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In this article, I trace the slow evolution of the contemporary idea of “academic freedom” through two court cases of the early twentieth century. Unfortunately for academics, this history does not end with a ringing endorsement of the right of academics to speak freely without being afraid of losing their teaching jobs. Rather, the courts have tended to agree that while faculty do have freedom of speech under the first amendment, they do not necessarily have the right to keep their jobs no matter what they say. This chapter illustrates the court’s early validation of punishing the “free speech” of employees if it promotes a “bad tendency” in Patterson v. Colorado in 1907 and concludes with Oliver Wendell Holmes’ ruling in 1919 that introduces the concept of the “marketplace of ideas” to evaluate speech even though the defendants were convicted of espionage as they exercised their “freedom of speech.” For the educator, freedom of speech is essential in having the academic freedom to pursue their discipline.

The UK government’s attempt to “prevent” terrorism and extremism in the university sector is rightly seen as an intolerant threat to academic freedom. However, this development has not come from a “right wing” authoritarian impulse, but rather, replicates many of the discussions already taking place in universities about the need to protect “vulnerable” students from offensive and dangerous ideas. Historically, the threat to academic freedom came from outside the university, from pressures exerted from governments, from religious institutions who oversaw a particular institution or from the demands of business. Alternatively it has been seen as something that is a particular problem in non-Western countries that do not have democracy. While some of these problems and pressures remain, there is a more dangerous threat to academic freedom that comes from within universities, a triumvirate of a relativistic academic culture, a new body of identity-based student activists and a therapeutically oriented university management, all three of which have helped to construct universities as safe spaces for the newly conceptualized “vulnerable student.” With reference to the idea of vulnerability, this chapter attempts to chart and explain these modern developments.

During the months leading up to and immediately following President Donald Trump’s election, the unique intersection of classroom academic freedom and teacher and students’ first amendment rights would be duly tested, as headlines reminded citizens, parents, and pundits that the reach of raw emotions and political viewpoints did not stop at the schoolhouse door. School and classroom-based events would eventually test the norms of community, the interpretation of legal precedents, the resolve of district and school leadership, and the rights or limits thereof of the teachers themselves. This analysis is grounded on case studies of eight such incidents, all of which occurred at the high school level in public school districts. These eight cases are analyzed in terms of the incidents, the teacher’s actions or speech, the consequences, the relevant legal precedents surrounding academic freedom, the parental, student, and community reaction, and the short- and long-term impacts moving forward.

The first amendment, a crucial component of American constitutional law, is under attack from various groups advocating for censorship in universities and public schools. The censors assert that restrictive speech codes preventing anyone from engaging in any expression deemed hateful, offensive, defamatory, insulting, or critical of sacred religious or political beliefs and values are necessary in a multicultural society. These speech codes restrict critical comments about race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, physical characteristics, and other traits in the name of tolerance, sensitivity, and respect. Many hate speech codes are a violation of the first amendment and have been struck down by federal and state courts. They persist in jurisdictions where they have been ruled unconstitutional; most universities and public schools have speech codes. This assault on the first amendment might be a concern to all citizens, especially university professors and social studies educators responsible for teaching students about the democratic ideals enshrined in our constitution. Teachers should resist unconstitutional speech codes and teach their students that the purpose of the first amendment is to protect radical, offensive, critical, and controversial speech.

Purpose – This chapter has three general purposes: to trace Canada’s hate speech laws from their policy inception to their current state; to identify the importance that media and mass communication have played in the creation and development of Canada’s hate speech laws; and to demonstrate the critical relationship that media has had to significant legal cases on hate speech. Methodology/Approach – This chapter historically maps the policy development of and legal challenges to Canada’s hate speech laws. It takes directed notice of the relationship of media and mass communication to the development and implementation of those laws. It engages with libertarian and egalitarian arguments on free speech throughout the chapter testing these ideas through an examination of the legal cases cited. Findings – Canadian legislators and courts have long grappled with the balancing of rights with respect to the issue of “hate speech.” Advances in mass communication technology have added intricate challenges to that legal balancing. Awareness of media’s allure to hatemongers and racial extremists and of media’s protean characteristics make regulation of its hateful content a continuous legal challenge. Canada’s greatest challenge yet to the regulation of hate speech will be its adaptive response to the growing phenomenon of online hate. Originality/Value – This chapter highlights the little recognized prescient statements made by the Cohen Committee about the allure of media and the dangers of its technological advancements in Canadian free speech debates. Providing a comprehensive survey of Canada’s “hate speech” laws, it recognizes the importance that advancements in mass communication have played in the creation and development of Canada’s “hate speech” laws.

The article examines the issue of free speech in a law and economics perspective. The property rights approach is contrasted with the common law and constitutional standpoints. Consequentialist and market efficiency may not provide adequate criteria for judging limitations to freedom of speech. Constitutional instruments may then be required.

This chapter compares the status of intellectual freedom in libraries “then” (1970s) and “now” (2005). As starting points for comparisons, it uses two Advances in Librarianship chapters, by Edwin Castagna (Castagna, 1971) and David K. Berninghausen (Berninghausen, 1979), respectively. The US Supreme Court, although somewhat ducking the direct question of library censorship in a school library case in 1982, has consistently upheld intellectual freedom, even in the face of an onslaught of federal laws passed by Congress to restrict speech. The high-water mark came in 1997 when the American Library Association joined the American Civil Liberties Union and others to challenge the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which would have prohibited “indecent” speech on the Internet, an undefined term that could have swept away vast quantities of speech. In 2003, however, the Supreme Court ruled against libraries when it held that a narrower law, the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) is constitutional. This law requires libraries and schools that receive specified federal funds and discounts to use “technology protection measures” to block obscenity, child pornography, and material “harmful to minors.” This chapter looks at these and related cases, as well as the library profession's evolving ethical and political stance on intellectual freedom issues.

This chapter is about online hate speech propagated via platforms operated by social media companies (SMCs). It examines the options open to states in forcing SMCs to take responsibility for the hateful content that appears on their sites. It examines the technological and legal context for imposing legal obligations on SMCs, and analyses initiatives in Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union and elsewhere. It argues that while SMCs can play a role in controlling online hate speech, there are limitations to what they can achieve.

With a focus on Canada, but framed by similar and shared concerns emerging in the United States, this chapter examines the current status of what constitutes and defines academic freedom for academic librarians and the rights and the protections individual, professional academic librarians have with respect to the freedom of speech and expression of their views in speech and writing within and outside of their institutions. It reviews the historical background of academic freedom and librarianship in Canada, academic freedom language in collective agreements, rights legislation in Canada versus the United States as it pertains to academic librarianship, and rights statements supported by Canadian associations in the library field and associations representing members in postsecondary institutions. The implications of academic librarians using the new communication technologies and social media platforms, such as blogs and networking sites, with respect to academic freedom are examined, as well as, an overview of recent attacks on the academic freedom of academic librarians in the United States and Canada. Included in this analysis are the results of a survey of Canadian academic librarians, which examined attitudes about academic freedom, the external and internal factors which have an impact on academic freedom, and the professional use of new communication technologies and social media platforms.