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Prior literature demonstrates that the effectiveness of bank monitoring decreases when multiple banks are involved, due to a free rider problem, leading to lower firm value. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether this free rider problem exists in an emerging market context, and whether the relationship between multiple banking relationships and firm value is conditioned on bankers’ incentives to monitor.

The authors use multivariate panel regression to examine the hypotheses. The conditioning effect of the incentive to govern (the amount of average bank lending) is modeled using an interaction variable. Based on the result of the Hausman test, the authors employ two-way fixed effects estimator to estimate the coefficients.

First, the negative relationship between multiple banking relationships and firm value holds true among Indian firms. Second, the authors show that this negative relationship is lessened for firms with high average bank debt or higher free cash flows. The analyses suggest that these moderating effects are related to a reduction in the free rider problem rather than a decrease in financial constraints. However, these results are only significant among larger firms.

Prior literature has not considered the conditioning impact of the “incentives to govern” when examining the free rider problem, inherent in situations where multiple actors are involved. The authors show in this study that the free rider problem disappears when the incentives to govern are considered in the overall research framework.

This paper aims to show that zakat solves the collective action problem by changing the framework of giving. An additional purpose of this paper is an attempt to fill a critical gap in the Islamic economics literature. This gap concerns the nature and role of zakat in effectively delivering aid to those in need while mitigating the potential for free riding. There is also a general gap in the current literature on Islamic economics that the issues of zakat and charity have not received the same attention as the focus remained mostly on money, banking and the issues of interest and usury. The paper is also an attempt to provide a refocus.

This paper attempts to build an argument to show how zakat can function as a unique solution to the free-rider problem in voluntary charity. The author’s argument is based on a precise theoretical framework, namely the “free-rider problem,” and how zakat can function as a unique solution to this problem. The author also uses game theory to show how reputation can lead to cooperation in a repeated game. The author uses an example from Pakistan to show how reputation can be a disciplinarian of zakat collection organizations.

Zakat solves both the free-rider problem in ordinary charity and the coordination problem between members in a large group. The free-rider problem is solved by changing the very framework of giving and the coordination problem between Muslims around the globe disappears because the rates and details of levying zakat are centrally created based on divine revelation.

This paper presents an important topic as it addresses one of the most popular giving practices in Muslim societies, called zakat. It also provides a framework in examining the meaning and function of zakat in Muslim societies.

Free-riding behaviour may threaten the success of teamwork, when one or more group members receive the benefits of other members’ achievements with little effort or cost of their own. The purpose of this paper is to investigate students’ collaborative behaviour to address the problem of free riders (FRs) in university settings.

The research is an 11-week field study of three senior finance classes and incorporates mobile learning employing Quip and Google Docs applications to facilitate group work. A comprehensive set of quantitative and qualitative methods analysing students’ perceptions, instructors’ reflections, peer reflections and mobile learning methods are used to answer questions pertaining to group work, the work experience, FRs and ways to minimise the last.

In this paper, the author shows that students at the university level have positive views of group work despite the presence of FRs. Students like to form their own groups; consequently, peer evaluation appears to be unreliable. The study points to free riding as a serious threat to academic productivity and calls for actions and strategies from institutions and instructors to eradicate this behaviour. Mobile applications enable instructors to track FRs and to some extent discourage their behaviour.

There are limited studies that focus on FRs in higher education and, to the researcher’s knowledge, no such investigation has been applied in the Middle East and North Africa. Likewise, there is little research available on incorporating mobile learning to assess group work in higher education. This study aims at exploring the existence and associated experiences of free riding, along with methods to curtail the problem. The findings of this study provide a good platform for inquiry into the FR phenomenon in higher education and its impact on student learning, as well as the possible roles of instructors and mobile applications. The findings of this study could be developed further through more research with a view to providing a broader perspective of the situation in Middle Eastern and North African cultures.

The literature on intrapreneurship recognizes the notion that regular employees can be expected to be entrepreneurial. Using self-determination theory as a basis, the purpose of this conceptual paper is to focus on the role of compensation systems in incentivizing entrepreneurial action by regular employees who constitute the bulk of the organizational workforce.

This conceptual paper suggests that greater clarity on the role of compensation systems in entrepreneurial action by regular employees would require an understanding of how entrepreneurial action happens through relationships among employees. An exploration of both compensation systems and the relationships among employees undertaking entrepreneurial action as part of team/group settings can deepen our understanding of intrapreneurship. Self-determination theory and relationship-focused theory allow for such an exploration.

The literature on self-determination theory, has identified the needs of autonomy and relatedness among employees. This conceptual paper will propose that the interaction between compensation systems and the needs for autonomy versus relatedness among employees determines the type of relationships chosen for entrepreneurial action. After the chosen type of relationships are formed and entrepreneurial action begins, challenges in the implementation of compensation systems are likely to emerge – distributive justice issues under individual based compensation and free-riding issues under team-based compensation. The entrepreneurial performance of the team/group will likely be influenced by the interaction between the challenges in the implementation of compensation systems and the type of relationships chosen for entrepreneurial action.

