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The purpose of this paper is to review the utilization of game theory in the entrepreneurship literature. Game theory can potentially be employed to assess strategies incentivizing productive entrepreneurial activities and subsequent economic development. Therefore, the author reviews entrepreneurship articles and explores the application of game-theoretic models and concepts in the literature.

First, the author provides an overview of the entrepreneurship ecosystem concept, highlighting key challenges in its study. The author also briefly highlights successful applications of game theory in the innovation literature. Second, the author systematically reviews and synthesizes entrepreneurship research employing game-theoretic models and concepts. The author's objective is to provide a state-of-the-art overview of the use of game theory in entrepreneurship.

Broadly, the author categorizes entrepreneurship-game theory articles into three groups based on their scope and purpose: entrepreneurial policy applications, inter-firm applications and entrepreneurship theory applications. Entrepreneurial policy applications include entrepreneurs and the government or policy as the main players in a game. Inter-firm applications encompass games between entrepreneurs and other private entities. Entrepreneurship theory applications include articles that utilize game theory to advance the author's understanding of entrepreneurial behavior and/or mechanisms in the market.

To the best of the author's knowledge, no previous paper has reviewed the use of game-theoretic approaches and models in entrepreneurship literature. This study addresses this research gap.

This study aims to propose a risk-induced game theoretic forecasting model to predict average daily rate (ADR) under COVID-19, using an advanced recurrent neural network.

Using three data sets from upper-midscale hotels in three locations (i.e. urban, interstate and suburb), from January 1, 2018, to August 31, 2020, three long-term, short-term memory (LSTM) models were evaluated against five traditional forecasting models.

The models proposed in this study outperform traditional methods, such that the simplest LSTM model is more accurate than most of the benchmark models in two of the three tested hotels. In particular, the results show that traditional methods are inefficient in hotels with rapid fluctuations of demand and ADR, as observed during the pandemic. In contrast, LSTM models perform more accurately for these hotels.

This study is limited by its use of American data and data from midscale hotels as well as only predicting ADR.

This study produced a reliable, accurate forecasting model considering risk and competitor behavior.

This paper extends the application of game theory principles to ADR forecasting and combines it with the concept of risk for forecasting during uncertain times.

This study is the first study, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, to use actual hotel data from the COVID-19 pandemic to determine an appropriate neural network forecasting method for times of uncertainty. The application of Shapley value and operational risk obtained a game-theoretic property-level model, which fits best.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

This paper aims to study the role of absorptive capacities in coopetitive alliances that involve leakages of sensitive private knowledge regarding firms’ production processes.

This paper uses a game theoretic approach to model a differentiated product market in which two firms asymmetrically informed about the economic value of a business opportunity must cooperate to exploit this opportunity. Under coopetition, firms gain access to their partners’ core knowledge as the result of inevitable leakages of information. Firms differ in their absorptive capacities, which affects their abilities to leverage this new knowledge outside the collaborative activity.

Firms with superior absorptive capacities are more likely to devise alliances whose purpose is to gain access to their partners’ core knowledge. This opportunistic behaviour does not disappear even if firms compensate their partners for the damages caused by this deceptive business practice. This paper also finds that a highly specialised product safeguards firms with limited absorptive capacities against these opportunistic behaviours.

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the role that absorptive capacities and product specialisation play in influencing the emergence of opportunistic behaviours in coopetitive alliances. The theoretical analysis underscores the extent to which the risk of opportunism associated with the exploitation of a partner’s specific core knowledge outside the scope of the cooperative activity affects not only the nature and intensity of market competition but also the incentives to pursue coopetitive alliances.

The consumers want to purchase the target products in the right place, whereas the manufacturers want to allocate their possible products to optimal distribution channels. The manufacturer must know how to handle itself in this business. The study aims to examine the B2B channel decision-making with different product qualities in a non-cooperative supply chain.

The authors develop a B2B Manufacturer-Stackelberg game as an analytical framework, combining asymmetric preference of purchase channels choice by the consumers, a continuous quality setting of the manufacturer and differential channel structure to study the manufacturer’s product strategy and channel optimisation. By horizontal comparisons across four channel structures, product variety can be classified into the differential quality-level zone through exogenous quality intervention, and the preference of manufacturers in each quality-level zone within the structures can be ranked.

Theoretically and practically, the hybrid-channel structure should be completely neglected when the direct channel dominates the retail channel. In contrast, dual-channel structures dominate single channels irrespective of the channel power, and channel preferences between high-quality and low-quality zones are stable, whereas the preference in medium-quality zone is unstable. In addition, the supply chain system cannot achieve global Pareto improvement without any additional coordination mechanism between the manufacturer and the retailer.

The extended results by numerical examples suggest that the bigger the area of the medium-quality zone, the more significant the product variety of the manufacturer.

In the shipping industry, both sales and purchases of second-hand ships and freight transport services are prevalently tailormade and traded with intense bilateral negotiations. Price bargaining is the key step of this negotiation process and plays a crucial role in determining mutually agreed prices. Despite its cruciality and applicability, the price bargaining has yet received due conceptual and/or theoretical attention in the shipping literature. This paper attempts to conceptually examine the role of bargaining in shipping transaction prices and subsequently puts forward directions for future research. In doing so, the paper focuses on two types of transactions taking place in shipping markets: asset market trading of second-hand vessels and service market trading shipping freights.

