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During the twentieth century mathematics has expanded at an unprecedented rate. This expansion has been accompanied by the increased application of mathematics to science. At a time when pure mathematics has been placing more and more emphasis on abstraction and the analysis of broad concepts there has been a corresponding proliferation of practical applications. This seems to have resulted from the fact that the sciences, too, have become more concerned with the discernment of general patterns in the study of nature. This search for simplifying ideas has increased the demand for ever more abstract tools of analysis.

Economic ideas are the product of contemplation, but also of our economic lives. In the history of ideas, Gérard Debreu’s shining book of 1959, Theory of Value, represents the pinnacle of purity in contemplating economic life. Rather than contextualizing this oeuvre through his intellectual life, as is usually done, this essay describes his axiomatic analysis by contextualizing it through his economic life. What do we learn about Debreu’s axioms on consumption when thinking of his own consumption? What do we learn about his theory of value when thinking of his own values? Historiographically, this approach permits the use of a widely neglected source in the history of economics: anecdotes. Epistemologically, blending axioms and anecdotes offers a description of how axioms regulate an economic discourse. Finally, this essay offers a language for the material dimensions of economic life that are so underexposed in Debreu’s own work.

This chapter tells the story of how the concept of Pareto efficiency was shipped from Lausanne to the modern US theory of competitive general equilibrium, focusing on the specific role of Maurice Allais. It identifies similarities in both epistemological approach and theoretical achievements realized first by Pareto, then by Allais, and finally by Debreu and Arrow and Hahn. It also shows that these similarities are not casual, since historical circumstances account for the influence of Pareto on Allais and later of Allais on Arrow and Debreu.

We commence answering the above questions first with an extension of the definition of Economy given by Gerard Debreu (1959). Choudhury (1999a) has extended Debreu's formulation by introducing the learning parameter of unity of knowledge. The ethically induced economy in the light of conscious oneness is a complex relational universe of its micro-parts. These comprise prices, quantities, incomes, resources, preferences and production menus, and technological choices. These are studied in relation to multimarkets and their agents represented by vector-variables of each of the above-mentioned categories. All of these categories of the representing variables are mutually interactive according to the interactive, integrative, and evolutionary (IIE)-learning processes (explained earlier) by the medium of knowledge-flows that emanate from the episteme of conscious oneness.¹

Discussion of scientific progress in science philosophy texts suggests that aggressiveness and selfishness on the part of scientists is associated with high productivity. It is argued that the behaviour that appears to be the most improper actually facilitates the manifest goals of science. This article shows that the making of the 1930s generation of a sample of eminent economists was shaped by a high sense of co‐operation; continuing collaborative contact in the form of dual authorships of books and articles, joint teaching assignments, and review and support of each other′s writings, but very little of the intensive, relentless competition one finds among natural scientists. The difference stems not so much from the fact that economics is a soft science, but rather from the degree of maturity of the discipline. The 1930s generation of economists was fortunate to enter the field at a time when it was ready for its take off.