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This paper presents evidence that the valuation consequences of targeted share repurchase announcements are positively related to the size of the firms' pre‐repur‐chase free cash flows and to the firms' pre‐repurchase build‐up of liquid assets. The paper further reports that the level of liquid assets declines permanently following the share repurchases. The results suggest that a share repurchase is a viable means to cut down surplus cash and that such decision can increase shareholder wealth by reducing agency costs of free cash flows.

I seek to identify whether cash flow management can affect the performance and risk of the Greek listed companies.

This study examines the relationship of cash flow management with performance and risk, using a sample of 80 non-financial companies listed in the Athens Exchange. The study covers the period 2018–2022, and panel data analysis is applied. Both financial performance and stock return are taken into consideration, while risk concerns the volatility of the companies’ share prices. The various explanatory variables used include the net cash flow, free cash flow, cash conversion cycle days, cash flow from operating activities, cash flow from investing activities, cash flow from financing activities, inventory days, customer days and supplier days.

The empirical results provide evidence of a positive relationship between financial performance and net cash flow and free cash flow. In addition, operating cash flow is positively related to financial performance. The opposite is the case for investing and financing cash flow. Finally, some evidence of a negative relationship between financial performance and inventory and customer days is provided too. On the other hand, stock return and risk are not related to the cash flow management variables at all.

To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the few studies to examine the relationship of cash flow management with performance and risk, using data from the Greek stock market. The results can form an effective selection tool for investors seeking Greek companies with the highest financial performance potential, which may reward them with higher dividends.

The internal factors that influence the decision to change dividend growth rates include two competing models: the earnings and free cash flow models. As far as each of the components of each model is considered, the informative and efficient dividend payout decisions require that managers have to focus on the significant component(s) only. This study examines the cointegration, significance, and explanatory power of those components empirically. The expected outcomes serve two objectives. First, on an academic level, it is interesting to examine the extent to which payout practices meet the premises of the earnings and free cash flow models. The latter considers dividends and financing decisions as two faces of the same coin. Second, on a professional level, the outcomes help focus the management’s efforts on the activities that can be performed when considering a change in dividend growth rates.

This study uses data for the firms listed in two indexes: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA30) and NASDAQ100. The data cover quarterly periods from 30 June 1989 to 31 March 2011. The methodology includes (a) cointegration analysis in order to test for model specification and (b) classical regression in order to examine the explanatory power of the components of earnings and free cash flow models.

The results conclude that: (a) Dividends growth rates are cointegrated with the two models significantly; (b) Dividend growth rates are significantly and positively associated with growth in sales and cost of goods sold only. Accordingly, these are the two activities that firms’ management need to focus on when considering a decision to change dividend growth rates, (c) The components of the earnings and free cash flow models explain very little of the variations in dividends growth rates. The results are to be considered a call for further research on the external (market-level) determinants that explain the variations in dividends growth rates. Forthcoming research must separate the effects of firm-level and market-level in order to reach clear judgments on the determinants of dividends growth rates.

This study contributes to the related literature in terms of offering updated robust empirical evidence that the decision to change dividend growth rate is discretionary to a large extent. That is, dividend decisions do not match the propositions of the earnings and free cash flow models entirely. In addition, the results offer solid evidence that financing trends in the period 1989–2011 showed heavy dependence on debt financing compared to other related studies that showed heavy dependence on equity financing during the previous period 1974–1984.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the nationality of ownership affects investment through its interaction with return expectations and cash flow and to answer the question whether this is due to asymmetric information or managerial discretion problems.

Asymmetric information and managerial discretion hypothesis are being tested in a fully extended model, which provides for a variety of effects from the explanatory variables. The paper also uses firm and industry variables to account for the investment opportunities or marginal q instead of using the average Q. Using industrial variables instead of stock market data enables the possibility to extend the sample to cover a more representative sample of firms and especially a group of firms where financial constraints are expected to be more profound. Another aspect of the paper is that the ownership variable varies with the nationality of the shareholders of the firm and not with the shareholdings of the managers. This means that the paper restricts its search in two sub‐samples, those of domestic firms and of foreign (multinational) ones.

