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This paper aims to examine the relationship between Shariah compliance and corporate capital structure decisions. This study explores the variation of capital structure speed of adjustment.

The authors’ sample includes a sample of the largest 200 nonfinancial firms trading in the Malaysian and Pakistan stock markets. This study uses ordinary least squares and dynamic two-step system generalized method of moments to test the hypotheses of the study.

The results show that Shariah-compliant firms use a lower level of leverage than the noncomplaint firms. Moreover, while both types of firms have optimal capital structures, the speed of adjustment toward the targets is slower for Shariah-complaint firms than non-Shariah-compliant firms. This variation can be seen through the different levels of market imperfection experienced by the two types of firms. Shariah-compliant firms follow Islamic rules that restrict the type and degree of leverage, thus affecting the availability of external funding to Shariah-compliant firms.

The findings call for more development and innovation of financing instruments that comply with Shariah rules that will increase of supply of external funds for Shariah-compliant firms and, thus, reduce market imperfections that are faced by Shariah-compliant firms.

The study contributes to the limited number of studies that examine the nexus between conventional corporate theories and Islamic corporate finance.

When major reallocations of the firm’s assets are necessary, a balance in the corporate governance structure favoring the CEO can be a necessary condition for planning and initiating major strategic moves. The purpose of this paper is to examine firms making major acquisitions to identify corporate governance elements that are particular to undertaking major strategic initiatives.

The authors test the proposition that firms making major strategic acquisitions will exhibit a corporate governance structure that is different in a number of its governance elements from firms making other acquisition decisions. The authors categorize the elements of corporate governance structures into CEO characteristics, internal monitoring, external monitoring and CEO compensation.

The authors find the propensity of acquiring firms to make major strategic acquisitions is abetted by the CEO’s attributes and compensation, by the structure of the audit committee and compensation committee, and by the firm’s prior financial performance.

The analysis of firms making major acquisitions presents the corporate governance dynamics of an environment that is conducive to strategic risk taking.

Our paper shows an empirical analysis of the European football companies to test the association between sport results, proxied by ranking position and financial performance in panel framework (starting from 59 firms over the 2013–2018 time span).

We use panel data models for studying the relationship of our interest and we make no a priori assumption about the strict exogeneity of the covariates and estimate equation using both Random Effects GLS (RE-GLS) and Fixed Effects OLS (FE-OLS) estimations.

Our results suggest there is stable and significant relationship between the two types of performance and that when detectable this is linked in a positive way to the profit maximization of the business model, suggesting that it is more useful for investor remuneration and to increase technical-tactical resources and therefore sports results. Not surprisingly, as for many clubs, concentration effect is relevant while the financial fair play regulation is not. In fact, the current regulation of UEFA authority does not seem to have an impact on sport and financial results.

This work complements literature in several ways. First, we offer new empirical evidence for the association between the sport and financial performance for a panel of the European football companies, listed and not. Second, we show that the persistence of the sport results is strongly correlated with financial performance.

The purpose of this paper is to show the importance of policy discussions on the role of governance in limiting excessive risk-taking at times of turmoil.

Corporate governance measures are regressed on measures of risk taking using a sample of US bank holding companies (BHCs) during 2002-2014.

Results show that BHCs with more concentrated shareholders, more managerial ownership, smaller boards, and less outside directors undertake less risky investments with respect to total assets, loans, and off-balance-sheet items. Capital adequacy effect is overpowering pushing for more risky positions. Finally, banks with good governance push for less risky positions, even with larger capital ratios, during the financial crisis period relative to the precrisis boom.

This paper extends research on the association between bank ownership structure and risk taking. It adds to prior research by examining a key feature of banks, namely, their bank-specific capital adequacy. The relevance of this study stems from recent initiatives undertaken by the Basel Committee, the Group of Thirty (G30), and bank regulators to address deficient corporate governance structures that led to bank breakdowns.

One of the innovations of this paper is the use of risk-weighted measures to proxy for risk taking in banks, using risk weights used by bank regulators to adjust for operational risk, credit risk, and market risk.

