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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether the development of a needs‐based funding formula for resource allocation incorporates the needs of funders or the needs of the service providers.

The paper analyses interview data and documentary evidence gathered from a UK local education authority about the creation of a “needs‐based” formula for sharing resources to schools. It employs and extends a framework developed by Levačić and Ross to evaluate needs‐based formula funding.

Although formula funding is purported to be a more objective method of resource allocation, the paper finds that as with other resource allocation methods the power relations between the funder and the service provider impacts on the extent to which service provider needs are incorporated into the funding formula.

This paper considers only the funding of schools. Further work is needed to investigate formula funding for other public services.

Debates between funders and service providers should be encouraged by policy makers to ensure that allocations based on the funding formula are acceptable to service providers.

The paper provides a useful analysis of a needs‐based funding formula for resource allocation in schools and whether this incorporates the needs of funders or the needs of the service providers.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze recent regulations and proposed regulations issued by the US Department of Labor (DOL) that relate to the reporting of compensation paid to service providers to employee benefit plans.

The paper reviews the statutory provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), applicable DOL regulations as available in the Federal Register and certain public comments and a DOL FAQs document regarding the applicable regulations available on the DOL's web site. The paper also relies on observations of common market practice based on actual experience.

Recent DOL regulations – in particular those related to Form 5500 reporting and the “Necessary Services Exemption” – may significantly affect the reporting obligations of certain private investment fund sponsors with respect to their employee benefit plan investors. It shows that, although the scope of these regulations is understandable in the context of participant‐directed defined contribution plans, they may be less so in the context of defined benefit plans, which invest more frequently in private investment funds. There are some potential exceptions, on which private investment fund sponsors may be able to rely. Achieving compliance with the rules as drafted, however, may be time‐consuming and costly.

Private investment fund sponsors may wish to begin looking at their compensation and service provider arrangements in light of these regulations and consider how best to respond.

The paper contains two experienced ERISA practitioners' analysis of recent regulations on which relatively few stakeholders have seemed to focus to date.

This paper aims to explore how accounting is fostering neoliberal citizenship through the participants of Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). More specifically, this paper aims to understand how accounting discourse and the management accounting technique of budgeting, when intertwined with automated administrative processes of the NDIS, are giving rise to a pastoral form of power that directs people’s behaviour toward certain ends.

Publicly available data has been crafted into an autoethnographic case study of one fictitious person’s experiences with the NDIS – Mina. Mina is an amalgam created from material submitted to the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on the NDIS. Mina’s experiences are then analysed through the lens of Foucault’s concept of pastoral power to explore how accounting has contributed to marketising and digitising public disability services.

Accounting rhetoric appears to be a central part of rationalising the decision to shift to individualised disability funding. Those receiving payments are treated as self-governable, financially responsible subjects and are therefore expected to have knowledge of management accounting techniques and budgeting. However, NDIS’s strong reliance on the accounting concepts of funds, budgets, cost and price is limiting people’s autonomy and subjecting them to intervention and control.

This paper addresses calls to explore the interplay between accounting and current disability policies. The analysis shows that incorporating accounting into the NDIS’s algorithms serves to conceal the underlying ideology of the programs, subtly driving behaviours towards neoliberal objectives. Further, this research extends the Foucauldian accounting literature by revealing the contribution of accounting to reinforcing the authority of digital pastors in contemporary times.

The purpose of this paper is to describe interpretive and compliance issues arising under the Labor Department's interim final regulations under the statutory exemption for the provision of services provided by Section 408(b)(2) of ERISA, which will become effective on January 1, 2012.

The paper analyzes the published interim final regulations and considers significant comments filed in response to the proposed regulations.

Effective January 1, 2012, covered service providers who rely on the statutory exemption for the provision of services provided by Section 408(b)(2) must begin complying with the interim final amendments to the regulations under Section 408(b)(2) (the “Regulation”). Among other changes, the Regulation will require service providers to provide additional disclosures of direct and indirect compensation and to identify whether they expect that they will be providing services as a fiduciary or as a registered investment adviser. The primary purpose of the Regulation is to assist plan sponsors in evaluating service provider relationships, including total compensation that will be received by the service provider and conflicts of interests to which the service provider may be subject. The Regulation will apply to both new and existing service provider arrangements on January 1, 2012. Failure to comply with the Regulation may result in the assessment of excise taxes under Section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code unless other exemptive relief is available. Service provider arrangements may be eligible for exemptive relief under certain other statutory and administrative exemptions.

The paper describes possible compliance issues that may arise under the Regulation and identifies and evaluates interpretive and compliance issues that have been noted since the proposed amendments were published.

Objectives – Purchasing has been promoted as a key policy instrument to improve health system performance. Despite its widespread adoption, there is little empirical evidence on how it works, the challenges surrounding its implementation, its impact, and the preconditions for it to function effectively, particularly in low- and middle-income settings. The objective of this chapter is to analyze critically the extent to which purchasing could be, and has been used strategically in China and to identify modifications that are needed for purchasing to be effective in assuring that the government's new funding for health care will result in efficient and effective health services.

Methods – We present a conceptual framework for purchasing, which identifies three critical principal–agent relationships in purchasing. We draw on evidence from secondary data, results of other research studies, interviews, and the impact evaluation of a social experiment in rural China that explicitly used purchasing to improve quality and efficiency. This information is used to examine purchasing relationships in urban social health insurance (SHI), the rural medical insurance scheme, and purchasing of public health services.