In total, 2,700 domestic and foreign (multinational) manufacturing firms located in Greece in the 1992‐1997 period were examined, providing consistent evidence supporting the asymmetric information hypothesis against the managerial discretion hypothesis. These results also support the significance of ownership effects, at least with respect to the national origin of the firm's shareholders.

This paper provides evidence that the nationality of ownership affects the investment behavior and is related with the specific information problems of the firms.

This paper explores dividend announcements based on information hypothesis. We explore in particular whether or not information signaling theory existed in Taiwan. We also explore the free cash flow hypothesis. In order to eliminate affecting factors, we target companies with irregular dividends as research samples, just like those with specially designated dividends (SDD). We examine whether or not those proceeds may be deemed as future earnings prospection. In this paper we study mainly dividend announcements made during stockholder’s meetings of the companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) or R.O.C. Over-the-Counter Securities Exchange (ROSE). We apply event study as means of analyzing abnormal returns of the companies. In addition we use the GARCH model with traditional ordinary least square to estimate the market model. The results indicate that SDDs are considered positive signals by the national exchange, TSE. In addition, we also show that the first-time SDD does transmit a positive signal to the market regarding the firm’s future cash flow, and that the SDD of no payment in the previous three years is negative. Furthermore, we prove that low Q firms have greater market reaction than high Q firms in announcement period. The free cash flow hypothesis and firm size effects could not be verified in Taiwan.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it investigates whether high free-cash-flow companies with low-growth opportunities (surplus free cash flow (SFCF)) are associated with income-increasing earnings management. Second, it scrutinizes the effect of audit quality on the income-increasing earnings management and SFCF and earnings management relationship.

This study focusses on companies listed on the Bursa Efek Indonesia, Bursa Malaysia, and Stock Exchange of Singapore over the period 2005-2010. The cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model is used to measure discretionary accruals (DACs) (the proxy for earnings management). SFCF is an indicator variable with firm j scored 1 if their retained cash flows is above the sample median and their price to book ratio is below the sample median in fiscal year t; otherwise is scored 0. Audit quality refers to the quality of the auditor. Indicator variable with firm j scored one (1) if their auditor in fiscal year t is a Big 4 audit firm; otherwise scored zero (0).

The empirical result provides supports for the hypothesis suggesting that company managers with high free cash flow and low-growth opportunities tend to use their discretion to select income increasing accounting choices. Investigation based on each of the three-country sub samples indicates that the relationship between SFCF and managers’ income-increasing accounting choice is applicable in Malaysia, partially applicable in Singapore but it is not valid in Indonesia. In addition, the statistical analyses based on all sample and country sub-samples indicate that audit quality has negative relationships with earnings management measure. The result of univariate analysis suggests that mean of DACs in companies audited by Big 4 auditors are significantly smaller compared to that of in non-Big 4 audited firms. However, the results of multivariate analysis suggest that audit quality has only partially significant association with earnings management. Moreover, this study finds that Big 4 auditors insignificantly moderate the SFCF-earnings management relationships.

This research may have implications for ASEAN economic reformers and regulators who are working on improving corporate governance and transparency in their countries and for investors who need insights about associated type of agency problems that may arise in across countries and Asian context studied.

Based on an approach used by Chung et al. (2005), this study provides empirical evidence from Asian context studied incorporating three neighboring countries forming Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore-Growth Triangle. This study suggests that the association between SFCF and income-increasing earnings management applies not only in the USA and UK corporations in which most previous studies focussed on but also in the Asian corporations. Factors explaining the association between SFCF and income-increasing earnings management may incorporate aspects related to country of origin.

The authors show that there is a negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firm overinvestment using Korean data from 2007 to 2016. Since Jensen (1986) shows that a firm's free cash flow is an important factor of overinvestment, the authors examine how free cash flow influences the sensitivity of overinvestment to EPU. The authors find that a high level of free cash flow attenuates the negative effect of EPU on overinvestment. The authors find that there is no significant difference in the effect of EPU on overinvestment between Chaebol (Korean family-run conglomerates) and non-Chaebol firms, which is consistent with the literature that the features of Chaebol are weakening.