This conceptual paper gives a new direction to how collective entrepreneurial processes and outcomes can be understood. Self-determination theory and relationship-focused theory, in unison, can be useful in analyzing the role of intrinsic motivators, extrinsic motivators, and relationships during entrepreneurial action.

Group incentive schemes have been shown to be positively associated with firm performance but it remains an open question whether this association can be explained by the motivating characteristics of the group-incentive scheme itself, or if this is due to factors that tend to accompany group-incentive schemes. We use a controlled experiment to directly test if group-incentive schemes can motivate sustained individual effort in the absence of rules, norms, and institutions that are known to mitigate free-riding behavior.

We use a controlled lab experiment that randomly assigns subjects to one of three compensation contracts used to incentivize an onerous effort task. Two of the compensation contracts are group-incentive schemes where subjects have an incentive to free-ride on the efforts of their coworkers, and the third (control) is a flat-wage contract.

We find that both group-incentive schemes resulted in sustained, higher performance relative to the flat-wage compensation contract. Further, we do not find evidence of free-riding behavior under the two group-incentive schemes.

Although we do find sustained cooperation/performance over the three work periods of our experiment under the group-incentive schemes, further testing would be required to evaluate whether group-incentive schemes can sustain cooperation over a longer time horizon without complementary norms, policies, or institutions that mitigate free-riding.

By unambiguously showing that group-incentive schemes can, by themselves, motivate workers to provide sustained levels of effort, this suggests that the “1/n problem” may be, in part, an artifact of the rational-actor modeling conventions.

Purpose – Institutional investors are facing increased pressure and threats of legislation from the European Union to abandon passive ownership strategies. This chapter investigates the legal prerequisites for active ownership among institutional investors in two Scandinavian countries to highlight differences in the legal framework that potentially account for apparent dissimilarities in the practice of shareholder activism.

Design/methodology/approach – Data on shareholder proposals from Danish and Swedish annual general meetings from 2006 throughout 2010 suggest that institutional investors are approximately a thousand times more active in Sweden than in Denmark.

Findings – The comparative study of the legal framework for shareholder activism shows diminutive legal distance in general, however, we find that the shareholder-based nomination committee employed in Sweden constitutes an exception. This is relevant, as such a setup transfers power from the board of directors to the owners. Presumably, this reduces the impact of free-rider and collective action problems, and increases the shareholders’ inclination to make proposals, which is also what we find. Moreover, we find other differences in the legal framework that support the transfer of power to the owners.

Research implications – We contribute to literature by investigating the importance of local governance mechanisms created by the legal framework – an area where research is scarce. The chapter discusses how two classical theoretical dilemmas – free-rider problems and collective action problems among shareholders – can be reduced by the implementation of local corporate governance elements.

Originality/value – The chapter outlines the actual practice of shareholder activism, in terms of proposals, in Denmark and Sweden, and highlights divergent legal elements which theoretically transfer power to the shareholders. Thus, regulators should be aware of the impact by local governance mechanisms, and how shareholders react under different legal prerequisites.

Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In this chapter, we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.

From a theoretical agency perspective, the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders (‘AGM’) is an important corporate law solution for mitigating agency problems between shareholders and managers in large public corporations. At the AGM, shareholders are informed, they are offered a venue to discuss and ask questions, and they are involved in decision-making. Despite these theoretical important functions, the AGM is largely criticized in practice. Criticism contains, for example, rational apathy and free-rider behaviour that lead to low shareholder turnout, a lack of (meaningful) dialogue and side-stepping behaviour. Yet, fundamental empirical research on the AGM in practice is lacking, which makes this book highly relevant. This chapter provides the outline of the research that is conducted in this book.

Despite the growing research exploring the possibility and feasibility of financing socially oriented projects through crowdfunding, relatively little research examines which crowdfunding model is better to serve such purpose. The purpose of this paper is to offer novel insights to mitigate this research gap.

A unique data set collected from the largest Chinese crowdfunding platform is used to test the hypotheses. To solve the perceived self-selection problem, the propensity score matching method is adopted in this paper. Based on this approach, the results of similar prosocial campaigns in two different models (pure donation and hybrid donation) are compared.

The empirical results show that the hybrid donation model is negatively associated with the status of success and the extent of success of prosocial campaigns. Specifically, compared to the pure donation model, hybrid donation model leads to a lower probability of success, fewer contributors, a lower funding amount and a lower completion ratio.

The paper contributes to a relatively understudied theme in crowdfunding, namely, donations. It does so by introducing the concepts of pure vs hybrid donation models and investigates the model selection problem in financing social projects through crowdfunding based on cognitive evaluation theory.