Corporate financial communications concern public and private disclosure (Holland, 2005). This paper aims to explain how banks developed financial communications and how problems emerged in the global financial crisis. It explores policy responses.

Bank cases reveal construction and destruction of the social, knowledge and economic world of financial communications over two periods.

In the 1990s, learning about financial communications by a “dominant coalition” (Cyert, March, 1963) in bank top management was stimulated by gradual change. The management learnt how to accumulate social and cultural capital and developed “habitus” for disclosure (Bourdieu, 1986). From 2000, rapid change and secrecy factors accelerated bank internalisation of shareholder wealth maximising values, turning “habitus” in “market for information” (MFI) (Barker, 1998) into a “psychic prison” (Morgan,1986), creating riskier bank cultures (Schein, 2004) and constraining learning.

The paper introduces sociological concepts to banking research and financial disclosures to increase the understanding about financial information and bank culture and about how regulation can avoid crises. Limitations reflect the small number of banks and range of qualitative data.

Regulators will have to make visible the change processes, new contexts and knowledge and connections to bank risk and performance through improved regulator action and bank public disclosure.

“Masking” and rituals (Andon and Free, 2012) restricted bank disclosure and weakened governance and market pressures on banks. These factors mediated bank failure and survival in 2008, as “psychic prisons” “fell apart”. Bank and MFI agents experienced a “cosmology episode” (Weick, 1988). Financial communications structures failed but were reconstructed by regulators.

The paper shows how citizens require transparency and contested accountability to democratise finance capitalism. Otherwise, problems will recur.

In the current study, corporate investment is examined by using a user cost of capital model for two important Latin American economies: Brazil and Mexico. In this paper, a dynamic user cost of capital model is employed. The extended model also accounts the investment model with the convex adjustment cost. Moreover, the link between structural change, financial liberalization and investment is also investigated. The present study, therefore, sheds new lights on the investment behavior of the Latin American emerging markets.

The differenced generalized method of moments approach is employed to control the endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation for modeling the corporate investment over 20 years for both countries.

The findings indicate that the dynamic user cost of capital-based investment model explains the corporate investment in Brazil and Mexico. Especially, the interest rate and depreciation explain the investment behavior of nonfinancial firms in both countries. At the same time, structural change and financial liberalization do not have a significant impact on interest rates, an important user cost of capital.

This is the first study examines the corporate investment using dynamic user costs of capital approach for an emerging market. The user cost of capital-based investment models is clearly understudied models for emerging markets. This study is particularly important for emerging markets as investment models need to have a theoretical background.

En el presente estudio se examina la inversión empresarial utilizando un modelo de coste de capital del usuario para dos importantes economías latinoamericanas: Brasil y México. En este trabajo se emplea un modelo dinámico de coste de capital para el usuario. El modelo ampliado también tiene en cuenta el modelo de inversión con el coste de ajuste convexo. Además, se investiga la relación entre el cambio estructural, la liberalización financiera y la inversión. El presente estudio, por tanto, arroja nueva luz sobre el comportamiento de la inversión en los mercados emergentes latinoamericanos.

Se emplea el método GMM diferenciado para controlar la endogeneidad, la heteroscedasticidad y la autocorrelación en la modelización de la inversión empresarial a lo largo de 20 años en ambos países.

Los resultados indican que el modelo dinámico de inversión basado en el coste de capital para el usuario explica la inversión empresarial en Brasil y México. Especialmente, el tipo de interés y la depreciación explican el comportamiento de la inversión de las empresas no financieras en ambos países. Al mismo tiempo, se constata que el cambio estructural y la liberalización financiera no tienen un efecto significativo sobre los tipos de interés, que es un importante coste de uso del capital.

Este es el primer estudio que examina la inversión empresarial utilizando un enfoque dinámico basado en los costes de capital para un mercado emergente. Los modelos de inversión basados en los costes de uso del capital son claramente modelos poco estudiados para los mercados emergentes. Este estudio es especialmente importante para los mercados emergentes, ya que los modelos de inversión deben tener un trasfondo teórico.