This paper aims to examine the mediating effect of dividend payout on the relationship between internal governance mechanisms (board of directors and ownership structure) and the free cash flow level.

Linear regression models are used to investigate such relationships applying data from a sample of 207 non-financial firms listed on the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ stock markets between 2009 and 2016. To test the significance of mediating effect, the author uses the Sobel test.

The author finds a partial mediation effect of dividend on the relationship between both board independence and managerial ownership and the level of free cash flow. The results confirm the major role of outside directors in corporate governance. This governance mechanism contributes to the protection of shareholders’ interests through a generous dividend policy. However, the author finds that large managerial shareholdings increase the level of free cash flow through lower dividend payouts. This result suggests that powerful managers follow their preference of retaining excess cash to their own interests.

This paper offers insights to policy-makers of emerging economies interested in the development of the corporate governance. This study provides guidance for firms in the construction and implementation of their own corporate governance policies.

The main contribution of the present paper is to examine the dividend payout as a potential mediating variable between internal governance mechanisms and free cash flow. Moreover, it highlights the issue of efficient management of substantial funds in Sharia-compliant and non-Sharia-compliant firms.

Scholars have examined the importance of a firm's dividend policy through two competing paradigms: the signalling hypothesis and the free cash‐flow hypothesis. It has been argued that our understanding of dividend policy is hindered by the lack of a model that integrates the two hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to address this by developing a theoretical dividend model that combines the signalling and free cash‐flow motives. The objective of the analysis is to shed light on the complex relationship between dividend policy, managerial incentives and firm value.

In order to consider the complex nature of dividend policy, a dividend signalling game is developed, in which managers possess more information than investors about the quality of the firm (asymmetric information), and may invest in value‐reducing projects (moral hazard). Hence, the model combines signalling and free cash‐flow motives for dividends. Furthermore, managerial communication and reputation effects are incorporated into the model.

Of particular interest is the case where a firm may need to cut dividends in order to invest in a new value‐creating project, but where the firm will be punished by the market, since investors are behaviourally conditioned to believe that dividend cuts are bad news. This may result in firms refusing to cut dividends, hence passing up good projects. This paper demonstrates that managerial communication to investors about the reasons for the dividend cut, supported by managerial reputation effects, may mitigate this problem. Real world examples are provided to illustrate the complexity of dividend policy.

This work has been inspired by, and develops that of Fuller and Thakor, and Fuller and Blau, which considers the signalling and free cash‐flow motives for dividends. Whereas those authors consider the case where firms only have new negative net present value (NPV) projects available (so that dividend increases provide unambiguously positive signals to the market in both the signalling and free cash‐flow cases), in this paper's model, the signals may be ambiguous, since firms may need to cut dividends to take positive NPV projects. Hence, the model assists in understanding the complexity of dividend policy.

This paper investigates the Jensen's free cash flow (FCF) hypothesis in the context of UK cash acquisitions. Under this hypothesis, financial slack induces mangers to acquire targets for cash if such behaviour generates either pecuniary or non‐pecuniary rewards for them, giving rise to a potential agency problem around cash takeovers. We argue that the stronger position of shareholders, as opposed to firm managers, in the UK should help in constraining such potential agency problems around such mergers. Compared to the USA, position, this should make the FCF hypothesis less relevant in the UK.

This paper uses short‐run announcement period returns and long‐run calendar‐time returns in testing our hypotheses.

This paper shows that low leverage and high FCF may be advantageous provided shareholder monitoring is adequate. By analysing both announcement period and long‐term returns, we show that acquirers with high levels of FCF are superior performers, and that any long‐run under‐performance of cash acquirers appears to be associated with low cash resources and low institutional ownership.

Inevitably, long‐run returns measurement is contentious, although we present results from alternative models to mitigate this. Limitations are necessarily imposed by the sample size, meaning that multi‐way partitioning of the data is not feasible.

The practical implications are that the UK regulatory and institutional ownership regime may actually protect the interests of shareholders and mitigate agency problems.

As far as we are aware, this is the first paper to systematically test FCF, leverage and institutional ownership effects in the context of UK cash acquisitions.