Findings – To date, use of strategic purchasing is limited in China. Both the urban and the rural health insurance schemes act as passive third-party payers, failing to take advantage of the opportunities to strengthen incentives to improve quality and efficiency. This may be because as government agencies, the extent to which the Ministries of Health and Labor and Social Security can act independently from provider interests, or act in the best interest of the population, is unclear. Other important challenges include ensuring adequate representation of the population's views and preferences and making better use of the leverage provided by purchasing to create appropriate provider incentives, through better integration of financing and improved coordination among purchasers.

Implications for policy – In designing purchasing arrangements, attention needs to be paid to all three principal–agent relationships. Successful purchasing appears to require mechanisms to mobilize and represent community preferences and more strategic contracting with providers. More research is needed to strengthen the evidence on which purchasing arrangements work, which do not work, and under what conditions different purchasing configurations can work most effectively.

To explain the benefits and the regulations pertaining to Jersey as a domicile for investment funds.

Provides an overview of Jersey as an international financial center followed by a detailed description of Jersey regulations applying to private funds, expert funds, listed funds, regulated investor funds, retail and other collective investment funds (CIFs), and notification-only funds. Explains fund vehicles including unit trusts, limited partnerships, and companies. Discusses taxes and fund service providers.

Jersey is one of the world’s major international finance centers, offering location and time-zone benefits; stability and reliability; tax neutrality; a stable political, fiscal and regulatory infrastructure; and highly-skilled financial-service providers.

Expert guidance from experienced investment-funds lawyers

The purpose of this paper is to test two hypotheses: first, that the regulatory framework applicable to funds in Malta and the Malta Financial Services Authority's (MFSA's) approach to financial supervision, have been instrumental to the process which made Malta an attractive jurisdiction for the registration of funds; and second, that the proper implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) and the sustained commitment of the MFSA to engage qualified resources for proper supervision of the financial sector are fundamental, if Malta is to remain an attractive funds jurisdiction.

The research was carried out through a literature review of available documentation and empirical research via a survey carried out by way of a questionnaire that was sent to a selected sample of fund professionals operating in Malta.

The findings of the empirical research suggest that the regulatory and supervisory regime in Malta has indeed played a pivotal role in establishing Malta as a funds jurisdiction. The research has also confirmed the challenges which Malta is facing in this field.

The paper examines the regulation and the supervision of funds in Malta and sheds light on the challenges that need to be overcome if Malta is to retain its position as a jurisdiction for the registration of funds. The authors also make recommendations on how the challenges may be addressed.

This chapter presents a review of community transport in Australia with the aim of providing material for comparative research in flexible transport.

Research on Australian community transport has been brought together to present an analysis of the key features of the industry: history; geography; funding; regulation and the use of volunteers.

Each key feature has led to the current strong state/territory basis for service organisation and delivery, despite the federal responsibility for supplying most of the funding and ensuring equity and standards. Varying approaches to regulation and supply have also been driven by remoteness and the prevalence of large pockets of entrenched social disadvantage in some regions.

The chapter summarises research findings including hitherto unpublished research on an application of flexible transport services outside mainstream public transport operations in Australia.

To explain the January 6, 2016 written guidance (the “New Guidance”) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Investment Management on payments made by mutual funds to intermediaries for distribution and non-distribution-related services.

Explains the SEC’s earlier guidance in the 1998 “Supermarket Letter,” the provisions of Rule 12b-1, the practice termed “distribution in guise,” the emphasis in the “New Guidance” on the role of a fund board’s business judgment, how Rule 12b-1 compliance fits into Rule 38a-1 compliance programs, specific fund activities and arrangements with intermediaries that are of concern to the SEC staff, and the focus of the New Guidance on an adviser’s fiduciary duty to mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interest.

The New Guidance articulates clear expectations that fund boards will have a process to evaluate the nature of intermediary payments and that fund advisers will provide boards with information in the advisers’ possession that the boards need to carry out that evaluation. Another intent of the New Guidance is apparently to give the SEC a clearer basis to bring enforcement actions concerning the use of fund assets to pay intermediaries for distribution-related activities.

Practical guidance from experienced investment management lawyers.

This paper sets out to assess the role of the chief compliance officer (“CCO”), how the CCO performs his/her duties, and how the CCO interacts with the fund's board three years after the adoption of Rule 38a‐1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Reviews the CCO's responsibilities under Rule 38a‐1, discusses how the CCO role has evolved since the rule was promulgated, and focuses on key issues such as oversight versus supervision, the annual review process, risk assessement, testing methodologies, and the annual report to the fund board on the adequacy and operation of the fund's compliance program.

Properly conducted compliance requires the support of a wide range of the advisory/administrative team with the CCO playing the role of conductor of the orchestra. More and more CCOs seek to distance themselves from approving the day‐to‐day actions of other employees, so they cannot be considered to have assumed supervisory responsibility for those employees. Although a fund is required to perform an annual review of the adequacy of its compliance programs and its Primary Service Providers' compliance programs, most CCOs have found the review process is ongoing and occurs continuously throughout the year. Now that these compliance programs have been in place for two years, more CCOs are devoting time and resources to identify high‐risk areas and to implement transactional, periodic, and forensic testing programs. The CCO annual report has taken many different shapes and sizes, but generally summarizes material changes to the fund's compliance policies and procedures that have already been reported to the board.

A current, practical assessment of the CCO role by expert lawyers who advise funds on their compliance programs.