The governance of capital market institutions did not receive much interest compared to their banking sector counterparts, partly due to their different ownership structures. Recent trends; increased competition, technological advances, structural changes, globalization, all had their share of impact on governance systems of capital markets institutions particularly on exchanges. Corporate governance of non-financial firms and capital markets institutions differ in several ways. Firstly the role of risk management differs since they may impose systemic risks to the financial system. Secondly well-implemented governance structures and processes are required but are not sufficient in capital markets since there are several conflicts of interests to be addressed. Therefore whether and how effectively they function is what matters. Thirdly the governance structures of such institutions exhibit different effectiveness on their decisions.The governance of FIs in capital markets is discussed in terms of board structure and management, risk governance, supervisors, shareholders, executive compensation, role of regulators, authorities and values and culture. The role of stock exchanges in corporate governance are discussed separately in terms of implementing corporate governance codes, demutualisation and its impact on regulations, transparency and accountability issues and the effects of M&As among exchanges. Market needs strong analytical tools and reliable benchmarks to assess governance risk. The corporate control and the regulation of the institutions by the exchanges when the corporations (regulated) are the competitors of the exchanges (regulators) or owned by the stockholders of the exchanges must be addressed. The risk of regulatory arbitrage, calls for the need of harmonisation among regulators. Better regulation of FIs and greater global coordination among regulators are seen as the most two important issues to prevent another crisis.

The purpose of the paper is to examine the relationship between litigation risk and payout policy.

The authors employ various regression techniques including probit, logit and tobit regression methodologies to study the relationship between litigation risk (contemporaneous measures, litigation dummy) and payout policy (dividend payout likelihood and dividend yield). The authors also conduct several robustness tests.

The authors find that firms involved in a lawsuit have a lower propensity to distribute dividends to shareholders. In particular, the authors document a negative relationship between litigation risk and payout policy as measured by dividend payout likelihood and dividend yield. The results are robust to a series of robustness tests including using alternate regression specifications, alternate measures of litigation and payout policy, a propensity-score matched sample and using an instrumental variable.

The paper identifies another determinant of payout policy and documents another avenue whereby legal institutions affect corporate payout policy. The link between litigation risk and payout policy is of interest to the business community, financial economists, management and the investing public.

Using a sample of US firms more likely to be affected by agency problems, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate value and financial policies and to study whether credit market freedom (CMF) affects this relationship.

The authors identify a sub-sample of non-financial US firms potentially affected by agency problems using a joint criterion of over-investment and high cash-holdings. A generalized method of moment econometric framework is then used to estimate the impact of cash-holdings and leverage policies on firm value for this sub-sample. This exercise is also performed by taking into account the level of CMF of the state where the firm operates.

The results show that the relationship between cash-holdings – or leverage – and firm value is “U-shaped.” In addition, when the authors focus on the role played by the level of CMF, the authors find a number of interesting facts: CMF facilitates the firms’ access to external finance, thereby relaxing the need of internal funds for investing; the relationship between cash-holdings and firm value is “U-shaped” only in states enjoying high levels of CMF; the probability of observing firms more likely to be affected by agency problems is higher in states with high levels of CMF.

The empirical findings provide important insights to policymakers, shareholders and practitioners. To policymakers, the results suggest that providing institutional environments with greater CMF can enhance the firm access to external finance, the level of corporate investment and the economic growth. To shareholders, the findings highlight that the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders may be more severe in states with higher CMF; therefore, adequate financing policies and corporate governance mechanisms must be used to mitigate these conflicts and maximize the firm value. Finally, to practitioners, the evidence suggests that, in valuing a firm, they must take into consideration whether the economic environment provides managers with more freedom to stockpile cash and invest sub-optimally.

The paper contributes to the corporate finance and governance literature in two respects. First, it provides new evidence on the shape of the relationship between cash holdings and firm value for firms affected by empire-building managers. Second, at the best of the knowledge, it is the first corporate finance study, which analyzes the role played by the CMF at the state level on the capital structure and the level of investment of the firms.