocation scheme for the urban JDA as well as provide a direction for cooperation between express enterprises and lead managers to pay more attention to the comprehensive performance.

Cooperative game-based methodologies including the proportion method, the core theory, nucleolus and Shapley value have been employed. Four criteria consisting of enterprise operation, customer satisfaction, environmental sustainability and information technology have been incorporated into Shapley value for improvement.

This paper reveals that express enterprises in logistics service market can achieve more benefit from JDA than those who operate separately. Among proposed profit allocation schemes, improved Shapley value scheme shows more rationality by considering partners’ asymmetric contribution. Besides, a stable alliance can be always ensured with partners’ lower propensity to disrupt and relatively balanced negotiation power under improved Shapley value scheme.

This paper makes a few attempts to contribute to the literature on the improvement of Shapley value and applies the concept of “propensity to disrupt” into the field of logistics. Besides, this paper provides various profit allocation schemes and incorporates influencing factors into Shapley value for an improvement thus helping policy-makers make better-informed decisions on urban distribution. Additionally, a case study based on urban express enterprises in Southwest China has been conducted to verify the proposed profit allocation schemes.

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the internal mechanism of the deviation of targeted poverty alleviation under the condition of asymmetric information.

Introducing a traditional signaling game theory model with dynamic asymmetric information, this study uses a dataset covering 813 poor households from Southern Xinjiang, China, to theoretically and empirically study the effect of aspiration of the poor households on poverty alleviation.

First, there exists asymmetric information between the poor households and village leaders. Second, the “short, arbitrary and fast” poverty alleviation approach may quickly pull people out of poverty, but it may also nurture a dependency culture where poor households lose their aspiration and ability to escape poverty through their own efforts. Third, due to long lasting universal state support, poor households in the national designated poor counties are less able and ambitious to escape poverty by themselves than their counterparts living in the national nondesignated areas.

The research results show that pro-poor development policies should be upheld to improve the residual utility that can benefit all households as a result of the poverty alleviation campaign. Relevant policy recommendations are made for China's continuous effort to fight relative poverty beyond 2020.

A lack of visibility into the manufacturer’s production cost information impedes a retailer’s ability to maximize her own profits, especially when market demand is uncertain. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of an option contract within a one-period two-echelon supply chain in the presence of asymmetric cost information.

Based on the principal-agent model, the retailer, acting as a Stackelberg leader, offers a menu of option contracts to mitigate the risk of uncertain demand and reveal asymmetric production cost information. The optimal contract in asymmetric and symmetric information scenarios is derived. Finally, the impact of production costs on the optimal contracts and the actors’ profits is explored by numerical experiments.

By comparing the optimal equilibrium solutions in two scenarios, the authors show that asymmetric cost information has a large impact on the optimal option contract and profits. In addition, information rent is affected by the type differential. The results prove that the level of information asymmetry plays a vital role in option contracts and profits.

Different from the existing literature on private demand information, this paper considers a supply chain with asymmetric cost information in the context of option contracts. Interestingly, not only the production cost but also the probability of a low production cost can affect the option strike price. In addition, from the perspective of the manufacturer, a high cost does not always bring a high information rent. These findings can provide some guidance to decision-makers.

This paper aims to examine optimal decisions for information security investments for a firm in a fuzzy environment. Under both sequential and simultaneous attack scenarios, optimal investment of firm, optimal efforts of attackers and their economic utilities are determined.

Throughout the analysis, a single firm and two attackers for a “firm as a leader” in a sequential game setting and “firm versus attackers” in a simultaneous game setting are considered. While the firm makes investments to secure its information assets, the attackers spend their efforts to launch breaches.

It is observed that the firm needs to invest more when it announces its security investment decisions ahead of attacks. In contrast, the firm can invest relatively less when all agents are unaware of each other’s choices in advance. Further, the study reveals that attackers need to exert higher effort when no agent enjoys the privilege of being a leader.

In a novel approach, inherent system vulnerability of the firm, financial benefit of attackers from the breach and monetary loss suffered by the firm are considered, as fuzzy variables in the well-recognized Gordon – Loeb breach function, with the help of fuzzy expectation operator.

This study reports that the optimal breach effort exerted by each attacker is proportional to its obtained economic benefit for both sequential and simultaneous attack scenarios. A set of numerical experiments and sensitivity analyzes complement the analytical modeling.

In a novel approach, inherent system vulnerability of the firm, financial benefit of attackers from the breach and monetary loss suffered by the firm are considered, as fuzzy variables in the well-recognized Gordon – Loeb breach function, with the help of fuzzy expectation operator.

This paper aims to manage better the conflicts in labor disputes by improving the understanding of mediation dynamics from a game-theoretical perspective.

Signaling game model is adapted to a hypothetical labor dispute based on the legislative regulations on the mandatory mediation system in Turkey.

The paper determines mediation equilibria in which both players get positive payoffs. Analysis of the mediation equilibria helps to improve the understanding about the litigation and mediation dynamics depending on the variables. The variables are clearly separated from each other due to their reverse effects on strategy choices of the parties. Mediation payoff and litigation cost are characterized by their incentive effects on mediation preferences, whereas mediation fee and litigation payoff are characterized by their disincentive effect. While increasing amounts of incentive variables strengthen the mediation tendency of the employee, increasing amounts of disincentive variables reveal the opposite effect. Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that if the litigation payoff is too small to recover litigation costs, accepting the mediation becomes the optimal strategy. This prediction is contrary to that of traditional game-theoretic litigation/settlement models, in which small-claim disputes typically cannot be settled.

The assumption that the mediation fee is not a part of the litigation cost eliminates the disincentive effect of mediation fee and makes it neutral on the strategy choice of employee.

This paper first analyzes the strategic role of mediation in labor disputes by using a signaling game. Despite its mediation focus, the paper also provides practical insights for litigation.