The paper begins with a systematic literature review of price bargaining in the field of economics and management disciplines from a game-theoretic perspective. This approach does logically lead to the establishment of a conceptual framework for price bargaining in shipping sub-markets as a step toward having taken into consideration a variety of heterogeneities commonly present in trading activities and market dynamics.

A set of research areas has been consequently identified where price bargaining and mechanisms for the shipping freight and asset markets could be further explored and analyzed in a way to make better pricing decisions under a more tangible framework.

One of the critical challenges when using bargaining mechanisms to make a decision on pricing shipping services and assets is how to operationalize the study for empirical investigation as some of the factors are internal information of the players and are not adequately revealed to externals: that is, an imperfect information sharing case. The current study aims, however, not to conduct an empirical analysis but to initiate a conversation among maritime economists by bringing their attention to this not-yet fully explored and potentially impactful field of research and by asking them to treat bargaining from a perspective for pricing shipping assets and services. It is claimed that, by doing so, one could better understand price differences between individual contracts.

This study would be considered the first of its kind to provide a detailed survey of the bargaining theory and models from a game theoretical perspective as a theoretical lens to understand its importance and relevance in pricing shipping assets and services. It also provides a simplified operational case on utilizing bargaining in practically pricing freight services.

The purpose of this study is to propose a decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme based on a certificate transaction mechanism for the transaction of excess consumption certificates (ECCs) of renewable energy. The aim is to address the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode and to promote the development of the green electricity industry.

The proposed scheme involves calculating the quotation difference for the same type of certificate transaction based on the quotations of all users of both buyers and sellers. The transaction volume is then determined based on the order of quotation difference from large to small, and the total interests of cooperation are calculated. The nucleolus method is adopted to allocate the total interests to each member of the alliance and calculate the final transaction price. The blockchain technology is used for the transaction to achieve accurate traceability and efficient supervision, and a corresponding smart contract is designed and simulated in the Ethereum consortium chain.

The results of the simulation show the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The decentralized multi-party cross-trading scheme can overcome the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode, such as low transaction efficiency, difficulty in obtaining the optimal transaction strategy and efficient supervision. The proposed scheme can promote the development of the green electricity industry by stimulating users' demand potential for green electricity.

The proposed scheme is original in its use of a certificate transaction mechanism to facilitate the trading of ECCs of renewable energy. The scheme adopts a decentralized multi-party cross-trading approach that overcomes the problems associated with the existing centralized transaction mode. The use of the nucleolus method for the allocation of total interests to each member of the alliance is also original. Finally, the use of blockchain technology for accurate traceability and efficient supervision of the transaction is an original contribution to the field.

Currently, digital technology has been proposed as a new archetype for developing an effective traceability system in the perishable food supply chain (FSC). Implementation of such a system needs significant investment and the burden lies with the members of the supply chain. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact on the profit of the supply chain members due to the implementation of an effective traceability system with such a large investment. The study also tries to explore the impact of the implementation of such a system by coordination among the members through a cost-sharing mechanism.

A two-level supply chain that comprises a supplier and retailer is analyzed using a game-theoretic approach. The mathematical models are developed considering the scenario for an individual, centralized and both members invest using a cost-sharing mechanism. For each of the models, the impact of product selling price, information sensing price and quality improvement level on profit is analyzed through numerical analysis.

The study reveals that consumer involvement can be a strong motivation for the supply chain members to initiate investment in the traceability system. Further, from an investment perspective cost-sharing model is beneficial compared to the individual investment-bearing model. This mechanism can coordinate as well as benefit the FSC members. However, the model is less beneficial to the centralized model from profit and quality improvement levels.

Food wastage can be less from supplier and retailer perspectives. Moreover, consumers can purchase food items only after verifying their shipping conditions. Consequently the food safety scandals can be reduced remarkably.

Digital technology adoption in the perishable FSC is still considered emerging. The present study helps organizations to implement a traceability system in the perishable FSC through consumer involvement and a cost-sharing mechanism.

This paper aims to propose an integrated use of balanced scorecard (BSC), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and game theory approach as an enhanced performance measurement technique to determine and rank the importance of manufacturing indicators of a steel company as a real case study.

An efficiency change ratio is defined to examine the characteristic function of each coalition which is super-additive. Then, the Shapley value index is used as the solution of the cooperative game to determine the importance of the BSC indicators of the company and rank order them.

The results reveal that “profitability rate” is the most important BSC indicator, whereas “customer satisfaction” is the least significant one. The ranking order of the importance of all BSC indicators makes it possible for the senior managers of the organization to realize the importance of each index separately and to improve the profitability and the number of customers by presenting programs according to the budget and time constraints.

The main contribution of this paper lies in the adoption of a game theory approach to performance measurement in the industrial sector that determines and ranks the importance of manufacturing indicators.

This paper aims to consider the effects of a merger on technology adoption and welfare in the presence of passive cross ownership. Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare. The results are important for antitrust policies and suggest that the antitrust authorities may not need to be too concerned about mergers in industries with cross ownership.

Game-theoretic analysis.

Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is original.